Years after the Renaissance Dam crisis, and the marathon of negotiations that followed the declaration of the Agreement of Principles on March 23, 2015 between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, the crisis is still stagnant, and its dangers increase with the passage of time, and the drums of war are beating on the banks of the Nile.

With the entry of the second filling phase of the dam without an agreement, it became clear that Ethiopia is still indifferent to the Egyptian-Sudanese demands and objections, and considers that it is not forced to make concessions, which indicates that the risks of violent conflict may be as close as possible, especially if the dam is completed and work begins Without reaching a solution to the crisis between the three parties, by reaching an agreement on operating rules.

Security Council and a new turnعطف

Within the framework of the Egyptian attempts, Egypt recently resorted to the Security Council, warning that the continuation of the crisis leads to “international friction” that endangers international peace and security, but although the Security Council can compel Ethiopia to stop construction and filling until a binding agreement is reached between the three parties to the crisis, it is unlikely to happen.

This is indicated by what the President of the Security Council, Nicolas de Riviere, said in a press conference, Thursday, the first of July, where he said, “The Council does not have much to do in the Renaissance Dam crisis, and that the Council has nothing but to bring the parties together to express their their concerns, and then encourage them to return to negotiations to reach a solution,” according to Reuters.

Regardless of what the President of the Security Council said, we believe that even if the Security Council did pass a resolution on Ethiopia, it is likely that the Ethiopian state would not abide by it.

 The roots of the conflict in the Nile Basin

To understand the nature of the Renaissance Dam crisis, it is important to shed light on the roots of the crisis in the Nile River Basin.

Water constitutes the basis for civilized interactions, conflicts and external interventions, and throughout the various historical stages it forms the focus of political geography, in addition to the fact that water represents an issue with economic, political and social dimensions whose interactions extend to become a potential driver of conflicts.

The conflict over the Nile waters is a conflict that has deep roots in history, but specifically after the end of the colonial era, the position of the countries of the upper Nile River adhered to the absence of a binding legal framework governing the division of water between the Nile Basin countries, and he believes that the agreements of the colonial era were to achieve the interests of the colonial countries, and did not It was in the interest of the basin countries, as it was approved during the occupation period and there was no national will to refuse or accept, and the 1929 agreement was in favor of the colonial powers, and Egypt and Sudan benefited from it only after the end of the occupation period, and then negotiations must be made to re-divide and distribute water shares, according to rights current without others.

 Nyerere Principle and Nile Water Sharing

On November 30, 1961, Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania - in whose territory the greater part of Lake Victoria is located - announced in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations his country's position on the Nile water agreements in the colonial era, where he stressed that Tanzania is an agreement 1929 is unilaterally void unless a substitution agreement is concluded within two years.

This led to a tension in the relationship with Egypt, and claims rose among the Nile Basin countries that their positions should be consistent with the water policies advocated by the World Bank, and the proposals of some countries to price and sell water to Egypt and Sudan. For Egypt and Sudan to pay for the Nile water.

It is worth noting that the Nile Basin countries have unified positions towards the downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan. However, some of the upstream countries that do not depend primarily on the Nile River and have an abundance of water, did not take a hard stance towards Egypt and Sudan, but were more tolerant in their positions. This is due to the fact that There is no harm or effect on their interests.

The roots of the Ethiopian position

With regard to Ethiopia’s position towards the Nile River and Egypt in particular, there are historical roots for this position, but what we want to point out here is the position on the principle of rights acquired based on agreements in the colonial period. Ethiopia announced its rejection of the condition of obtaining prior permission from Egypt and Sudan before Establishing any projects on the Nile River, and reserved for itself the right to use the waters of the Nile, and this was guaranteed by a text in an official memorandum on February 26, 1956, and also claimed ownership of the Nile waters because they originate from their lands, in accordance with the principle of absolute sovereignty.

In addition, Ethiopia rejected the water-sharing agreement between Egypt and Sudan in 1959, and opposed the construction of the High Dam, and formally protested that, and in 1981 announced the start of a project to build 40 dams and canals with US and Israeli support. Until 2013, Ethiopia had already implemented projects related to thirteen dams. Between large and small, Egypt did not object because these dams did not represent a serious harm to it, and the Renaissance Dam, the subject of the crisis with Egypt and Sudan, was the fourteenth dam.

During the Nile Conference held in Addis Ababa in 1997, Ethiopia called for the abolition of colonial agreements and the Egyptian-Sudanese agreement of 1959.

Changing conditions in the Nile Basin

It is axioms, according to the geopolitical school (that the most powerful country among the countries that a river passes through its territory always seeks to control the rest of the territories of other countries for the purpose of controlling the river), and over the past eras, Egypt has enjoyed a strong influence over the river countries, as it became the dominant force in the Nile Basin region This led to the stabilization of the situation, as one of the basin countries, including Ethiopia, did not think of entering into a conflict and direct confrontation with Egypt, especially when it came to Egypt's water security.

In the nineties of the last century, the change in regional conditions in favor of Egypt and Sudan after 2011, and the secession of South Sudan led to the rise of Ethiopia and East African countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya), and the availability of international financing for projects and businesses in these countries, provided by China, contributed In challenging the Egyptian hegemony and its decline in the basin countries.

