What fate awaits the Ennahda movement in Tunisia?

The Tunisian Court of First Instance issued a 3-year prison sentence against the head of the Ennahda Movement, Rached Ghannouchi, on charges that his party received funding from foreign parties (Anatolia)

The Islamic Renaissance Movement in Tunisia has reserved a prominent place for itself in local, regional and international attention, through a distinctive intellectual and political experience that attracted the interest of political actors and research bodies in which it found room to delve deeper into questions that impose themselves in Tunisia, and in general Arab countries, and even in the Islamic world, which are the following:

To what extent can an Islamic movement develop in its structure and approach to the point where it becomes part of the social and political fabric in its countries? Are the volatile and sometimes bloody relations between them and the ruling systems due to a fundamental structural obstacle that creates a clash every time between them? Or is it nothing more than political choices, some of which are due to internal considerations, and the other part to a regional and international environment that rejects political Islam and does not hesitate to confront it and even eradicate it?

"Freedom is for us and for others"

At one point in the year one thousand nine hundred and eighty-two, the Islamic Tendency Movement held a press conference in Tunisia in which it expressed its desire for legal work, stressing that its adoption of democracy is principled and has no doubt, considering that it does not contradict anything with Islam.

The movement went too far in its proposal, stressing that it would adhere to the country's laws and its republican system, and that it would rely on the votes of voters and the results of the ballot boxes, even if it chose a communist party to rule Tunisia, the Land of Zitouna.

At that time, the Islamists raised a slogan that was later repeated in their literature inside and outside universities: “Freedom is for us and for others,” in a message that seemed directed at the regime that had then entered a phase of economically motivated and politically conservative liberal openness under the government of the late Mohamed Al-Mazali.

Despite all this, the regime, along with leftist and nationalist movements, responded coldly to what the Islamic Tendency Movement put forward. The movement was later subjected to security campaigns and fierce intellectual and political confrontations, accusing it of double rhetoric and practicing a kind of “democratic piety” in an attempt to hide the extremist Brotherhood background, which was at the time Impressed by the experience of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the regime that led to its establishment, he soon found himself in a bloody war with his regional and international surroundings.

In the years: eighty-two, eighty-four, eighty-seven, and ninety-two of the past century, the militants of the Islamic Tendency Movement were leaving a wave of trials to find themselves in another hospitality, awaiting them on charges of conspiring against the security of the state, and involvement in building cells and carrying out terrorist acts, and they were the ones who... They bet on getting involved in the Tunisian social, political and trade union fabric.

This created an aura of prestige and mystery around their experience in its various stages, and made their deletion a central goal for the most extreme official, security, and ideological circles in their stance on the phenomenon of “political Islam.”

To the left of the Brotherhood

Between the discourse of praise and the discourse of betrayal, an objective diagnosis of the phenomenon of the Islamic trend appears to be a process fraught with difficulties and pitfalls to some extent, at least in view of the deception involved in the lack of definition in any term or designation for a socio-political phenomenon.

If Arab officialdom - and the security circles and ideological opponents within it - tend to place Islamic movements in one accusation basket, a careful, objective view reminds us that the Islamists are an extended family, with problematic relationships between its components that begin with disagreement and do not end with contradiction and sometimes even rivalry. .

A fact with which it is in no way possible to confuse the experience of the Islamic movement in Tunisia and others. The Islamists in Tunisia presented themselves as involved in the national state and its declared goals of development and modernization, thus drawing a distance from other, more conservative and “Salafi” versions of Islam.

In order for this distance not to remain just a theoretical claim, and despite the “security ordeals” that Tunisia’s Islamists went through, in which the leaders were imprisoned and exiled, it included statements.

Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi, the historical leader, wrote an in-depth theorization of the problem of Islam’s relationship with democracy, which was included in his famous book: “Public Freedoms in the Islamic State,” where the man affirmed that a fruitful marriage between Islam and democracy is possible, and that its fruit could be a state rooted in its identity to the extent that it is It is open to the civilizational gain of humanity, and interacts with the realities of the two realities: the regional and international of the Tunisian Republic, in a way that breaks with tyranny, regardless of the background it conceals, even if that background is religious.

With this understanding, Ghannouchi’s ideas approached what was proposed by the late Sudanese Islamic leader Hassan al-Turabi, some of which were considered by the “Orthodox Presbyterian Brotherhood” to be mere intellectual “scraps” being circulated to satisfy the prevailing intellectual and political fashion in today’s world.

In contrast to the Arab environment, Western political and academic platforms received the ideas of Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi with clear celebration, considering that they fall to the left of the Brotherhood, translating into something like deep revisions that can be built upon to defuse the sharp differences and confrontations between Islamists and the West, as well as local Arab and Islamic governments.

