Two pieces of news are side by side in the feed: the refusal of the Georgian government to move in Parliament the law on mandatory registration of foreign agents, which was copied from the American original source, and plans to oblige NGOs in Europe to report on foreign funding, even from private sources, in order to assess how much this threatens “European democracy” .

Along the way, it turns out that this is part of the preparations for the creation of a pan-European legislation on foreign agents.

But this is not just a manifestation of the "democratic hypocrisy" of the modern West.

There are also several nuances that reflect the fundamental difference between the situations in Georgia and in European countries, especially in Germany and France.

In Georgia, the US is seeking the final desovereignization of the country and the complete subordination of the Georgian state to manipulators from pro-American NGOs.

Their strength is obvious: the recent protests in Tbilisi, of course, did not start out of the blue, but ended as if by magic.

In Georgia, the United States is not afraid of the appearance of any serious pro-Russian sentiments.

No, there are pro-Russian people in Georgia, but their opportunities to express themselves publicly are minimal.

The United States is absolutely sure that in Georgia the information and political vulnerability of society and the Georgian state from outside influence can only be used by them.

And they are right: there are simply no other players in the Georgian information and political field.

If only Turkey, but this is a purely niche story.

And most importantly, for the United States, any outcome is acceptable: it will be possible to topple the current neutralist government and bring frankly pro-American proteges to power - well, especially after the statements of Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili that Georgia will not open a “second front” against Russia.

For Russia, even purely political revanchism in Tbilisi, fueled from across the ocean, means the emergence of risks that will have to be somehow responded to.

Chaotization of the country is also not bad, Russia will still get a hotbed of tension near its borders.

Hence the main slogan of the United States - maximum freedom "without shores", which ideally means the elimination of state control over the media and NGOs.

The situation in Europe is qualitatively different.

The United States, considering the European countries as controlled satellites, is afraid of sobering tendencies in European public opinion.

They attribute the increase in such sentiments to pro-Russian propaganda, but this is simply an unwillingness to become a "bundle of firewood" that Washington will not hesitate to throw into the fire of a great European war.

Having previously squeezed out all European investment resources, technologies, and, most importantly, finally undermined the prospects for European-Chinese economic cooperation.

Washington has enough political resources, but civil society, despite increased brainwashing, is not fully controlled.

There are also vestiges of European democracy in the 1970s and 1980s.

And the United States cannot afford the chaos of Europe, at least not at this stage.

The European Union must fully fulfill its mission as the basis of the anti-Russian military-political coalition, while Washington sucks the last juices out of the European economy into the staggering American financial system.

Therefore, Washington, and the European Commission as well, needs a situation in Europe that is exactly the opposite of what is being created in Georgia: the maximum limitation of external information and political influence.

The United States in Europe needs graveyard silence, which means that it is necessary to cut off civil society from a different view of the political and social perspective (not only Russian, but also Chinese), to deprive it of the opportunity for an open dialogue with representatives of other societies, and even within their own countries.

We need further tightening of the screws in the information and political spheres.

To the characteristic crunch of the spine of European democracy.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.