NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg declared "the impossibility of a meaningful dialogue with Russia while it behaves as it is now in Ukraine."

That is, not only Kyiv, but also its real puppeteers do not want to talk about anything with us, counting on victory on the battlefield.

First of all, I would like to note that Russia began to “behave as it is now” on February 24th.

However, all our proposals for a meaningful dialogue have been rejected before.

In this regard, the question arises: how would Russia have to behave in order for NATO to become interested in a “meaningful dialogue”?

There are two versions.

The first is a total renunciation of sovereignty, which, in fact, Ukraine did.

This is how the US and NATO present "meaningful dialogue."

But in Russian it is called "dictat".

No, thanks.

But NATO seems to be confident that sooner or later Russia will surrender and ask for peace on any terms.

Here we need to say “many thanks” to Mikhail Gorbachev, who surrendered everything in the 1980s without any guarantees, as well as to Boris Yeltsin, who divided the country for the sake of personal power and in a matter of years squandered the military power of the Soviet Union so much that it took a suicide march of paratroopers to Pristina so that NATO would somehow take into account Russian wishes regarding the situation in Kosovo.

And then there were those who wanted to check what Russia would answer if NATO simply destroyed this landing force.

In general, NATO is confident in its own strength and in our weakness, and therefore does not want to talk.

The second version of what must happen for the West to become really interested in agreements is a serious threat to the well-being of NATO countries, or rather, the United States - they don’t give a damn about Europe.

Not nuclear, because it is double-edged, and Russia fully shares the universal conviction that it is impossible to win in a nuclear war - only to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor bearing a mortal threat.

As long as nothing threatens the United States, they will look favorably on the de-industrialization of Europe, and on the transformation of Ukraine into a permanent hotbed of instability, and on new hotbeds - in the same Kosovo, for example.

In this regard, the question arises: what threat to the well-being of the United States can Russia pose by excluding the unacceptable and impossible nuclear option?

Especially considering that the West did not cope with the Soviet Union - a mortal blow to the state was dealt from within.

And NATO, meanwhile, watched with interest what was happening, after which, no longer meeting resistance, it absorbed our former allies and even parts of our state, who were explained that they, it turns out, were “occupied”.

It is obvious that the modern United States is very reminiscent of the Soviet Union of the 1980s.

This is gerontocracy (and much more serious: Brezhnev died at 75, and 80-year-old Biden is going to run for a second term).

This is also a harsh ideological dictate, the bearers of which do not themselves believe in the ideology they are promoting.

Various actions in support of BLM and LGBT are not much different from ritual Soviet demonstrations.

This is a significant bias in the budget towards assistance to overseas countries - how much has Washington already spent on Ukraine, even taking into account the corruption factor?

Therefore, if a miracle does not happen, a large-scale internal crisis in the United States is only a matter of time.

And our task is, firstly, to assist all those who advocate a reduction in the hypertrophied international activity of Washington, as well as those who advocate the independence of Texas, California and other states - just like Britain and then the United States supported our separatists .

And secondly, to be strong and influential enough at the moment when the crisis comes.

The collapse of the USSR had a very negative impact on our traditional trading partners at that time.

Given the role of the United States in international trade, their perturbations are capable of dragging not only Europe, Japan and Australia into the deepest crisis, but also many other countries.

And then, when a strong and calm Russia will stand in the midst of general chaos, it will be possible to talk about a "meaningful dialogue."

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.