— What were the special services that existed in the Soviet Union before the emergence of the State Security Committee?
— In fact, the historical predecessor of the KGB was the Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR, which existed in 1946-1953.
But in March 1953, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee of the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a reform of government bodies was carried out, during which the MGB was liquidated and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The united Ministry of Internal Affairs was headed by Lavrentiy Beria, who was also deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
His first deputy, in turn, was Ivan Serov, who remained in his position even after the arrest of Beria and the appointment of Sergei Kruglov as the new minister.
It should be noted that Serov had good organizational skills and after the creation of the KGB as a separate department in 1954, he became its first leader.
Company commander Senior Lieutenant Igor Tuibakhtin with cadets of the Moscow Higher Border Command Red Banner School of the KGB of the USSR named after Mossovet
RIA News
© Boris Babanov
— How was the KGB fundamentally different from the previously existing Soviet intelligence services?
— Back in September 1953, the so-called Special Meeting, which had existed in the Soviet intelligence services since 1934, was liquidated.
It actually had the right to violate the constitutional provision on the administration of legal proceedings exclusively by the court.
A special meeting sent people into exile and extrajudicial imprisonment.
Also at a certain stage he was given the right to impose death sentences.
There was nothing like this in the KGB.
The next fundamental difference was the emergence of prosecutorial control and supervision, including over the investigative activities of state security agencies.
A special department was even created in the USSR Prosecutor's Office.
Since 1954, the review of cases of previously convicted persons began.
Some of them were rehabilitated, another part was released taking into account the sentence already served, some had their charges changed and their terms of imprisonment were reduced.
A fundamentally important point was the widespread use of preventive measures by state security agencies since 1958, which made it possible to prevent offenses and give people the opportunity to avoid criminal liability.
From a social, political and legal point of view, this was undoubtedly a positive step.
The KGB, both at the union and republican levels, became truly accountable to party bodies.
Before the creation of the committee, this requirement formally existed, but in practice the intelligence services did not comply with it.
— What regulations regulated the activities of the KGB?
— At the initial stage, until 1959, its work was regulated only by resolutions of the Council of Ministers and the fundamental decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 13, 1954.
The wording of the decree was closed.
Only the creation of a new state structure was openly discussed.
Its goals, objectives, powers and management scheme were not publicly disclosed.
On January 9, 1959, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee approved the “Regulations on the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its local bodies.”
It was top secret and was not published anywhere.
Although, assessing it from the point of view of today, we can say that there was actually nothing secret there.
In addition to this Regulation, the KGB bodies were guided in their work by the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the State Border Law and other regulations.
A separate law “On State Security Bodies in the USSR” was adopted only on May 16, 1991.
In practice, it operated for only a few months, but it was very good and, I think, would have played a positive role in history if it had acted longer.
— Please tell us about the most ambitious and striking achievements of the KGB, as well as the most tragic failures.
— KGB officers showed the highest operational skill, brilliantly carrying out large-scale operations that had a positive impact on the security and peaceful existence of the country.
For example, the arrest on May 25, 1954 of the commander of the UPA * General-Corruption Vasily Kuk.
This includes the disclosure by the KGB of a joint operation of the British Secret Intelligence Service and the American CIA, code-named “Gold,” to build a tunnel to the communication lines of the Soviet troops and the communication lines of the GDR.
It was a very expensive operation, but the West did not even suspect that the KGB knew about it from the moment the plan to create the tunnel was approved.
Another brilliant operation of the committee was preventing the implementation of the American Mongoose plan to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba, as well as providing counterintelligence support for the transfer of Soviet troops to the island.
At that time, over 140 vessels and a huge contingent of people were involved, but there was no leak of information.
The State Security Committee played an important role in resolving the Caribbean crisis and in ensuring subsequent détente.
KGB resident in Washington Alexander Feklisov became an unofficial mediator in negotiations between the governments of the USSR and the USA.