However, it was necessary to wait for the Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia, until the Islamists in Tunisia entered an unprecedented phase in their experience with the flight of the late Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from the country, and it entered a phase of broad and fragile political reforms, which gave the Islamists - for the first time in... Tunisia's modern political history - the opportunity to work legally, to lead on electoral occasions in the voting results, and to become, in a first of its kind, part of the government system in the context of a faltering economic and security reality.

The plight of freedom..!!

In a historical scene full of ironies, during a television interview, Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi shed copious tears as he saw leftist lawyer Abdel Nasser Al-Aouini raising his voice - in the heart of Habib Bourguiba Street, not far from the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior in the capital, Tunis - with the word that resonated throughout the country and the Arab world: “Ben Ali fled... Ben Ali fled.”

These developments were much more than what the Islamic Tendency Movement had aspired to, which, following promises made by Ben Ali regarding political openness early in his reign, changed to the name of the Ennahda Movement.

The most that the Islamic movement in Tunisia demanded was to reduce the burden of tyranny, stop “securitizing” the Islamic file, and open the door to political participation, even if at a minimum, in exchange for the authority’s insistence on the “individual settlement” approach in dealing with the Islamists, an approach that succeeded in luring Activists, some of whom were in prominent leadership positions, returned to their homeland in exchange for not being persecuted and enabling them to enjoy their civil rights.

The topic of changing the name was brought up again through a blog post by the new Secretary-General of what became known as the Ennahdha Movement Party, the historical face of Ajami Al-Warimi, known collectively as “Al-Haitham”, where he said: The party is moving towards historical revisions that include the name, the contents of the proposal, the political position, and the method of work in the arena. Political, which are the reviews that were documented in working papers, he said; It will eventually find its way into the general political arena.

What is noticeable is the different context within which the new version of the reviews is presented, as they take place under the president of Zakat Ennahdaoui, who played a decisive role in his rise to power, and he is the president who brought the country into what became known as the “July twenty-fifth” path, adopting presidential decrees. Which authorized him to abolish the Constitution of 2014, dissolve the most important constitutional bodies and grant himself absolute powers in governance, and a new constitution that his critics considered a blatant expression of an authoritarian tendency that the country had never known in its modern political history.

These reviews are also being presented at a time when Sheikh Ghannouchi has barely spent a year in prison on multiple charges, one of which led to a three-year prison sentence under the pretext of Ennahda receiving foreign funds.

This is in addition to the most dangerous file, which is the party’s involvement in terrorism within the framework of what was known in the media and the judiciary as the “Secret Apparatus of the Ennahdha Movement” file, which has a controversial connection to the assassination of the leftist leader Chokri Belaid and the nationalist Mohamed Brahmi.

All of this is happening while the Ennahda Movement party is going through a strange and unprecedented situation, as the authorities closed its headquarters. This caused a kind of paralysis in its work and imposed a kind of organizational loss on its followers. However, despite the suspensions that affected prominent leaders from the first rank, such as Acting Secretary-General Munther Al-Wanissi, the party remained present within the components of the National Salvation Front opposed to the coup, playing a pivotal role in supplying it with its treasury. The masses are allowed to hold protest demonstrations or events every time, as is the case on the anniversary of the Tunisian revolution.

Battle of time

Events are accelerating little by little regarding the Islamists in Tunisia, at a time when the question is growing about the upcoming presidential elections in the country, amid what appears to be an early election campaign for President Saied, and a prior judicial framing of it that has made most of the names involved in any competition with him subject to judicial consequences that prevent them from running in the first place. In light of this and the impact of a stifling economic crisis, the Islamic card returns to loom on the horizon with high political returns, and a vital bet for everyone who seeks a title for a political path in the country.

Ennahdaists say: What they describe as the eradication camp sees the elimination of the Islamic movement from the scene as a fundamental goal without which all costs are trivial, even if the country’s gains in freedom, separation of powers, guarantees of its independence, and media freedoms are in vain.

Ennahdaists assert that several parties are pushing the country towards offering Islamists as a sacrifice for regional and international agendas. They have shown hostility to the Tunisian revolution and the Arab Spring in general, confiscating the path of democratic transition and returning Tunisia to the box of “security treatments” where opponents are counted on and excluded through harsh judicial prosecutions.

A narrative to which those who radically disagree with it respond by saying that the Ennahda Movement party was a partner in corruption, if not a culprit in it, and that what they describe as the “black” decade put the Tunisian Brotherhood on the test of exercising governance, revealing from their point of view the truth about their relationship to democracy and their affiliation to the national state.

In light of this polarization, the messages of the current leadership of the Ennahda Movement party seemed to be competing with time in an attempt to avoid further clashes with the orientations of President Kais Saied, and to reproduce the form and content of the experience until it finds a position for itself in a scene that has changed greatly from what it was before the elections in 2019, amid a question. Asked whether there was enough time to complete a complex, old and new task, the controversy over which recently led to the resignations of historical leaders, she criticized what she described as the dominance of Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi and a narrow circle surrounding him over the reins of the party.

