As a general rule, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in Muslim-majority countries in our Arab region successfully use policies toward religion to restrict political competition and discourage democratic transition.
These policies work with four strategies:
First: Control and domination of official religious institutions
This does not mean that these institutions are just tools of the regime, but they are also arenas for conflict between multiple religious components within them, such as the Kuwaiti Ministry of Awqaf, which was an arena for conflict over its resources between the Salafis and the Brotherhood, and these institutions may also turn into an arena for conflict between the regime and other religious currents, such as Al-Azhar, which witnessed the expansion of Salafis and the Brotherhood at the expense of the historical understanding of the institution.
It also shows that these entities have a sense of mission and institutional interests, sometimes different from each other, and while they are generally aligned with the regime, they remain distinct from it. The state apparatus that opposes religious institutions is not as coherent as it seems, but it is a very floundering voice, as it can express many different concerns, orientations, and voices at once or at different times, and sometimes even some opponents of the regime.
Formal institutions are usually controlled by laws and regulations and by assigning their leadership and allocating resources to them, but they can also become grassroots and centers of power in their own right. Some argue that there are regimes that may allow this in order to exploit the trust enjoyed by some institutions and religious leaders to endorse their policies or mobilize around some of the decisions they make, and the dynamic interactions between Islamic institutions and governments in the region—which by their nature are not only religious but also social—have far-reaching political and economic implications.
These attempts at control are not unilateral, as pro-state Islamist figures and organizations often wield considerable influence because of the role they play as mediators between the regime and society. The experience of the Catholic Church's opposition to military regimes in Latin America shows us two important lessons and two basic bases that explain this opposition:
- First, opposition to authoritarianism depends on the degree of institutional autonomy the Church possesses.
- Second, the strength of the opposition depends on the existence of structural carriers, institutions that bind the church to society.
The primary purpose of authoritarian regimes in institutionalizing and organizing the religious sphere remains to reach an image of an Islam that does not represent a threat to their political entities and their survival, but can our official religious institutions be the voice of the people instead of the voice of the political and financial authorities?
Second: Challenging the authority of religious voices by unofficial actors
Increasingly, the authority of official religious voices has been challenged by many unofficial actors. Some of these actors stand outside formal structures entirely, but others may find shelter in more independent parts of official religious institutions, hence the second strategy, which is intervention in the organization that may amount to repression or prevention.
Since many regimes are politically rather than religiously motivated, it is likely that the motives behind the regulation process can be found in other factors affecting political competition, including the distribution of scarce resources and access to alternative sources of information.
Religion can promote a healthy civil society, especially in democracies, but authoritarian regimes often perceive it as a threat. Religious groups, as part of civil society, may be particularly threatening to authoritarian leaders because of their perceived ability to mobilize, especially at the grassroots level.
Religion is not just a set of beliefs but also a community of believers. Religious communities tend to represent the most diverse and powerful forms of institutional life outside the state. They are voluntary organizations that intersect with divisions. They are endowed with resources, loyal supporters, charismatic leaders, and connected to larger local and transnational networks. In other words, religious communities have a distinct set of resources that make them particularly good at mobilizing – a toolkit that authoritarian elites sometimes employ – and may perceive as a major threat. The historical lesson of authoritarian leaders is clear; informal religion must be suppressed or contained.
Religious policies are formulated and revised to allow for more religious expression while containing expansion and limiting the independence of religious groups. The institutionalization of religious life may be permitted, but it is never completely independent or as an equal partner of the state. In exploring the impact of different types of regulation on the prospects for developing competitive political systems, I find that regulation aims to prevent the development of an independent sector of society that could challenge the state.
Therefore, regimes harm democracy by preventing religiously motivated individuals and groups from competing for political power. The results of the studies suggest that the reasons behind regulation in these countries are largely directed at suppressing political competition rather than curbing extremist religious practices. Governments that restrict freedom of the religious sphere actually control what should be an independent voice in society. This hinders the development of alternative voices that can question and possibly challenge authority.
How can these regimes suppress democratic prospects?
I argue that government regulation of religion prevents democracy because it restricts political competition by cutting off the opportunity for citizens motivated or inspired by religion to express their ideas and pursue their interests in the public arena. In countries with high levels of religiosity, but low levels of opportunities for political or civic participation, participation in religious organizations is often the only means of public participation, and some systems may allow community energy to be diverted away from politics by expanding spaces for religious action, and sometimes allow religious actors to expand to fill the vacuum left by the state – as was done in the philanthropy that widened during the Mubarak era (1981-2011) in Egypt, for example – to address the neoliberal policies he pursued. The regime since the late eighties.
There are three conditions for supporting religious effectiveness in civil society for democratic transition, which I have already addressed in detail:
Third: Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism Lawsuits
These claims are usually used as a justification to restrict both the religious and political spheres, and I argue that if violent extremism did not exist, it would be invented by authoritarian regimes, because it justifies many repressive policies in all fields, and enhances their legitimacy internally and externally.
Strategies for the war on terror are dominated by security and cultural dimensions. The first dimension is clear, while the second is meant not to trace the structural factors that produce violent extremism from the spread of corruption, nepotism, poverty, marginalization, lack of freedoms, the spread of authoritarianism, in addition to abuses in the security field, etc.
All these factors are ignored and not paid attention to, only talking about the ideas and fatwas behind violent extremism, hence the role of official religious institutions to fight violent extremism from a cultural entrance, deepening the separation between the latter and the economic and political factors that produce extremism.
After the tragedy of September 11, 2001 and the outbreak of the global campaign against terrorism, authoritarian regimes in the region, through their participation, saw a way to ease Western pressure on them to bring about a democratic transition, or at least address human rights violations, and this trend was reinforced by a discourse that the world fears that power will fall into the hands of religious movements, whether extremist or moderate.
Fourth: Between religious and political patriarchy
Individuals who are more accustomed to strict hierarchical relationships in their personal lives may be less likely to resist such patterns of power in politics. The idea of similarity between primary social relations and those occurring in the wider community has a long history in the social sciences.
Several studies emphasize the relationship between women's enjoyment of equal rights and duties with males and the issue of democratization. Many eminent writers have argued that oppression and absolute control of the father in the family and of the male in relations between men and women have representations in the wider society, creating a culture of domination and subordination in society as a whole.
The prevalence of patriarchal practices in society, which move between all spheres – religious, political and social – and feed each other raises many questions that need to be pursued in essence:
- What values do religious actors spread in society?
- Are they values that support or oppose the authoritarian culture and practices that spread from the highest authority to the rest of society? In particular, the directives set forth in religion have normative authority for their practitioners, but they are bearing.
Ethics of citizenship, as it is now called, focuses on how citizens should understand the role of religious beliefs in civic affairs and especially their convictions about how human life is lived. Religious was sometimes contained by dictatorships, but it was also – at times – a powerful counterforce against authoritarian government, institutional repression and forced compliance with social norms instigated by authoritarian government. Religiosity does not seem to condemn us to authoritarianism, but it does not protect us from it either.