The recent Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement represents a new confirmation that many countries in the world are becoming more and more convinced that the deep political and economic crises they are experiencing, especially those following the war in Ukraine, are very difficult to reach a comfortable settlement, unless they are preceded by strategic political and economic decisions that until recently seemed impossible and difficult to accept.

In this context, it is possible to understand the recent developments in Egyptian-Turkish relations, after nearly 12 years of tension, estrangement and disharmony in positions and orientations regarding regional and international files, it seems that the two countries are on their way to overcoming this and entering a new phase of relations that responds to the economic, political and even security necessities, imposed by the requirements of the current international environment with all its pragmatism that transcends all colors of lines, including the color red, which expresses the impossible and impossible, and in a way that achieves the greatest possible of possible understandings, rearranging the priorities of contentious files, and marginalizing or ignoring files that until recently were a stumbling block in the way of normalizing relations between them.

Here, the Libyan file emerges as one of the most important files that are expected to turn from a conflict file to a file with many political and economic opportunities and interests, and understanding and coordination around it may lead to a major shift in the form and nature of the relations between the two countries, and the effects of this will extend to the whole region, and even the international environment.

The extent of regional and international interference in the Libyan file makes the Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement around it a matter of concern for other powers that may seek - within the framework of protecting their interests - to obstruct any joint steps taken by the two countries there. Many expect that the upcoming visit of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Turkey will witness the official announcement of this joint policy on the Libyan file, which turns the page on every previous dispute.

In addition to the worsening economic pressures experienced by the two countries, especially Egypt, whose currency has fallen to record levels and whose economy is controlled by increasing and unprecedented rates of inflation, the recent developments in the Sudanese arena and the consequent entry of the country into an armed conflict that lasted since mid-April do not seem to be in sight an opportunity for it to end peacefully or militarily. A situation similar to the Libyan case in the southern flank of the Egyptian state, in which the main actor is influential regional powers.

It seems that Egypt's stifling economic conditions and the fatigue of its diplomacy in managing the Libyan and Palestinian files have made it forced to reformulate the map of its regional and international alliances according to new visions that pave the way for building relations with Turkey that transcend the existing crises and the decline of the network of alliances with other regional powers, especially since credible reports have shown that these regional powers pursue policies that ostensibly cooperate and coordinate with Egypt, but they are secretly not embarrassed to take positions. They clearly conflict with the supreme interests of Egyptian national security in Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

The density of clouds and the forest of intertwined intelligence lines in Libya may not allow for a sober and realistic reading of the realities of the situation in Libya, and the joint opportunities it may allow for Egyptian-Turkish cooperation, but at least it provided the decision-maker – especially the Egyptian – with sufficient experience to allow the formulation of a more effective policy with the Sudanese crisis, which is very similar to that in Libya in terms of its general context and the size of regional and international intervention.

Another fact that we should pay attention to when talking about Egyptian-Turkish relations is that the two countries have become aware that the regional and international situation has become more pragmatic. With the world going through an economic crisis, the repercussions of the post-Corona pandemic, and the complexities of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it becomes necessary to overcome previous obstacles and seek joint economic, political and security understandings.

The current developments in Saudi-Iranian relations, which are based on a new reading of the complex reality, help us to expect that Egyptian-Turkish relations will be heading towards a new phase entitled zeroing the problems that marred their relations with important regional neighboring countries.

The recent victory of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the presidential elections, and the subsequent initiative of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to be the first of his well-wishers, contributed to further preparing the atmosphere for entering the new phase, and the practical culmination of this stage will be the upcoming visit of the Egyptian president to Turkey, which was originally scheduled for July 27 and then postponed to an unspecified date in August or September 2023.

The coming weeks will determine whether "pragmatism" will determine the future course of Egyptian-Turkish relations or whether influential regional powers that fear the repercussions of this rapprochement will succeed in thwarting or hindering it.