Beyond the New U.S. Activism in the Middle East

Earlier this month, Washington and Tehran reached a deal to swap Iranian prisoners in the United States for American prisoners held by Iran, and to release billions of dollars of Iranian funds frozen abroad. Shortly after the deal was announced, U.S. officials said Iran had significantly slowed the pace of its stockpiling of weapons-grade enriched uranium and reduced some of its stockpiles in what appeared to be part of the deal. If the deal is completed, the move would be the first diplomatic breakthrough between the two sides since negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear deal reached an impasse, demonstrating their strong desire to maintain a space for diplomacy to reinvigorate nuclear negotiations in the future, or at least reduce the risk of a continued nuclear stalemate on the status quo that has been relatively calm between the two countries since Biden took office. In parallel with this détente, the Biden administration is actively working on a project to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. According to a report from the Wall Street Journal, Washington and Riyadh have reached agreement on the broad outlines of a deal in which Saudi Arabia recognizes Israel in exchange for concessions to the Palestinians, US security guarantees and civilian nuclear aid to the kingdom.

The new U.S. activity in the Middle East reflects Washington's desire to return to playing an influential role in the dynamics of regional politics, at a time when the decline in U.S. relations with its allies in the region raises doubts about the future of its role. When Biden made his first visit to the region in July last year, one that included Saudi Arabia, Israel and the Palestinian territories, his main goal was to persuade Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to pump more oil into global markets to curb the price hike caused by Russia's war in Ukraine. More than a year after that visit, and the major shifts in the Middle East, including the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the growing Chinese involvement in the region, Biden seems convinced that reversing the United States' role in the Middle East may bring risks that outweigh the expected gains. As a result of this conviction, the United States has embarked on a series of initiatives mostly aimed at allaying the concerns of its Gulf allies about its security commitment in the region and dealing with the new risks that have emerged.

The perceived benefits of Turkish swing can be summarized as three main benefits:

• First, China's emergence as a threat to the United States' standing in the region led to Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Saudi Arabia nearly five months after Biden's visit. This visit included major economic agreements between the two countries, and Beijing was then able to sponsor an agreement to normalize relations between Riyadh and Tehran, which the Biden administration warned about the consequences of the decline in the region. It became clear that Beijing saw the U.S. retreat as an opportunity to displace it as the region's dominant power. Unlike Washington, whose strong presence in the Middle East for eight decades has relied on its close alliances with actors such as the Gulf states, Turkey, and Israel, China has the advantage of forging broader partnerships involving various actors, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran.
• Second: The Saudi trend is increasing towards China. Although Beijing's role in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement may, from a strategic perspective, serve the United States' desire to reduce the risk of large-scale regional security turmoil, it actually serves to push Riyadh to strengthen its nascent partnerships with China and Russia. Given the increasing importance that the Gulf region has gained in international politics, especially after the Russian-Ukrainian war and in terms of global energy policies, it is receiving special attention in global geopolitical competition. One of the expected benefits for the United States in giving Saudi Arabia future security guarantees is that it will act as a powerful catalyst to persuade MbS not to move forward with strengthening ties with Beijing and Moscow.
• Third: The escalating risks of Iran's nuclear program. As a result of the deadlock in negotiations to revive the nuclear agreement between Tehran and the West, Iran has again accelerated the process of uranium enrichment, and the risks of the shadow war between Iran and Israel escalating into a military confrontation, especially with the return of Benjamin Netanyahu to power. In addition, Iran believes that the U.S. retreat is an opportunity to strengthen its regional influence. Growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia, which has partly helped Moscow in its war on Ukraine, has shown that the stalled negotiations to revive the Iran nuclear deal could push Iran to engage closely alongside Russia and China in the global geopolitical competition with the West. All these reasons have recently prompted the Biden administration to open a channel of dialogue with Iran through a prisoner exchange deal. The agreement is expected to encourage Iran to slow its nuclear program and consider the benefits of keeping channels of communication open with the West to revive the nuclear deal in the future.
• Fourth, Benjamin Netanyahu's return to power and his formation of the most extreme government in Israel's history have not only increased the risk of war between Israel and Iran and the security burdens it imposes on the United States in the region, but have also raised the risk of a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. An expected benefit of the United States returning to exert strong influence over Israeli policy is to reduce the risk of war with Iran and an escalation of conflict with the Palestinians, as well as to strengthen new Arab-Israeli relations by involving Saudi Arabia in normalization agreements with Israel. Encouraging potential normalization between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, as well as strong interactions between U.S. allies in the region such as the Gulf, Turkey, and Israel, would enhance future allies' ability to rely on themselves with less U.S. involvement in managing their affairs.

In light of this, the new U.S. activity cannot be seen as signaling a radical change in the U.S. approach to its role in the Middle East in the long term, or as much as it reflects its desire to remain strongly engaged in regional issues, as much as it aims to manage the process of loosening engagement with the region in a way that minimizes collateral effects on U.S. interests.