Human experiences, in politics and governance, tell us how the political leadership deals with the strategic moment, and how the rules react to this rare moment, it is a strategic compass, or a "model" by which the present turns to a new destination, and usually matches the basic premises for calibrating the different options, which allow themselves to be examined and sorted.
Thus, leadership tends to overlook the familiar assumptions and perceptions prior to that moment, and prefers less traditional decisions, which are built on the emerging foundations of strategic visions, by combining the common position of leadership, and analysing all the assumptions of the basic typical perceptions of central estimates, which the decision links to beliefs, principles, and consensus, adopted and demonstrated by public opinion. Every strategic philosophy refers to a set of these beliefs, public opinions, or regulations regarding the nature of this consensus. Leaders apply these beliefs, values, and rules to help make policy decisions that provide guidance, cohesion, mission, and motivation to pursue the strategic goals of the country and society.
showdowns
The ongoing battles in Sudan and their catastrophic repercussions create a rare moment of national vigilance and strategic clarity, and add a new political experience to what the Sudanese experienced in their recent and distant past, after the intransigence of the Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change created new sources of uncertainty about the future path of political consensus.
However, the military's integrated victories should produce a rare moment of strategic clarity for its partners in the political process, from the broad political community that has been excluded in the past period. Despite what is happening on the ground, at the moment, there is still a negotiable path to manage the remainder of the transitional period, not necessarily according to past bargaining guidelines, or what was known as the framework agreement, but rather a broader agreement on a sincere approach to elections, because any result less than the outcome of the ballot box will, in the long run, be a worse outcome for stability than what existed before April 15, 2023.
At the national level, most of the political debate was concentrated between three main camps, the first of which was the army, with the Rapid Support at the time, the second was the Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change, and the third was the Democratic Bloc, which includes the membership of the Juba Peace Agreement tracks, and others.
At the other end of the political spectrum are those who have been forced to remain outside the equation, representing a broad coalition of nationalists opposed to foreign interventions, who argue that Sudan's national interests and sovereignty simply lie elsewhere than in the hands of its own people, and that the rules of a new type of colonialism are being established through different arrangements and names.
Find a vision
There is no doubt that exclusion was clearly demonstrated when most of the people continued to describe themselves as being outside the political process that was underway, that the state had become "less effective" in whatever it decided, and that the army leadership had to sit down and pay attention. The challenge before them was their ability to formulate a compelling vision for the future of the local community, the region and the world. Therefore, the lack of a future vision for the state and society is a real problem, and it would not have been possible to overcome it without the foolish adventure that some aspirants to easy access to power introduced rapid support into.
Will the Sudanese army, after all patriots rally around it, face a challenge related to formulating a new vision for its future role, or updating the basic components of its comprehensive strategic plans, which include the vision, mission and national goals, in addition to the more specific strategic goals and measures on which its combat doctrine is based?
This alternative spectrum, which is out of the equation, is the most politically important, but it has remained somewhere between the first and third category. He continued to condemn the activists' rush to foreign missions and their barbarism in attitude towards the regular forces, while at the same time praising the courage of the army, especially its ability to guard the country's borders in the east and west. However, even before the recent escalation, it was not clear whether the approach of this spectrum had succeeded in making a believable "deal" with the first and third groups, and had never approached the second, which had initiated absolute hostility since the day of its formation, but had been accused of a number of accusations, not least of all the relationship with the former Islamic Front regime.
The main supporters of such an approach, or selective screening, were and still are foreigners with their Sudanese loyalists, led by Germany's Peretz Volcker, who came at the invitation of former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and with the mandate of the Security Council, supported by a tripartite committee comprising the United Nations, the African Union and IGAD, and a quartet in which the ambassadors of the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are active.
Public opinion monitoring continues to indicate that the Sudanese overwhelmingly oppose any kind of foreign intervention, even if it is covered by surveys of "friends of Sudan", who have not been elected to this friendship. Similarly, ample evidence suggests that there are "friends" who support the fighting raging in the country's capital and its outskirts, even though their partisans are now suffering major battlefield setbacks, and that broader popular mobilization makes it more difficult for them to realize the dream of dismantling the Sudanese army in favor of mercenary militias.
Moreover, these tripartite and quartet committees are active in seeking a peace that preserves some of their investment in rapid support and support for the framework agreement they have established on the scale of a political minority, the exclusionary second camp, or the Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change. This is something that the military has categorically rejected because it is convinced that even if a negotiated peace temporarily freezes the conflict, there is no guarantee that the conflict will remain frozen in the long term. Various experiences of conflict have taught him that other "frozen" conflicts in Sudan have re-ignited in Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile, and continue to fuel the ongoing instability in the country.
Future Requirements
Therefore, despite the enthusiasm associated with political ambitions in determining the future of governance in Sudan, the reality is that the next stage will have to deal with a long array of great challenges facing the state and society, after the collapse of all the rubble of experimentation at the level of governance and administration, and the macroeconomic recession, if not a recession that produced the country's positive growth data.
Therefore, once the effects of the conflict have been addressed, the State should focus on adopting a more integrated and comprehensive framework for managing social and economic policy and policies, with a focus on improving domestic resource mobilization, enhancing spending efficiency, exploring alternative sources of financing fiscal deficits consistent with macroeconomic stability and growth, and above all with the imperatives of independence and sovereignty.
The war against the state, led by the Rapid Support Militia, proves that Sudan is in greater danger than political activists had ever thought the day it began, and all dreams of power are at stake. It has been proven to public opinion, in Sudan and elsewhere, that states are not built by chants and slogans, but progress by planning and institutions, which are based on security, stability, and broad consensus on the upper limit, which is the bond of patriotism, and the lowest and the quotas of employment and means of pension.
History is accelerating and stealing Sudan's opportunities again, because the rationality of politics weakens with each new cycle of government. This present crisis has made it even clearer, as we live in a situation shaped by the policies of exclusion and revenge, during 4 years of disagreement, and the entrenchment of vulnerability.
Certainly, this means that the call to respond to the demands to control the borders of national sovereignty must be accelerated, as activists have done everything that could degrade their destinies, and the interventions of the triumvirates, quatrains, embassies and the UN colonial mission are in the lap of those who have accepted the loss of the sale. The strategic moment requires taking the necessary swift measures to break many of the "taboos" along the way to recover from the chaos of the lean years of drought, and unprecedented steps, after the army found tremendous support from the people, and was able to quickly triumph over the conspiracy of activists and the rapid support rebellion, and restore legitimacy for the benefit of the state and society.
Conclusion
The army leadership must now transform the political vigilance of the Sudanese people, which it is scrambling to support, into a permanent awakening on which the strategic position is based on all the excesses witnessed in the past period, because there is much that needs to be done, the essence of the reaction to the rebellion will help unite large sectors of society, which enables the state to use the full range of its policies and levers as tools of force, as the members of the armed forces have shown that they are ready to pay a heavy price to defend the security and safety of the country and the people, and the price of Freedom is from the power of the mob, and the leadership must build on this approach in the coming period, not only in terms of political arrangements, but in other areas, foremost of which is the economy and people's livelihood.
An unprecedented popular consensus has been achieved on the importance of the military, and the military must not go beyond this strategic "moment," or the moment of national awakening and clarity of political vision.