A reflection shows a woman next to a poster of a Qassam fighter, holding a rocket launcher and standing near a life-size model of a drone with the phrase "Al-Aqsa Flood" in Beirut's southern suburbs (French)

Vast Boon:

Fifty years between the Egyptian army's fight in the October 1973 war against the Israeli entity – which has become one of the most prominent feats of Egypt's modern history – and the inability to even bring relief supplies into the Gaza Strip, where the Zionists carry out horrific daily massacres of women, children and the elderly, except with the permission of the Zionists themselves. Between the declaration of war in 1973, the restoration of Arab dignity, and the mere failure to withdraw the ambassador from Tel Aviv – after forty days of massacres – is vast.

Resistance from duty to burden:

The October 1973 war was the last Arab-Israeli war, followed by Egypt's entry into the path of a peaceful settlement (the Camp David Agreement 1978), and the Palestinian resistance faced the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, almost alone. Since the Arab regimes approved the initiative of Emir Fahd in 1982, these regimes have resolved their paths, and this has been enshrined since their adoption of the Arab initiative in 2002, but they linked this to Israel's commitment to the two-state solution in all its requirements. However, several Arab countries have ignored the Israeli commitment requirement and established contacts and relations with the Israeli entity under the table or even above the table. This process deepened after the PLO joined the settlement process and signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, in which it committed itself only to peaceful means.
Thus, the settlement process turned the resistance work into a "burden" after supporting it was a well-deserved duty, and the regimes' support for the Palestinian Authority in suppressing the resistance and coordinating with the occupation seemed normal, given that the organization is the official body representing the Palestinians.

Burden to Opponent Resistance:

Since the rise of the counter-wave of the Arab Spring in 2013, the Arab position on the question of Palestine has been declining and miserable. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a number of Arab regimes allowed a margin of popular interaction and financial donation campaigns, and gave reasonable scope to the line of resistance to communicate its ideology politically and in the media. Its media outlets have been bolder and more open in condemning the Israeli entity and its practices and its supporters. After this wave, these Arab regimes have become more inclined to restrict freedoms and suppress the popular will, and more belligerent against popular and civil institutions, opposition figures, and political activists.
The media has also been used to focus on local Qatari issues, to retreat from themselves, and to occupy people with their livelihood or trivial matters, with the absence of Palestine, its resistance and the steadfastness of its people from the media except in a marginal framework. Some impulses were given way to market normalization with the Zionists and to attack the resistance, while nationalist, nationalist and free Islamic voices were systematically suppressed and arrested. This reflected negatively on the ability of the masses to interact with the cause of Palestine and the issues of the nation. Moreover, many peoples, who have tasted the bitterness of regime repression and exhausted by internal conflicts, are no longer able to express themselves and interact to the same extent with the Palestinian cause, although they still express the authenticity of the nation and reject normalization, with Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa still at its heart.
The resistance line was not helped by its overwhelming victory in the 2006 Legislative Council elections. In light of the Palestinian division and Hamas's control of the Gaza Strip, the regimes sided with "Palestinian legitimacy."
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, three factors emerged that pressured Arab retreat and retreat from supporting the resistance: the first of which is internal conflicts, conflicts and turmoil in light of the waves against the Arab Spring, and preoccupation with internal concerns and files. Second, the Arab regimes that continued to dominate, away from the management of their peoples, have become more vulnerable to pressures and more in need of regional and international external support, especially the United States and the West. This made it easier for Americans, especially under Trump, to press for normalization of relations with Israel.
Third, the Palestinian armed resistance consists of two Islamist movements: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. They were united by the regimes' opposition to the line of resistance and the hostility of these regimes to the Islamic currents that spearheaded the Arab Spring in their countries, which made resistance work more difficult and the lack of an incubating strategic environment in the Arab countries. This caused the resistance to build a strong relationship with Iran, which supported the resistance financially and militarily, which further strained relations with a number of Arab regimes, and came to view the resistance through its relationship with Iran, rather than through its duty towards Jerusalem, holy sites and Palestine, and its national and Islamic responsibilities and national security.
With the expansion of the normalization process that accompanied the establishment of relations with the Israeli entity by four Arab countries in 2020 – and the development of the network of political, economic, tourism, security, military and media relations and interests, and the conclusion of dozens of cooperation agreements – the Palestinian issue turned into a marginal issue, and many Israeli practices against the Palestinian people and against land and holy sites were turned a blind eye. The Israeli leadership's shift to more religious and nationalist extremism has also been overlooked. Thus, if the question of Palestine itself has turned into a burden and a problem after it was a duty, honor and responsibility, then armed resistance against Israel has become antagonizing and provoking the regimes, and appearing as an element of failure and disruption of the path of normalization, and as an element of revolution and incitement for the citizens of these countries.

