Al-Qassam Brigades (Source: From the official website of Al-Qassam)

About three weeks before the “flood,” I wrote an article declaring “the failure of Islamists in the Arab region and the end of political Islam.”

The aforementioned article - for me - was not the only one in this regard, and of course it will not be the last. It was preceded by several articles analyzing the predicament of Islamists in the decade of the Arab Spring, and others will certainly follow it.

In this article, I will not recount the arguments nor explain the foundations upon which I built my view in evaluating the future of Islamists in the region, which is essentially: that the intellectual, political, and societal contexts that helped their spread no longer exist now.

Since the late last decade of the twentieth century, we have been witnessing profound changes in intellectual structures, cognitive models, patterns of religiosity, economic structures, and the nature of the state in terms of its roles and functions...etc.

These changes have not been rewarded - until now - by different responses from Islamists, allowing them to be reproduced again. My saying this, of course, does not mean the complete disappearance of their organizations or their speeches from the scene; What I am talking about is the broadening societal acceptance and support for them politically, and the inclusion of new individuals in their organizations.

The reader may wonder - and he has the right to do so - why then is the question being raised again with the “Al-Aqsa Flood” - that unprecedented process initiated by Hamas - one of the living embodiments of the Muslim Brotherhood - on October 7, 2023? In other words, what new does this process bring to the future of Islamists in the region?

I expect that the waves of violence in the region will increase, and the areas of instability will increase. This will push the inability to support the Palestinians, mixed with the anger resulting from the Arab regimes abandoning them and leaving them to face their fate alone, despite the tools they have to stop it or at least mitigate it. This scene will give momentum. to violence in the region

 Four preliminary observations

Before presenting the criteria for answering this question, I would like to draw attention to four preliminary observations:

First: As one of the repercussions of the escalation of the counter-revolution in the face of the Arab Spring, Hamas increasingly sought to separate itself from the authority of the Brotherhood - as happened in its amended charter in 2017, and to position itself as a resistance movement leading the Palestinian struggle. 

This approach continued to crystallize in the document in which it presented its account of the flood, explained the logic behind this process, and emphasized its definition of itself as a Palestinian resistance movement with an Islamic reference.

Second: Evaluating this approach in terms of its success and failure requires a separate article, but we quickly point out that Hamas’s discourse in Operation “Flood” was a mixture of old elements and new ones.

In the past, Hamas was unable to expand its circle of supporters when it called its operation “the Al-Aqsa Flood,” and not “the Jerusalem Flood,” for example. There is still confusion - despite an attempt to overcome this, as in the aforementioned document - between Judaism and Zionism, as there still is. The distinction between civilian and combatant in the Zionist entity is a matter of confusion.

As for what is new, there is an attempt to respond to the global support that the issue has gained among some countries of the South and international public opinion. In the new; A talk about the historical dimension that places October 7th in its extended context, and a talk about international humanitarian law and genocide...etc.

The third observation, which I referred to in my previous article on Al Jazeera, is that the Palestinian issue has become the mirror that reflects the crises of the contemporary world and in which different groups link their own suffering to the pain of the Palestinians.

With the "flood"; The growing historical trend has crystallized that the Palestinian issue is no longer the primary issue of Arabs or Muslims, despite what opinion polls have shown of their sympathy and support for it. This support seems weak and ineffective, while there appears to be a major shift in sectors of global public opinion - especially in the West - towards the issue, in addition to the support of many countries of the South, which can be said; The Palestinian issue has become the issue of the Palestinians first, and the issue of those who are suffering in the world now.

This transformation will have major strategic repercussions in the near future, especially after the war on Gaza turned into a mirror that reflects the totality of crises suffered by wide sectors of humanity on our planet, which can be said; The forces and movements that support the Palestinians against the war of extermination see - each from their own perspective - their own suffering.

Will the Palestinian resistance - with Hamas at its heart - pick up on this thread and seek to reposition itself within this broad horizon, or will it remain trapped in the perceptions of some ideas of political Islam that are outdated and proven to fail?

Fourth: What Hamas did on October 7 was a great act, but it coincided with a fragile Arab reality in general, and among Islamists in particular. This was evident in the weakness of the demonstrations supporting them, which could have played a major role in stopping the war. In other words; The Palestinians are now paying the price for what happened to the Islamists over the past decade.

Six determinants of the future of Islamists

First: Repositioning the Islamists once again, with their two sides: the violent and the moderate.

I expect that the waves of violence in the region will increase, and the areas of instability will increase. This will push the inability to support the Palestinians, mixed with the anger resulting from the Arab regimes abandoning them and leaving them to face their fate alone, despite the tools they have to stop it or at least mitigate it. This scene will give momentum. to violence in the region.

