A major shift in the relationship of Arab youth under the age of thirty with religion and the practice of religious rites in the Arab world, as the number of people accepting religiosity is increasing compared to their number in 2018, according to a new survey conducted by the "Arab Barometer" network.
According to the survey, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian territories witnessed a decline in the number of people who described themselves as non-religious of all age groups, while the survey revealed that more citizens of these countries described themselves as religious.
According to the 2022 poll, Morocco witnessed a 7% decrease in the number of people who described themselves as non-religious among all age groups, followed by Egypt, with a decrease of 6%, and then Tunisia, Palestine, Jordan and Sudan, with a decrease of 4%.
In the category of youth under the age of 30, Tunisia witnessed the largest decline in the number of young people who described themselves as not religious.
Today, about two-thirds of Tunisian youth participating in the survey describe themselves as religious, a significant decline compared to the 2018 survey, in which about half of the Tunisian youth participating in the survey described themselves as not religious.
However, is there a relationship between a return to religiosity - as monitored by the Arab Barometer and other field research - and "Islamism" as presented by Islamic political movements over the past century?
Young people come to view religion as a private matter that no longer serves political or ideological purposes, but instead focuses on personal well-being and self-discipline, making it appear more as a conduit for spirituality.
Islamism is by no means equal to Islam, but as a concept it refers to a political ideology that constitutes ideas of political and social organization inspired by the teachings of Sharia, and a social movement that routinely engages in political activities and mobilization in the name of Islam.
In other words, what are the most prominent characteristics and characteristics of youth religiosity now?
What are its future prospects?
Can this type of religiosity meet with the project of Islamic political movements?
And under what conditions?
Although there are a few studies that have empirically examined “the characteristics of youthful religiosity in the era of the Arab Spring”, I would like to stress that I am not one of those who adopt the idea of transcendence and discontinuity in understanding the Arab reality. the overlap at times between the old and the new, and between different phenomena;
In the sense that we are facing multiple patterns of religiosity that interact with each other as a result of the religious field being characterized by plurality and diversity, and despite the efforts that have been made over the past decade of attempts to control and control by some regimes and institutions over the religious field, these efforts have failed for reasons that are not the field to delve into in This article.
Characteristics of youthful religiosity
Some empirical data paint a picture of the region's youth as religious, yet youth view religion as a private affair that no longer serves political or ideological purposes, but instead focuses on personal well-being and self-discipline, making it appear more as a conduit for spirituality.
These data monitor high levels of religiosity, primarily at the individual level, as it is no longer linked to a collective social utopia, as one of these studies concluded.
Despite the emphasis of many studies on the individuality of youth religiosity in the current stage, this fact does not help us in understanding the complexity and structure of phenomena, and does not open us to multiple questions that require an equal effort aimed at exploring the areas of intersection between religious among young Arab men and women under thirty, and between the cognitive, social and political domains. economic and organizational in the last decade.
These areas of intersection ask us many questions that we must pay attention to if we want to analyze and understand the phenomenon of youth religiosity now and its future consequences:
In the field of knowledge, it is possible to discuss questions such as: the extent of the fluidity and solidity of Islamic concepts, and what are the ruling Islamic concepts, or in other words, what does the Islamic description of these young people mean, not as theoretical ideas but as practical practices, and from what sources they derive their condemnation in light of the decline in trust in institutions Religious - as observed by studies - and the absence of the great innovators who witnessed the public arena over the last quarter of the twentieth century?
This level will open the interested people to new phenomena such as the society of watching, reviewing, consumption, the image - the image of the male and female preachers - and the expectation of the one who is invited.
It also makes us realize the position of individual religiosity in its relationship with the collective, the limits and nature of the relationship between the private sphere and the public sphere, and the position of individual freedoms in the practice and realization of this youth.
At this level, it is possible to discuss the weight of religion in determining the meaning of identity for them, and is it still present and in what sense, or has it been reduced?
As one of the surveys indicates a decline in the percentage of Arab youth who consider religion an essential element of their identity?
If so, what is the nature of the relationship between other determinants of identities and dealing with and perceiving the world?
