A new test of democracy in Tunisia

The decision of the Tunisian Ennahda Shura Council to nominate Abdel Fattah Moro, vice-president and deputy speaker of parliament, to run for president in mid-September is a paradigm shift in the political performance of the movement, whether or not Moro arrives. What is remarkable in this decision is that it received the unanimity of the members of the Shura Council who attended the meeting and the 98 out of 150 members of the Council.

Although some leaders of Ennahda disagree with the decision to run in the presidential elections with a candidate from the movement, there is acceptance of the decision and respect for it pursuant to the principle of institutionalization. As noted by Rafiq Abdessalam, a member of the movement's executive board, who, if he sees the candidacy for the presidency as a risk that will have internal and external consequences, believes that Ennahdha is a movement of institutions, has traditions of institutional work, and has a leadership class not based on a leader or sheikh. And Meridians ";

Since the announcement of Moro's candidacy for the presidential election, reactions have varied between cautious welcome, fear and disapproval. These are conflicting feelings that reflect the state of uncertainty and uncertainty experienced by the Tunisian experience, which is a feature of the experiences of democratic transition in general. As Philip Schmitter, one of the most important theorists of democratic transition in the world, says, "Democratic transition is a process with uncertain results."

While some considered that Ennahdha had crossed the "red line" it set for itself by not competing for power, by nominating one of its leaders for the presidency; others considered it an opportunity to judge the Islamists and their effectiveness in running governance, in order to govern Them realistically and not ideologically. Some went on to bet on Moro and his successors, Ennahdha and the Islamists, failing to test the government, even before the race began.

Whatever the attitudes and reactions, they all have the same title: concern about the Tunisian experience of falling into the trap of polarization and political and ideological divisions, which plagued the rest of the Arab experiences in killing and claimed its transitional experience. This fear is justified in light of the setbacks of the Arab Spring that have taken place over the past years and diminished hopes that it could be overcome and move towards the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia.

At the same time, Arab Islamists were divided between a faction that welcomed the Ennahda decision, and considered it a new step towards normalizing the Islamists' relationship with politics and the question of power, and represents a departure from the historical fear and hesitation of the competition for power. Another sees this as a risk that could not only lead to Islamists in Tunisia, but to the nascent democratic experience as a whole.

The background of this faction's fears lies in the internal and external repercussions of the Renaissance experience, especially if its candidate wins, especially in light of the fierce war led by the countries of the counter-revolution (Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia) against political Islam east and west.

This division is justified in light of the negative experiences of the Islamists on the issue of power, and the fear of testing it so that the movement is not affected by its repercussions. Examples from Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Morocco and Turkey do not bode well and do not encourage the Islamists to fight a power struggle that may cost more than they gain.

But if the Islamists are worried about Ennahdha's move to nominate one of its leaders for the presidency in Tunisia, especially since the specter of the Egyptian experience is still present, where the deep state and the "civilian" elites turned on the arrival of the "Muslim Brotherhood" to power, and suppressed them and crushed it did not happen Since Nasiriyah Egypt, this step represents a serious challenge and test for democratic forces and elites (or who claim to be so) both in Tunisia and abroad, and their willingness to bear the burden of this step and work to make it a success, whether Moro wins or loses!

I mean the willingness of the secular elites and parties to accept, firstly, the candidacy of a president from an Islamic background, and not to fall into the trap of intimidation, mutilation and exclusion, and secondly to deal with him positively in case he won the elections and came to power, and not to turn against him as happened in Egypt.

In other words, Moro's candidacy for the presidential elections in Tunisia represents a watershed and revealing the extent to which the Tunisian elites adhere to and adhere to the rules of the democratic game, without being drawn into the scenario of demonization, obstruction and failure. It is a challenge that will reveal the solidity of Tunisia's democratic experience and its transition to a stage of democratic consolidation in which democracy becomes “the only game in the city,” says Schmitter.

Therefore, the important question now is not whether Moro will succeed or fail in the upcoming presidential elections, but about the willingness and ability of the non-Islamic elites in Tunisia to overcome the "Islamophobia", which remained with it during the reign of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and some of his representations emerged after the revolution. And the extent of acceptance of a candidate - perhaps a president - from an Islamic background.

Will these elites respect the choice of the Tunisian people and prejudice the legitimacy of the Fund and what it produces, or will it overcome its fear and phobia and sacrifice the outcome of the Fund and the democratic experience, and write its end with its own hands; as did its peers in Egypt?