The change in the international discourse also represented an opportunity for Ethiopia, as the concepts of human security and the equitable and equal use of water resources became popular, after military force and international treaties were the norm.

hegemony transformations

It is known that the relations of states are linked to what is known as the “water variable”, and the Nile River Basin is subject in the relations of its states to this variable, and therefore the relations of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Nile Basin countries must be viewed within the framework of the so-called “hydropolitics”.

Ethiopia’s start to build the Renaissance Dam without waiting for the approval of the downstream countries was a declaration of the end of the era of prior approvals as a condition for projects on the Blue Nile and heralding a shift in hegemony. The Ethiopian government, and the statements of Ethiopian officials confirm the concept of Ethiopian hegemony over the Nile River and this was evident in the announcement of the initiation of building more dams on the Nile, and changing the specifications of the Renaissance Dam and its storage capacity made experts describe it as hostile, and it represents a disaster for Egypt.

Escalation between the Egyptian and Ethiopian strategy

It is important to build expectations about the developments of the Renaissance Dam crisis, to understand the difference between the Egyptian and Ethiopian strategy, as there is an escalation between the two strategies, as Ethiopia follows the strategy of building dams, and Egypt has a strategy to preserve its share of water.

The Nile River represents a lifeline for Egypt and its people throughout history, and a matter of life or death for the Egyptian state, and the Renaissance Dam does not mean water to Ethiopia, as is the case of the High Dam for Egypt, which before it fluctuated between drought and flood according to the rainy seasons on the Abyssinian plateau.

By following the course of the Renaissance Dam negotiations, we find that the negotiating curve indicates that Addis Baba aims to reach the so-called “water zeroing” and create a strategic reality within the framework of water hegemony with which the Egyptian negotiator is unable to find consensual solutions within the framework of joint development and political spaces.

High stakes in the dam crisis

Looking at the Renaissance Dam crisis, we find that we are facing a tripartite conflict between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, which seems intractable to a solution in light of the lack of progress in settling the crisis, which raises the stakes in this conflict, especially since Egypt relies on the Nile River to provide more than 80% of its needs. The water, and the Renaissance Dam, with its specifications and Ethiopia’s unilateral actions, will cause serious harm to Egypt. Studies and estimates and many researchers have elaborated in his statement, clarifying its catastrophic repercussions on Egypt, which may cause an existential threat to the Egyptian people, and harm five million farmers in Egypt, in addition to that Egypt is in a state of failure The presence of the Renaissance Dam will reach in 2025 the level of water scarcity, according to United Nations estimates.

 Change the language of the Egyptian discourse

The period since 2011 has witnessed an escalation of sharp rhetoric in a nationalistic form, which in Egypt reached the point of calling for sabotaging the dam, far from the official discourse.

At the government level, the Egyptian and Sudanese side adhered to the principle of negotiation, and Egypt was keen to stress that its choice is negotiation and a peaceful solution, but with the hardening of the Ethiopian position, which does not change, and does not want to change, the tone of the Egyptian statements, which culminated in the statement of the Egyptian President, rose. , who said that “the dam will not be operated by imposing a fait accompli,” and he also warned at another time against touching a water point in Egypt’s waters.

Egypt has been keen on negotiating, and emphasizing that it is a non-hostile country, in order to come up with two results: a binding agreement or Ethiopian intransigence that the international community will testify to, especially since the negotiation here represents a kind of proof that Egypt is keen on all peaceful paths.

The dangers of beating the drums of war

By Egypt escalating the crisis to the Security Council and blocking the horizon for reaching a binding and just legal agreement that guarantees the water flows to Egypt and Sudan;

There is no guarantee of not slipping into violent conflict, especially in light of the African inability to end the crisis, and the international impotence, whether at the level of the Security Council, or the mediation level of international powers such as the United States and the European Union.

The Egyptian escalation and the steps that followed undoubtedly lend credibility in the event of resorting to the military option, which if the Egyptian state does not officially wave it in the event of the failure of negotiations, but it is not excluded, and it is wrong to question Egypt’s ability to take military action, and to look at this option on the It is impossible.

Conclusion

The Renaissance Dam crisis with its current course and Ethiopia’s insistence on unilateral action leads towards the possibilities of violent conflict, especially that the Renaissance Dam represents an Ethiopian project outside the Nile Basin Initiative and the Framework Cooperation Agreement, a project with specifications that exceed Ethiopia’s development needs, and the persistence of disputes regarding the sharing of Nile waters, And the belief that the quotas are unfair will continue to be a fueling factor for the rough conflicts in the Nile Basin, and the drums of war will always beat.

The completion of the construction and operation of the dam without a binding agreement poses a great danger to regional and international security and stability, especially since the confirmed fact is that there is an increase in demand for water resources as a result of the increase in population and development needs, and the lack of awareness of the needs of the downstream countries and the specific water scarcity of Egypt. It beats the drums of war, makes the outbreak of a water war a possibility rather than a possibility, and represents a threat to international peace and security.

Ethiopia in particular is required to cooperate greatly, and to understand the fears of the downstream countries and Egypt in particular, and that the international community should take the Egyptian fears and warnings seriously, and seek to silence the drums of war that the Renaissance Dam crisis is beating, and its voice becomes louder with the passage of time without reaching a binding and fair legal agreement Between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia.