By itself, the provocation of the Kyiv regime, which ended in the death of two Polish civilians, is not so interesting.

It is not as sophisticated as Bucha, which has had a serious impact on the mood in Western public opinion.

And not as bloody as the strike on the railway station in Kramatorsk, in which, playing on the emotions of the Western public, at first they also tried to blame Russia.

It was just an attempt on the knees by Zelensky, who is in obvious political and not only euphoria, to strengthen the propagandistic triumph of the G20, where the Western “shareholders” of the Ukraine-anti-Russia project, by twisting the hands of the organizers, were able to construct a mise-en-scene favorable for Kyiv.

Euphoria in politics is always fatal, but it is doubly destructive for non-independent politicians who believe in their ability to manage sponsors.

So far, of course, we are not talking about the fact that the United States has finally become disillusioned with Zelensky and is going to replace him soon.

But for the first time, Kyiv failed to play the card of emotional Russophobia of Western politicians and public opinion.

And new nuances appeared in the situation, making it worthy of analysis.

Firstly

, the White House has harshly and unequivocally demonstrated that Zelensky does not have carte blanche for provocations that are fraught with drawing the United States into a major conflict.

Kyiv publicly, which is important, was told: PR as much as you want, we will provide opportunities.

But all actions aimed at changing the military-political situation are taken only in agreement with Washington and under its direct supervision.

The reaction of the Biden administration confirms that the United States is beginning to prepare for the start in January 2023 of a full-scale audit of all US obligations to Ukraine.

And there they would not want to aggravate the already unpleasant situation with new details, especially those so badly slapped.

Secondly

, it turned out that Poland, of course, has some freedom of hands, but only within the limits designated by Washington.

And if Warsaw tries to marry them, then a shout from across the ocean follows almost instantly.

A. Duda tried to implement his own "game plan", stating the need for consultations under the Fourth Article of the NATO Charter, which provides for consultations if the country feels a military threat to itself.

We emphasize that it was proposed to use not the Fifth Article, which describes the mechanism for making decisions on a collective military response to the threat.

It was about purely procedural actions.

But even this was blocked by the Americans, and it is understandable why: Washington fears that the current main US ally in Europe will try to gradually draw them into the conflict.

The fears are not in vain: Warsaw, as evidenced by the footage of the meeting of the remains of allegedly Polish “mercenaries”, which is more like a meeting of dead active servicemen, is afraid of being left alone in Ukraine and seeks to tie “great countries” to itself in the classic Polish manner.

Thirdly

, old Europe, unlike Poland, has no free hand.

No.

European leaders, with the exception of the Baltic limitrophes, who, as usual, ran ahead of the locomotive, waited, watching how the “gentleman from Washington” would turn the situation around.

As for the immanent guilt of Russia, it is hardly worth paying attention to: this is just a kind of self-justification for European politicians, why they cannot find the political will to act in accordance with the national interests of their countries.

So, as they say, "and it's all about them."

Fourth

, NATO, which believed that both the conflict in Ukraine and the hybrid war against Russia were taking place at a safe distance, suddenly felt a serious vulnerability.

It is clear that the Lublin Voivodeship is far from the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, but Ukrainian drones flew to Zagreb ... So many in Europe, and not only in Central, realized that the conflict in Ukraine is gradually getting closer and closer, and NATO's military capabilities, not to mention individual states, to stop even occasional military risks, especially a full-scale military confrontation, are less than thought.

And this emergence of a long-term sense of threat should rather be attributed to the positive results of the Kyiv provocation.

To the factors that can increase the restraint of behavior of at least some European countries.

Finally, in the United States, and even among supporters of the Biden administration, a question arose that was previously ignored due to anti-Russian hysteria: is the Kyiv regime becoming too dangerous, is the political support of Washington, Brussels and Berlin interpreted too broadly in Kyiv?

And how can the Kyiv regime be contained while maintaining a “safe mode” (a kind of safe mode) of confrontation with Russia for the United States?

This question was almost never asked directly in connection with the “rocket provocation”, but it began to appear more and more clearly in the comments of experts and politicians.

And this, it seems, is the most important, although still largely hidden consequence of the provocation in Przevoduv, the significance of which in Kyiv is undoubtedly recognized.

And this is very dangerous, because as a tool to break the trend, they may choose to carry out an even more aggressive provocation.

All these questions signify an awareness in the collective West of a situation that has long been noticed in Moscow.

The West is approaching the decision point: either take full responsibility for the sustainability of the Zelensky regime, first in terms of funding and then from a military-political point of view, or look for opportunities without much loss of political face, as well as the lives of their own citizens, not to mention already about the final destruction of the economy, to get out of this conflict.

It is encouraging that there are people in the collective West who have found the political will to at least slow down their slide into a full-blown world conflict.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.