What is required, then, is to distinguish between spaces of fluidity, innovation and conservatism, and what can be described as the solid nucleus of Islamism among these young men and women?
And did the repression that took place over the past decade of everything that is dynamic Islam created a solid individual religiosity or was it characterized by fluidity?
Social:
At this level, it will be discussed how these young people deal with patriarchal authority in society, such as the relationship with the family and religious and educational authority. It is also possible to discuss the male/female dichotomy, and whether it still governs the nature of the relationship between the sexes as manifested in political Islam movements, or has it been transcended, And in what sense?
It can also be pointed out to the phenomena of dress and modesty among girls, and the location of charitable work is a priority for attention.
Politician:
Here, the discussions will pay attention to the location of political change in these young men and women, and their political imagination, if any, and most importantly, the thinking will be open to how these young people reconsider the question of the relationship between Islam and democracy, and the nature of their preferred regime.
In the German Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung poll, more than 38% of respondents supported a democratic political system, while only 11% supported a political system based on Sharia, and an additional 11% supported a political system based on democratic and Islamic principles.
In this axis, it may be useful to open up about the position of young men and women regarding the uprisings of the Arab Spring;
Some of them - in the first wave of it - were no more than seven or eight years old when it erupted, and the oldest of them was eighteen, and some of them participated in the second wave of it.
The opinion polls that were conducted to show their attitudes towards them may help us if they are supplemented with some qualitative analysis and interviews.
In this axis, it is possible to discuss their awareness of the issue of violence and jihadist response, and the position of revolutionary change in their thinking after the failure of the successive waves of the Arab Spring. It is also possible to open up to studying the position of religious Islamic youth in the human rights movement;
Many of them have merged with it.
Economic:
It will focus on the intersection between market phenomena and how they are manifested among religious youth now in a moment witnessing revisions and crises of the neoliberal system, globalization and the rise of the right, and what is the position of the escalation of the Chinese model of development and multipolarity, and do these young men and women pay attention to the idea of social justice, as it appears in the equitable distribution For opportunities, wealth and income, because they are the first affected by them, and here may be an opportunity to study the impact of the differentiation between the class affiliation of these young men and women and their positions on the social issue.
According to the latest survey studies, religiosity in the current period is more widespread in the countryside and major cities than in smaller cities, and among the upper strata of the middle and wealthy, university-educated classes. However, these characteristics are witnessing constant movement and continuous change that requires follow-up.
organizational:
This level opens us to the position of these young men and women towards the organizations and experiences of political Islam movements.
Especially over the past decade, have they been able to transcend organizationally and ideologically the major Islamic organizations or are they still prisoners of their ideas, such as “Islam is the solution” and the comprehensiveness of Islam and the Islamic state, and their practices such as comprehensive organization, reform of faith and education…etc.
At this level, we can open ourselves up to the transformations of Brotherhood and Salafi youth, and how they are now aware of the theses of their intellectual and organizational organizations in light of their multiple predicaments that appear in the absence of the organization from their lives - as in the Brotherhood - or the lack of confidence in the credibility of the Salafi thesis after its involvement in politics that showed its pragmatism And some of its components allied with the authoritarian regimes in the region.
In this article, we asked more questions than we answered;
The treatment always starts from the question, but it is good to point out that the crisis of the religious youth, as well as the predicament of the Arab Spring - which was led by the youth and witnessed the overwhelming presence of women - that he knows what he does not want, but he does not know what he wants, so a protest situation was born that could not present a project Politically an alternative to what I needed.
A final point remains, which is: I realize that the projects of the nomadic past were not mere formulations and passing phrases carried by the power of authority / organization. They have customs, traditions, institutions, language and perception of society and its members, a perception of the self and the other that expresses itself in laws, legislation, constitution, production relations…etc.
Islamism and the movements and organizations that emerged from it are like that, and they will remain with us for a while, but the religiosity of the youth will cast a thick shadow on the expanding social acceptance of its theses, which expanded in the last quarter of the twentieth century and continued until the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, which put it on it and plunged it into a historical predicament that we do not know - So far - what God has done with it.