As for the moderate Islamists, if they do not reposition themselves in the arena from the standpoint of unity of issues and concerns; They have no future and their crisis will deepen.

The Cairo demonstrations on Friday, October 20, chanted for Palestine, and called for life, freedom, human dignity, and justice. Slogans of the Arab uprisings. These chants came from young people who were no more than ten years old when the January 2011 revolution broke out, but they are longings for freedom and justice that have not ended. This is how the demonstrations went in Morocco, Bahrain and Jordan. To link, on one level, the priorities of internal issues and the Palestinian issue.

The Arab masses are aware of the governments' responsibility for the deterioration of their living conditions, and a section of them also realizes the responsibility of these governments for what befell the Palestinians in Gaza.

I wrote early on about the political decline of Islamists; Because of their inability to provide solutions to real-life problems and people’s living priorities. In the first wave of the Arab uprisings, the masses hoped that by electing them, they would address the problems of reality. However, these masses were also the ones who came out against them while they were in power - as happened in Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan in the second wave, and Egypt in the first wave, and these same masses who elected them after the Arab Spring were the ones who brought them down after that, as happened in Tunisia and Morocco.

Second: A new phase of the war on terrorism

In the early days of the "Flood"; During his visit to support Israel, the French President announced his desire to form an international coalition to confront Hamas, similar to the international coalition that emerged against ISIS.

The writer of these lines claims that this alliance has already been formed on the basis of security coordination that includes countries in the region, Israel, and some European countries. As Macron stated at the conclusion of his visit to the French press.

Any role for Hamas would be unacceptable to Washington, Israel, and most pro-American regional capitals. In three major conflicts before 2021, the fighting with Israel succeeded in reviving the popularity of Palestinian resistance. These waves of mass support always last as long as resistance continues. Arab regimes fear the popularity of any forces, and the model that spreads through this resistance.

The losers from the redrawing of strategic corridors and energy lines, such as Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey, will not join this coalition, but the fault lines may certainly include Iran and its proxies in the region.

Some Arab governments that led the counter-revolution would be happy to see Israel eliminate Hamas, the organization that emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood; The Islamic group, which these governments consider to be their enemy, will not accept its return again after the effort and money it has made over the course of a decade, and if Hamas accepts it; It will be forced to accept it by integrating its political wing without its military wing.

Third: There is no place for ideologies in the region

If the waves of the war on terrorism that extended throughout the Islamic world or what was called the “Greater Middle East” were intended - or so they claimed - to eliminate the Taliban, Saddam Hussein, and later the rule of ISIS in Syria and Iraq - that is, existing authorities - in order to establish democratic systems and build states ; This wave of war will be aimed at removing anyone who obstructs the economic axis that emerged in the face of the Chinese Belt and Road project, which includes India, the Gulf, Israel, and Europe, led by the United States.

The economy leads, strategic corridors draw alliances, and energy paths determine who is included and excluded. In this perception, there is no place for ideological movements and movements on both sides of the conflict.

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” may inspire a spectrum of nationalist, Islamic and leftist movements, and young Islamists - especially the Brotherhood - may regain their confidence in the Islamic project, and at least some of them will return to the ranks and stop fighting among themselves, and discover for themselves a new role at this stage... but that remains the case. Depending on the ability to bring about renewal in intellectual and political perceptions and visions, and provide new leadership.

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation may have given a moral boost to the followers of Islamic movements, but in practice its impact remains limited. Because the structural problems are as they are, with regard to the tyranny of the emotional heritage, the nature of thinking about change, discourse, and the essence of political thinking.

Fourth: The escalation of the religiosity of the conflict and the return of confrontation again on civilizational and cultural grounds between the West and the Islamic world

Egyptian university students chanted the Brotherhood’s favorite speech: “Khaybar, Khaybar, oh Jews, the army of Muhammad will return.” They are those who grew up in a period in which the Brotherhood disappeared from the public sphere for ten years or more, and in which they were criminalized. These slogans reflect a void and void that the claims of the new republic could not fill, but at the same time the Christian Zionist discourse that emerged in the current crisis restored acceptance of the Islamic discourse on the issue of Palestine.

In this crisis, all religious discourses emerged: Islamic, right-wing Christians, “evangelical Protestants,” and Judaism, in addition to Hindu nationalism, which some observers saw as one of the reasons for the Indian position in support of Israel after it had - historically - been supportive of the Palestinians. Today, India has become a close strategic partner of the United States and a strong ally of Israel.