The shock of the battle of "Al-Aqsa Flood":

The impact of surprise was great on the countries that rushed to normalize their relations with the Israeli entity, so the October 7 battle came as a flood that shocked the rapid normalization train and disrupted it, and made those who are ecstatic with relations and their flow fall into a state of stupor and confusion, as they felt a state of anger and anger at the resistance.

Therefore, the UAE did not hide its anger at Hamas' behavior, as Minister of State for International Cooperation Reem Al-Hashemi stated in the Security Council on 24/11/2023, – in a language completely uncharacteristic in Arabic literature – that Hamas' attacks on October 7 were "barbaric and heinous" attacks, and demanded the immediate release of the "hostages", describing what Hamas did as "crimes." But when it came to the Israeli occupation, it only demanded not to apply the policy of collective punishment, and did not condemn the crimes and massacres of the occupation, whose images and scenes were broadcast in front of the whole world, and the number of martyrs in Gaza exceeded 5100,2100, including about 1120,17 children and 11,2023 women, while adopting the Israeli narrative, which proved to be full of lies and exaggerations.
As for the Crown Prince of Bahrain, he condemned in the "Manama Dialogue" on 7/<>/<> the "Al-Aqsa flood" operation, describing it as "barbaric and horrific" and condemning Hamas and its behavior. At the same time, however, he did not condemn the Israeli crimes and massacres and did not describe them with the same characteristics, despite the fact that their brutality and barbarism have been seen by the world with hundreds of evidences and proofs.
Dennis Ross, a U.S. official who was instrumental in the peace settlement process, revealed that he spoke with a number of Arab leaders after October <> he had known for a long time, and that they told him that Hamas in Gaza must be destroyed; that if Hamas was considered victorious, it would legitimize its ideology. Musa Abu Marzouq, a senior Hamas leader, said in an interview with Al Jazeera Mubasher that many foreigners told him that members of the Palestinian Authority and some Arab countries were secretly calling on the West to eliminate Hamas.

Cold Arab-Islamic Summit:

The emergency Arab-Islamic summit on the aggression on Gaza was held on the thirty-sixth day of the aggression (November 11, 2023) after a great deal of inaction and "yawning", and after the martyrdom of about ten thousand martyrs, most of them civilians.
The final statement of the conference came without the usual classical behavior, as it stressed the cessation of aggression, allowing the entry of aid into the Gaza Strip, lifting the siege on it, rejecting the displacement of Palestinians, denouncing the double standards of the West and making Israel a state above the law, and affirming adherence to "peace" as a strategic choice, and to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. He called for financial support for the Government of Palestine (the Ramallah Authority government) and the need to mobilize international partners for the reconstruction of Gaza, but did not specify any financial contributions to any of the countries participating in the conference.
In short, the conference came within the framework of raising the threshold and absorbing what can be absorbed from the Arab and Islamic popular anger. There are no practical points to sever or suspend relations with the Israeli entity, nor to exert real pressure or serious threats if the aggression is not stopped or the Rafah crossing opened, and there is no support for the resistance or praise for its performance, nor for the steadfastness of the popular incubator in the Gaza Strip. There is even an insistence on the philosophy of powerlessness and on the failed path to compromise, which Israel has dropped and thrown behind its back. Nothing in the resolutions gives any serious positions towards the Judaization of Jerusalem and the dangerous path entered by the Judaization of Al-Aqsa.

***

As a result, the new nadir emerged in the handling of the Israeli aggression by a number of Arab regimes on the Gaza Strip, as reluctantly waiting for the occupation army to finish its "mission" to eliminate Hamas' rule over the Gaza Strip, as an opportunity to end the "abnormal and disturbing" situation, according to their perception. There was a feeling that the battle was decided in favor of the occupation, and therefore there was no need for practical steps to support the steadfastness of the resistance, nor the need to exert strong and effective pressure using their real weights and capabilities to stop the aggression, or to bring aid into the Gaza Strip.
On the other hand, there were a number of Arab countries that maintained their usual support for Palestine and their usual behavior towards the resistance and their support or understanding of its behavior, such as Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Oman.