This limited the potential for development and renewal within party structures and in the discourse that Ennahdha addressed to its audience and the general Tunisians, whether they were its supporters or opponents.

In the answer, the political reading cannot be free from balances of power that do not place the Ennahda movement in the best positions. It is now subject to a political path with no horizon for reconciliation, and a judicial path governed by considerations that most of them favor the Islamists, which has made many parties wonder whether it is an hour of withdrawal. Legal recognition of the Ennahda party is approaching; What will mean the dissolution of the party and the lifting of a political cover that might lead to the prosecution of its leaders and supporters on charges such as belonging to a “banned terrorist” group?

This is what was circulated in the media, and circles interested in the Islamic movement in Tunisia confided in it from time to time, and here are two scenarios and a third:

Egypt or Algeria?

Tunisian President Kais Saied preceded what he did on July 25 with a controversial visit to Egypt, in which the political and military leadership received him with great warmth. The resident of the Carthage Palace did not stop during and after heaping praise on Egypt’s experience as a model to be inspired by in saving the national state. From the clutches of "destructive thought."

In the eyes of President Saied’s critics, this constituted one of the lights that revealed to them an important aspect of the political background that guides the man in his dealings with the path of democratic transition, and with the parties active in it, led by the Ennahda Movement party. Almost everyone understood from the phrase “destructive thought” political Islam. , represented by the Brotherhood movement, which ended up being ferociously pursued by the deep state in Egypt, in a bloody confrontation embodied by the Rabaa massacre and others.

The Egyptian experience represented an obsession for many, especially after voices that rejected the results of the ballot boxes were repeated on electoral occasions during the decade of democratic transition from an advanced position for the Islamists. With those results, they repeated the call to follow the example of the Egyptian army in closing the files of the revolution and the democratic transition in the country under the pretext of saving it. From the clutches of the Brotherhood.

An Egyptian scenario that the Ennahdha Movement party in Tunisia sought to avoid by saying: He is not a Muslim Brotherhood by any means, even if he was linked to that intellectual background in his inception, heading towards a new definition that seemed to flirt with ideas close to the American administration under the title: “Democratic Muslims” in which Islamists become citizens with a conservative tendency who are inspired by Arab-Islamic culture, which helps in building a political and development experience. It dedicates pluralism and modernity in its various manifestations.

An approach that was met with rejection by France, the Emirates, and the visible and hidden circles within them, clinging to a battle declared by the Elysee over “political Islam” in reference to the Muslim Brotherhood, rejecting any experience inspired by what Turkey witnessed under the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whatever the justifications or justifications. .

Next to the Egyptian version, there is an Algerian version that was praised by President Kais Saied, where the state framed the presence and role of Islamists after a bloody decade in which confusion was mixed, so that the Islamists became part of the political scene with a limited influence within which they were content to criticize the general situation without the ability to threaten its deep balances.

There is a cold competition between the two versions in the Tunisian arena. It seems that the Ennahda Movement party is anticipating which President Kais Saied will lean towards between them, which will mean defining a basic feature of the Tunisia of the future in light of Saied’s efforts to engineer it in an unprecedented way according to concepts that almost eliminate the role of mediating bodies in favor of a relationship. Directly between the individual leader and the general public, the state identifies with the president and the people to melt within a crucible that its opponents describe as populism, for which they assert that Tunisia will pay dearly sooner or later.

Between this scenario and that, there is a third possibility with vague features, reminding those who forget that when Ben Ali fled, a ruling system in which the circles of soft and hard powers intersected did not fall with him, to later monitor from different locations the developments of the democratic transition experience, to contribute in one way or another to its eventual abolition. Having found in President Saied an objective ally who possesses qualities that were not found in anyone else, namely electoral legitimacy and a bright political image, and striving to sculpt an experience in which the individual leader plays a pivotal role, he sees that history is in the process of folding all traditional titles in favor of a completely different historical stage.

This deep component of the Tunisian scene, there is no accurate picture of its current reading of the transformations of the scene in the country, nor of the options it is discussing regarding the future after the Election Commission confirmed that Tunisia will hold presidential elections within two thousand and twenty-four.

Nor does anyone know precisely how you view the political scene in the country, of which the Ennahda movement is an important part, and which is a scene that is vitally linked to a very difficult economic reality, which, in view of warnings issued inside and outside the country, is unlikely to push Tunisia once again into a confrontation with the Islamists. It gives them new grievances, and does not provide the country with real solutions to its worsening crises.

No one is reassured for the future in light of these costly possibilities in one way or another, neither Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi, who was quoted by one of his lawyers as saying that his morale is high and that he has high confidence in Tunisia’s restoration of its democratic and economic health, nor President Kais Saied, despite his assertion that the country has entered a stage of no return in its battle against those who He describes them as corrupt, amid propaganda campaigns from his supporters in the virtual world.

And between this and that... a deep state that is accustomed to following what is happening closely... it hides from time to time... to sometimes decide the situation in a certain direction... that may be contrary to all expectations.