Ten years ago, shots were fired at a protest rally in Kyiv, increasingly engulfed in unrest. At that time, no one understood that Ukraine was crossing the line separating the now-habitual rallies from the beginning of the loss of statehood as such. Moreover, no one could imagine that the processes launched in those fateful days in Kyiv would determine the geopolitical picture of the world ten years later, leading to the largest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War.
The murder of about 100 Euromaidan activists by snipers who were never found in three days, from February 18 to February 20, 2014, created the main mega-myth of neo-Bandera Ukraine -
the legend of the “heavenly hundred”
who sacrificed themselves for the sake of “freedom and democracy.” But then what happened did not particularly surprise anyone. The degree of violence in Kyiv was constantly increasing, but neither side could gain an advantage.
“Bloodletting” to strengthen “negotiating positions” was, if not expected, then predictable. After all, not one of the “color revolutions” (and everyone understood that this was what was happening in Kyiv) was complete without a sacred sacrifice.
What was striking was the number of victims in a short period of time and the helplessness of the authorities. It was probably on February 21, 2014 that Viktor Yanukovych lost his last chance to remain in power, not deciding to harshly suppress opposition rallies, intern its leaders, and identify and arrest nameless snipers. He continued to act in line with the usual policy of oligarchic agreements for post-Soviet Ukraine, moreover, believing in the sincerity of Western visitors who lobbied for an agreement with the opposition.
Who the “unknown snipers” were, how the “heavenly hundred” died, where, by the way, people were recorded who actually died at the hands of Maidan activists, is now of interest only to historians. It is much more important to uncover the mechanisms used by the West, primarily the United States, to bring the “color revolutions” to a fundamentally new level of violence. Which led at a certain stage to Ukraine’s actual loss of statehood.
Let's highlight four questions.
First.
Did Western leaders initially have the goal of overthrowing the government of Viktor Yanukovych, or did everything work out “by itself”?
This question can be answered positively with confidence. Everything that the emissaries of Western countries did in Kyiv amounted to the complete delegitimation of Yanukovych as president. Yes, there was a visible difference between the “slow” European scenario and the “fast” American one. But the ending was the same in both versions, and the political psychology of the then president of Ukraine was brilliantly calculated. And Yanukovych did not disappoint expectations.
Second.
Why did the usual “hustle and bustle” between the government and the pro-Western opposition in Kyiv lead to such catastrophic consequences?
The political system of Ukraine, fundamentally deeply oligarchic, by 2014 had degraded to the format of feudal-oligarchic localism. And the institution of the President of Ukraine as a symbol of the unity of a mosaic country has already been discredited twice: first by the “third round” of elections, held under pressure from the West in 2004, and then by the incompetent and morally wretched “political ataman” of the times of Viktor Yushchenko.
The West, when starting a game with Yanukovych, proceeded from the fact that there is no completely legitimate government in Ukraine.
There is no completely legitimate political power in Ukraine even now.
Third.
Did Western countries initially plan to turn Ukraine into “anti-Russia”?
Most likely not. The West will turn in this direction after Minsk-2, which, as is now openly admitted, was signed only to gain time. Then, in February 2014, there was much more hope for destabilization in Russia itself, for forces friendly to the West coming to power in Moscow. After this, Ukraine would be needed only as a financial “laundromat” and, perhaps, as a testing ground for testing new socio-information technologies. Everything was confused by the reunification of Crimea with Russia, which gave the Russian authorities such a resource of trust that could no longer be interrupted by any political technologies. It was necessary to change the strategy, which took time.
Finally, the fourth one.
Was it possible to preserve the integrity of the country after blood was shed in Kyiv?
Hardly. The political regionalization of Ukraine was on the rise, the February murders in Kyiv and the disappearance of the remnants of legitimate power simply pushed the process of regionalization, including after the betrayal of Yanukovych, a demand was formed for strong leaders capable of defending the interests of the residents of the southeast. But the “disassembly” of Ukraine could be gradual, through confederalization and without great sacrifices. But here the West played its bloody role, pushing the post-Maidan “Turchinov junta,” tied by the “secret of unknown snipers,” to a forceful solution.
The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editors.