There are many examples of the importance of border control in such an open theater of operations.

Afghanistan is a negative example. Despite the successful ambush actions of the special forces of the USSR Armed Forces, we did not block the external border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Pakistan made it a passage yard, all American aid came from abroad. We could not defeat the mujahideen, even though we fought in the Afghan mountains and desert for ten years.

A positive example is the second Chechen campaign. As soon as we entered Chechnya, we had not yet taken Grozny, but had already blocked the Chechen section of the border with Georgia: the daring operation "Argun" was carried out, foreign aid stopped flowing into the KTO cauldron, giant gangs of militants were defeated by troops, the enemy underground was defeated by the Chechen police. All.

A failed example is the Minsk agreements. If Kiev had fulfilled them, Ukraine would have taken control of the borders of Donbass with Russia. But the West did not need peace, it achieved a war in Ukraine.

It must be admitted that before the Minsk agreements, Kiev tried to advance its troops and seize the border with the Russian Federation on its own. Unsuccessfully. And then Washington simply redirected them to the war - and here it is.

A positive example (Chechnya) is indicative of the combined actions of our law enforcement agencies. We unexpectedly landed the 56th Airborne Assault Regiment on the border with Georgia, took control of the commanding heights and began to "slide" into gorges, valleys and roads. I had the honor of landing with the troops. At the same time, Russian troops began to enter the border from the west (Ingushetia) and east (Dagestan), making their way towards each other. They closed - and the fate of the militants in Chechnya was decided.

What to do with the border between Ukraine and Poland? Who knows. If the Chechen version plays out, then Ukraine will not even be able to think about a counteroffensive. She will have big problems around the perimeter. But we do not have the strength for such actions. We would like to double the number of groups - and everything will go. This requires decisive mobilization. In my opinion, no one will go to it in Russia. We will call for volunteers, and this is long and not enough.

The author's point of view may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.