Intensifying fighting in cities has prompted many Sudanese to seek refuge in neighboring countries (Getty Images)
If the whole world had watched the film "The Attack on Darfur" by American director "Oy-Paul" – when he filmed, with a reality camera, the way the Janjaweed militia attacks the villages and cities of Darfur, and the heinous massacres it commits during wars, including the killing of men and children, the relentless rape of women, the burning of homes and animals and everything that comes alive – it would realize the gravity of what is happening in Sudan.
He also identified precisely what was happening in Khartoum, which has been subjected to unprecedented destruction and brutal attacks that have extinguished the flame of life, and this city may need many years to recover from its wounds.
Perhaps the people of Darfur, who knew and experienced militia warfare – were not surprised by what is happening now, and they inherited wisdom and believed in many popular legends.
One of these legends, of course, is um Kawakiya, a chaos – in which people receive each other's blood, honours and possessions – that occurs every hundred years, sometimes less, and is preceded by disturbing harbingers.
People are motivated to fight under the weight of tribal nervousness, in the absence of government and political parties, but the question is necessarily puzzling: How did um Kawakia move from Darfur to Khartoum, and what are the post-war scenarios?
Before we answer these questions, or rather foresee the future of the political process in Sudan, it is important to answer the central question that preoccupies most Sudanese: When will the war end?
But I think the important question is how the war will end, that is, by fighting or by negotiation? At the same time, some readings indicate that the war will end in the same way it began, suddenly and without permission, especially since the intelligence aspect of this war prevails over the others.
In addition, the external party that supplies weapons and funds to the rebel movement has goals behind this war, and once its goals are achieved, or it feels the futility of what it is doing, it will necessarily stop, or it may change its approach to dealing with Sudanese affairs.
Pieces on the chessboard
The Sudanese government must have realized this, and realized that the RSF is just pieces on the chessboard, moved according to external assessments, so the government began to direct accusations at RSF allies abroad.
At the same time, there are also diplomatic pressures and open intelligence lines between the Sudan and those countries, which may lead to understandings and results satisfactory to both parties.
It is important to identify actors on the ground, those that have chosen deceptive neutrality, but at the same time move under the guise of stopping the war.
By actors, I mean the military forces in the areas of operations, in particular: the Sudanese army on the one hand, and the Rapid Support on the other, and each party has allies from the civilian forces.
The Sudanese army, without a doubt, has gained the support of the broad Islamist current, in addition to the national alignment that included parties with mass weight, such as: the Democratic Unionist Party, led by Maulana Muhammad Osman Al-Mirghani, and the Beja Congress, as well as the armed movements that signed the Juba Peace and have fighting armies, all of which are now under a unified military command in the city of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, including forces affiliated with Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nur.
As for the rapid support, it depends on a political incubator that has been united and blocked by the forces of freedom and change, and its external line is led by the resigned Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, although Hamdok is less enthusiastic, and is only trying to win the favor of America and its allies, and some international organizations, which are all that are interested in controlling Sudan's resources, or rather preventing Russia and China from benefiting from these resources, especially gold.
The future scenarios for Sudan are mainly linked to the outcome of the conflict between these powers, the key to which is the liberation of the capital, Khartoum.
In the event that the army wins over the RSF, which is the closest scenario – especially after the army obtained quality weapons and mobilized thousands of fighters, and the political front supporting the support cracked, with the high frequency of international condemnations of the violations of the Rapid Support Forces, and many breakthroughs in foreign policy, the most important of which is the end of UNITAMS' mission in Sudan, which sided with one side over the other, as well as the approaching determination of the fate of the Rapid Support Commander Hemedti, where many indications go to the possibility of his death – this victory does not mean the annihilation of the Support Forces. Not until the end of the forces of freedom and change.
These forces are forces that the President of the Sovereignty Council and Army Commander Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan does not want to fade, but he is keen, by not cutting the lines of communication with them, to be present in the next stage, to balance the political field, and she herself has become convinced that it will not take over the government again, and what is not fully realized does not leave most of it.
The Islamist forces, which supported the army and fought alongside it, will throw away their arms and prepare for elections after the end of the war with new alignments and a more flexible ideological tendency. For its own organizational arrangements, it has decided not to participate in the government during the transitional period.
But this scenario, which will culminate in the victory of the army, needs negotiations, especially since there is rarely an endless war at the negotiating table, which is necessary even for the arrangements of the surrender process, determining the obligations of the warring parties, ensuring the provision of financial support, and compensating those affected, and these obstacles are difficult to overcome without international guarantees and financiers, which means that a return to the Jeddah platform is possible, but in a different way this time, after the failures that accompanied previous rounds.
Although no one knows, either, what exactly will happen before or after the Jeddah pulpit, "the unexpected always happens," according to a common French proverb that writer André Maurois used as the title of one of his novels, especially since the chronic authoritarian problem in the land of the Niles is related to the ambitions of people and tribes, and military coups.
We may also be surprised by a new RSF leadership that turns against the Dagalo family and takes the reins at a dialogue table with another military leadership at the head of state.
It is also not excluded, in the midst of these shifting sands, and if these changes are not at the level of people, they will certainly affect alliances and policies, and they will zero the meter at all.