Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (left) and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (European News Agency)
After Egypt announced on December 19 last, “the end of the negotiating tracks with Ethiopia regarding the Renaissance Dam, due to the latter’s procrastination, and the assertion of its right guaranteed under international conventions to defend its water and national security in the event it is exposed to harm.”
The question now arises about the Egyptian options in dealing with this crisis, especially since the negotiating option is no longer useful after negotiations that lasted 12 years, in addition to Ethiopia’s rejection of the legal option of resorting to arbitration, or international justice, not to mention the extreme difficulty of the military option. With the dam lake about to be filled, this military strike will flood many Sudanese cities, and will have disastrous effects on Sudan, and on Egypt as well.
The recent agreement with Somaliland can be understood in the context of Ethiopia’s endeavor to compete with Egypt’s attempt at hegemony in the Red Sea, after competing with it for water hegemony in the Nile Basin through the Renaissance Dam.
But perhaps Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, without realizing it, provided Egypt with the opportunity to be able to encircle and pressure him in its regional surroundings through neighboring countries - or the so-called countries of the Horn of Africa - whether in the narrow sense, which includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, or in the broad sense, which includes Sudan. , South Sudan, and Kenya.
This opportunity arose after the man, early this year, signed a memorandum of understanding with the Republic of Somaliland, which has not yet been officially recognized, stipulating that he would obtain an area of 20 kilometers in the vicinity of the port of Berbera for a period of 50 years, in exchange for recognizing the Republic of Somaliland and obtaining a share of the airline company. Ethiopian. This agreement was met with angry reactions, whether from neighboring countries, or even from Cairo, or from European countries and the United States. It also has many repercussions, some of which may have surfaced now, and others may appear later.
Reasons for Cairo
The Egyptian rejection of the agreement stems from several considerations, some of which may be related to the failure of the Renaissance Dam negotiations, and attributing this to the Ethiopian policy of procrastination in the negotiation process and following a “fait accompli” policy. Therefore, it is logical for Cairo to reject any agreement concluded by Ethiopia after the failure of these negotiations, not to mention that this The latest agreement may give Addis Ababa a foothold on the Red Sea, which Egypt considers an important part of its national security, in addition to being an Arab lake, which it was able to exploit in the 1973 war against Israel, when it was closed to ships loaded with Iranian oil and heading towards Eilat.
Therefore, this latest agreement with Somaliland can be understood within the framework of the Ethiopian endeavor to compete with the Egyptian attempt at hegemony in the Red Sea, after competing with it for water hegemony in the Nile Basin, through the Renaissance Dam, and other subsequent dams on the Blue Nile, which is one of the most important... The rivers of the Ethiopian plateau, alone constitute 60% of the total water coming to Egypt out of a total of 85% of the water coming from the plateau.
Therefore, in this context, it is possible to understand Cairo’s “violent” reaction to this agreement, especially during the recent visit of the Somali president, where President Sisi affirmed that: “Egypt will not allow any threat to Somalia or its security, and that the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland is rejected by Everyone... Somalia, as a member of the Arab League, has the right to defense support within the framework of the organization’s charter. We will not allow the security of our brothers to be threatened... No one will try Egypt.”
How the Egyptian moved in the Horn of Africa
you can say; Egypt is facing a historic opportunity to try to form a regional alliance under its leadership, which includes neighboring Ethiopian countries, exploiting the state of public dissatisfaction among these countries with the recent agreement, and with Abiy Ahmed’s practices in general, especially after his almost absolute control over the reins of power after the last elections in 2021. And the shift from the “zero problems” policy that he adopted in his first year of rule in 2018, to the policy of stirring up problems with neighboring countries through his efforts to impose Ethiopian hegemony in the region.
Therefore, perhaps Egypt’s first approach in this regard is to undermine the alliance it established in 2018 with Somalia and Eritrea, to achieve regional security and stability, and promote economic development:
Somalia now wants to prove its right to sovereignty over its entire territory, and not obtain any recognition of Somaliland. Therefore, it not only rejected the agreement and escalated against Ethiopia, but also resorted to the opponents of Addis Ababa, so Asmara was the first stop for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.” January 12 The second, then Cairo, January 21. The same applies to Eritrea, which believes that this agreement will not only come at the expense of its ports that Ethiopia uses in the export process, “Massawa and Assab,” but, and this is more important, it fears the possibility of Abiy Ahmed attempting to seize control. On the port of Assab again, in light of its expansionist ambitions on the one hand, and after the statement issued by the government which believed that Addis Ababa had lost its access to the sea (the Eritrean port) as a result of a “historical and legal error” in reference to the approval in 1991 of the Asmara independence referendum from Addis Ababa, Therefore, according to the statement, “the Ethiopian government has been working for years to correct this mistake.”
What further complicates relations between the two sides is Asmara’s rejection of the Pretoria Agreement that Ethiopia signed with the Tigray Front in November 2022, to stop the war, and Asmara’s reported support for the Fano Amharic Front in its recent war against the regime, in addition to the beginning of rapprochement “again” between Eritrea and the Egyptian regime.
Therefore, Egypt can exploit these developments in an attempt to form this alliance with both Somalia and Eritrea, and perhaps the recent visit of the Somali President to Cairo - and the Egyptian support for Somalia, as well as the visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shukry to Asmara immediately after the end of the Somali President’s visit to it, and his statements that... Ethiopia “has become a source of chaos in its regional surroundings” - an indication of the possibility of a rapprochement between the three countries on rejecting this Ethiopian hegemony.
This “proposed” alliance could expand to include Djibouti, which is one of the most prominent people affected by the Ethiopian agreement with Somaliland for two reasons: The first is that it came only two days after the agreement it sponsored between Somalia and Somaliland, which stipulated the resumption of political negotiations between the two parties, with a focus on the crucial issues of “separation or unity,” which means undermining Djibouti’s diplomatic efforts and undermining the idea of negotiations. The second consideration is This agreement may harm Djibouti's economic interests, as 95% of Ethiopian foreign trade passes through its territory, and in return it receives fees ranging between one and a half billion and two billion dollars.
Hence, she realizes that Abiy Ahmed is seeking outlets other than hers. It seems that Egypt has been seeking for some time to consolidate relations with Djibouti, which Sisi was the first Egyptian president to visit in May 2021.
The fifth country that could join this coalition is Sudan, which has witnessed tension in its relationship with Addis Ababa, especially in light of Addis Ababa’s support for Hemedti in the face of Burhan and the armed forces. As for the sixth proposed country, it is South Sudan, neighboring Ethiopia, where Sisi was also the first Egyptian president to visit in 2020, confirming the depth of relations between the two countries. Egypt is seeking to persuade South Sudan not to join the framework agreement on the Nile Basin “Entebbe.” Especially after the statements of the Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources of South Sudan, on March 22, 2013, that “his country does not recognize the 1959 agreement, and that it has joined the Nile Basin Initiative, and is on its way to Entebbe.” This is the same thing that Egypt seeks to convince Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi, By not ratifying the Entebbe Agreement, through a set of economic incentives
However, this proposed Egyptian alliance remains subject to the existence of a carefully and carefully thought-out Egyptian plan that seeks to resolve differences between the coalition countries and each other on the one hand, the strength of the incentives provided to them on the other hand, and the extent of acceptance by these countries that also maintain economic, trade and security agreements with Addis Ababa on the third hand. And finally, the possible Ethiopian reaction against these Egyptian moves.