The KGB's brilliant operations were the evacuation of Soviet intelligence officers from abroad: Kim Philby and George Blake.
The committee played an important role in providing international assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; KGB officers showed high professionalism during the release of Soviet hostages in Beirut in 1985.
Certificates of KGB employees: - junior officer of the KGB of the USSR, giving the right to store and carry firearms; - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yu.V.
Andropova
© Public domain
As for the failures, among them it is necessary to mention the betrayal of the Motherland by employees of the Soviet special services - for example, Oleg Penkovsky, Pyotr Deryabin.
To understand what kind of people became traitors, it is enough to say a few words about how they behaved.
Penkovsky told the Americans: “Give me miniature nuclear charges, I will install them in Moscow, wherever you say.
When you need it, you will detonate these nuclear charges, delivering a nuclear strike on the capital of the Soviet Union.”
And when he felt that he could be arrested, he set up a pre-arranged “nuclear danger” signal for his handlers.
They say that Penkovsky announced the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba and thereby prevented a war, but no, he had nothing to do with this.
On the contrary, he conveyed information about the technical data of Soviet missiles, about the deployment of the division, about the maintenance of missiles in positions, about the standby mode.
And the information received from him allowed the Americans to decipher aerial footage when they discovered the positions of our missiles.
This is really what he did for the enemy.
Therefore, there is no need to make him a hero who supposedly saved the world.
Another major failure of the KGB counterintelligence was the collaboration of GRU specialist Dmitry Polyakov with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.
He worked for the Americans for a long time before he was exposed and arrested.
A huge failure was the transfer by the last KGB chairman Vadim Bakatin, with the sanction of the highest Soviet leadership, to the Americans of a scheme to bug the US Embassy in Moscow.
This is simply an unprecedented betrayal of the interests of the state.
And this was a blow not only to state security, but also to our scientists who developed special equipment.
Real material damage was caused.
Filming of the multi-part television film "TASS is authorized to declare..." directed by Vladimir Fokin.
Yuri Solomin as KGB Colonel Vitaly Slavin and Vakhtang Kikabidze as CIA officer John Glebb
RIA News
© Galina Kmit
And, of course, we cannot help but say that during the events of the early 1990s, we were defeated in the psychological war waged against the USSR by the British, Americans and other NATO members.
The Soviet Union created a really viable and attractive alternative to their system for many, so they needed to destroy the USSR: they did not need a competitor in our person.
— There are many stereotypes and myths about the activities of the KGB: notorious phrases about “bloody executioners”, images of “colorless” people in suits, with one click of whose fingers a person could disappear without a trace... Do they have anything in common with reality?
— Negative assessments of the KGB’s activities are determined by associations with surveillance, repression, denunciations, provocations, persecution of dissidents, and the events of 1937, when the committee did not even exist.
Such stereotypes are deliberately introduced into consciousness.
Back in 1987, a massive campaign began to discredit the Soviet government, including state security agencies.
But state security is, in essence, an immune system that preserves the state mechanism.
When it was turned off, the USSR ceased to exist.
And to those who say that the country allegedly collapsed on its own, I would like to remind you that the United States even minted a commemorative medal “For Victory in the Cold War.”
Border patrol of the Pacific Border District landed on a hard-to-reach section of the border
RIA News
© Lev Garkavy
If we reject stereotypes and look at the situation objectively, it becomes obvious that the KGB, OGPU, NKVD are completely different structures.
The KGB had absolutely nothing to do with the repressions of 1937.
This is a different service operating under fundamentally different conditions.
From the introduction of new criminal legislation in the USSR in 1959 until the collapse of the USSR, in 32 years the KGB prosecuted only 14,689 people.
I'm not saying whether it's a lot or a little, I'm just giving a number.
* The organization of Ukrainian nationalists - “Ukrainian Insurgent Army” (OUN-UPA) - is a Ukrainian organization recognized as extremist and banned on the territory of Russia (decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of November 17, 2014).