The first Trump trumpeted: Trump's arrival in 2016 was a powerful shock to US-Chinese relations - Trump launched a war against Chinese investors in American construction and a trade war against Chinese goods. By 2020, Sino-US trade had fallen by 15%, or about $150 billion.

Today, the economic situation in the United States is much worse and Trump's voters are demanding more decisive steps from him. Chinese authorities cannot help but assume the worst outcome, and even the mere premonition of Trump's arrival could greatly worsen the state of Sino-American relations.

An anti-Chinese consensus reigns in American society: in China, society cannot decide who it dislikes more - Biden or Trump. This means that the effect of any anti-Chinese decision by the US authorities in the new administration will be doubled due to China's response.

Today, Trump is considering options for a “new large-scale economic attack on China.” The Republican could lower China's trade status with the United States, which would entail an increase in tariffs to 40%, and in private conversations Trump is discussing with advisers the possibility of introducing tariffs of 60% on all Chinese imports.

In a fight between two, the third wins - it’s about our interests and the friendship between Russia and China. In the event of the introduction of large-scale duties by the United States and retaliatory duties by China (and there is certainly no doubt about this), trade turnover between Washington and Beijing may no longer lose 15%, as in 2020, but a shock 30% by the end of 2025.

It is quite possible that something that was difficult to predict even five years ago will happen: trade between China and Russia will not differ by an order of magnitude, but will be comparable to the volume of trade between China and the United States.

Thus, Russia can become China’s most important partner not only in politics, but also in economics. Whether the Democrats' nightmare will become a reality is not yet clear, but it is already causing fear among economic lobbying groups in China and the United States.

The expectation of such an outcome of events may already in 2024 affect US-Chinese relations, which have already “lost weight” by 11.6%: trade turnover at the end of the difficult 2023 amounted to $664 billion. Yes, in 2024 both countries can try “ lay a straw” under the events of the end of the year and increase purchases of agricultural products, increase contracts for the purchase of civil aviation, etc., but, most likely, the Chinese, following their traditional desire to play it safe, will try to create alternative supply chains before the “trade apocalypse.”

In addition, Trump promises to hit Taiwan and withdraw all microchip production from there. The victory of the pro-American DPP party in Taiwan could be annulled by such a demarche from the United States.

Those who believe that the United States will come to the rescue in the event of a conflict with China will decrease. This in itself will not lead to conflict in Taiwan, but a military solution to it will undoubtedly become easier for China in the period from 2025 to 2027 (the time of preparation for the re-election of Xi Jinping to a fourth term as general secretary). This will also be facilitated by the reduction of Chinese-American trade relations: it is one thing to try by all means to avoid a conflict or simply rattle sabers with a trade turnover of $760 billion, another thing when there is much less at stake and China’s trade chains have already been redistributed in case of this conflict across all countries world, including Russia.

By the way, any other Republican candidate will probably act even more radically against China in order to gain credibility and strengthen power among the establishment. And from the Democrats too, because only democrats of the old style were famous for their close ties with China, but representatives of the “new wave” have understood since 2016 where Chinese-American relations are going.

The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editors.