In recent weeks, Arab officials have flocked to Syria, not to provide support to the victims of the earthquake that struck the northwestern regions of Syria and resulted in the death of nearly 5,000 people, but rather to normalize relations with the Syrian regime and re-float Syria's dictator Bashar al-Assad.
On February 27, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry arrived in Damascus on a visit, the first by a senior Egyptian official since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011. A day earlier, a delegation of Arab parliamentarians - led by Egyptian Parliament Speaker Hanafi al-Jabali - visited Damascus and met Assad and other Syrian officials.
Two weeks before that, that is, in mid-February, and a few days after the earthquake occurred, Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed made his third visit to Damascus, during which he met Bashar al-Assad.
A few days later, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi arrived in Damascus on a visit, the first of its kind by a high-ranking Jordanian official since the outbreak of the Syrian uprising more than a decade ago.
These officials justified their visits to Syria by offering support and solidarity to the Syrian people who were affected by the earthquake.
And it is not only a flimsy argument, because the earthquake did not occur in Damascus, but rather in places farther from the Syrian capital, such as Aleppo, Hama, Latakia, Tartous, and Idlib, some of which are not under the control of the Syrian regime.
It also reveals the extent of the strong desire of the officials of those countries to restore relations with the Assad regime, as if nothing happened during the past decade, as if this regime did not kill more than half a million people, and did not displace nearly 12 million Syrians internally and externally, and did not destroy the country. In order to stay in power at any cost.
In fact, attempts to normalize relations with the Assad regime and restore it did not begin with the earthquake, but rather years before that.
For example, we have seen clear Emirati support for Assad and his regime during the past years in which Abu Dhabi provided unlimited financial and economic assistance to the Assad regime, as it was the first Arab country to reopen its embassy in Damascus in late 2018, and the first Arab country to receive Bashar Al-Assad after an Arab boycott and blockade. It lasted a full decade since the start of the Syrian revolution.
There are phone conversations from time to time between the Emirati and Syrian presidents, and Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed is the most Arab foreign minister who visited Damascus in recent years.
The UAE is one of the few countries that has maintained open relations with al-Assad over the past decade, and there are many news reports about it providing explicit financial support by sending millions of dollars to the al-Assad regime in order to strengthen its internal position and solve its economic problems.
Perhaps one of the explanations for this support is the rivalry that existed between Abu Dhabi and Turkey during the past decade, before relations improved during the last two years.
Abu Dhabi is also trying to lure Syria away from the alliance with Iran, which Abu Dhabi sees as a threat to its national security.
As for Egypt, since mid-2013 its relationship with the Assad regime has been improving continuously, whether through direct military support or political and diplomatic support, especially with regard to the rehabilitation of the Assad regime and its return to the Arab League, which was suspended after Syria's membership in late 2011. There are news reports about Egypt's submission Military and logistical support for the Assad regime.
Before that, the Egyptian president expressed his support for the Syrian army affiliated with Assad, in an interview with a Portuguese newspaper in 2016. He also made - after the recent earthquake - a phone call with Assad, the first between the two parties.
Egyptian support for the Assad regime can be explained by several things.
The first is the similarity between the conditions that the Egyptian and Syrian regimes went through and the stance towards the opposition. The second is the close position between them regarding the “Arab Spring” uprisings. The third relates to the alliance of both regimes with Russia and the strong relationship between the presidents of the two countries and Putin.
Which means solidarity with his project in the Middle East.
What is remarkable about the matter is that those countries that normalize relations with the Assad regime are among the most important strategic allies of the United States, which strongly rejects - at least so far - normalization with the Assad regime and does not wish to rehabilitate it regionally and internationally.
Perhaps this can be explained by several things.
The first is that these countries see that the current US administration, led by President Joe Biden, is a weak and shaky administration, and will not do anything towards countries that violate its declared policy.
The second is that these countries are trying to exploit America's preoccupation with the Russian war on Ukraine on the one hand, and the conflict with China on the other, in order to pursue a semi-independent foreign policy that enables them to achieve their own interests.
Finally, some countries are trying to use the issue of normalization with Assad in order to blackmail America politically, strategically or economically.
It is expected that normalization with the Syrian regime will continue during the coming period, and we may soon witness the return of the normal regime to the Arab League after years of estrangement.
Those who seek this will not fail to find justifications, even if it is under the cover of supporting the "Syrian people" who are being killed and displaced continuously and systematically.
In conclusion, the normalization of some regimes with Assad should not come as a surprise to anyone.
There are many common factors between it and the Syrian regime, and therefore its support for it is basically support for itself, its strategy, and its vision for its people.