The Western media coverage, and the statements of some of its government officials, reminded us of the Judeo-Christian root of Western civilization, and the atmosphere of September 11, in which cultural discourses escalated, and talk of a clash of civilizations and statists, but this time it is caught up in the rise of religious identities mixed with an extreme right, ruling in many countries, as it appears. -For example- in Italy and India. Investment in right-wing discourses linking immigration issues to Islamophobia and the economic crisis is expected to increase.

What's new about the September era (2001-2021); It is across religions, cultures and continents. Anyone who looks at the map of Israel's supporters will find that it includes India, France, Italy, Britain and Germany, and at its heart is the Israeli government led by extremist religious Zionism.

The picture may be balanced after the support of many southern countries for the Palestinians, and the increase and continuation of pro-Palestinian demonstrations, which included the left alongside non-Zionist Jewish youth, indigenous people, blacks, etc., but networking with the components of these demonstrations requires an intellectual and organizational effort that the Islamists have not undertaken so far.

Here is an observation that is worth pointing out, which is: What is required after the war is the necessity of getting rid of extremists on both sides of the conflict. Of course, I believe that Hamas is a resistance movement, but we must note that what is required is to get rid of it as a terrorist movement similar to ISIS, and at the same time It is expected that the right-wing Zionists will be eliminated, as is evident in the post-Netanyahu talk. Otherwise, the economy cannot function again, nor can the strategic corridors and energy paths be activated.

Fifth: Youth engagement with the Palestine issue

I previously wrote about the changing patterns of religiosity among young men and women and its relationship to the theses of Islamists. From what I mentioned, there is a change in the patterns of contemporary religiosity, especially among young men and women.

The religiosity of young university students, both male and female, after the uprisings is of an individual nature. Its solid core is not formed by organizations, but rather by a network of interactions and a large number of initiatives. Its features are shaped on social networking sites and by practical practice, not ideological discourse. It is characterized by a dominant female presence, and its position on politics has not yet been determined, but is shaped by the contexts. And its development.

Unless the Islamist leaders realize these contexts and many others; What I fear most is that they will move from the failure of politics to the failure of advocacy as well, and this is what we see in the decline in the patterns of religiosity that the Islamists were spreading in society, especially among young men and women, which calls for rethinking some of the foundations of their theses regarding the “Islamization of society” according to what they represent. From the style of religiosity, and the position of the organization in this Islamization.

A segment of new generations born at the end of the last century and the beginning of the last century supports the Palestinian cause, and it comes from new approaches that are different from what the Islamists propose. It comes mainly from a humanitarian and legal source related to the common human values ​​that must prevail, in contrast to the Islamists’ talk about the idea of ​​one Islamic nation, the necessity of supporting Muslims, and protecting the holy sites.

The humanitarian/value approach suffers from many problems: it lacks historical memory, is easy to dissipate and is not sustainable, remains individually based and not collectively based, and is constantly fed through images and social media products.

Social media played a prominent role in advocacy and advocacy movements. It also presented new roles for these young men and women by producing content that identifies the issue, monitors violations, and presents alternative narratives to those prevailing in Western media, in addition to humanizing the issues by transforming victims from numbers into characters with a human being.

Perhaps the “Al-Aqsa Flood” will strengthen the belief among Islamic youth groups that the solution is to possess power and self-development, while the rest of the structural problems facing their other organizations will remain as they are, and perhaps a radical discourse will hijack the energy of anger that has afflicted sectors of Arab youth to direct it toward its rotten reality.

Sixth: Transformations of the power structure in the international system

Many major powers recognize that recent events serve as a warning about the new multipolar world and the position or danger of the Iranian and Islamic project in the Middle East and beyond.

Historically; Moderate Islamists were in the West's trenches, and played roles on its behalf in confronting the communist tide in the past or violent extremism later. In this crisis, it seems that they must be confronting many Western governments that have mobilized their full symbolic and material strength to confront Hamas and what it represents.

A set of common interests push Russia, China, and Iran, along with other countries such as Turkey, to take positions that differ somewhat from those of the Western bloc regarding the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. What distinguishes this group is that it is a league of “losers” - in the words of one analyst - of economic and political projects that threaten to integrate India, the Gulf, Israel, and Europe into an economic-political group led by the United States.

Iran is the link between Russian and Chinese influence and the ongoing war in Gaza. The ignition of the conflict between Hamas and Israel serves Iranian interests, by breaking the path of Arab-Israeli normalization, or postponing it for a long period, in addition to postponing the implementation of the economic corridor project between India and Europe, passing through the Middle East region, and last but not least; Delaying military conflict with it.

Do the Islamists in the region stand on the other side of the river? It is true that Russian and Chinese support for Hamas remains symbolic, but it may turn into more than that, which is worth monitoring.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.