The Finnish parliament has approved a bill on the country's accession to NATO.

184 out of 200 members of the Finnish legislature voted for this decision.

The news is quite expected, one might even say, almost routine.

Almost routine, but nevertheless extremely sad.

In the West, the term "Finlandization" has a pronounced negative connotation.

Like, Finlandization means only nominal preservation of sovereignty, complete subordination of the policy of a small country to the political course of a large neighboring state.

But was this the essence of the relations that arose between Moscow and Helsinki as a result of the Second World War?

I am quoting a book by the famous Soviet and Russian diplomat Yuri Deryabin “Is It Easy to Be an Ambassador” published in 2010: “Trade and economic relations with the USSR have become one of the decisive factors in ensuring employment in Finland.

After all, they gave bread to at least 150 thousand people, and indirectly to another 300 thousand ... Therefore, the unemployment rate in Finland fluctuated around three percent then, and when it went beyond this limit, it was perceived as a national catastrophe.

Yuri Deryabin, who died in 2013, knew very well what he was talking about.

His diplomatic career ended in 1996 with the post of Russian Ambassador to Helsinki.

And for the first time he began to work in the Finnish direction of Moscow's foreign policy back in the 60s of the twentieth century.

Many diplomatic memoirs are prime examples of history flattening.

The memoirs of Yuri Deryabin belong to a fundamentally different category.

He does not smooth over anything and does not simplify anything: “It should be noted that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet-Finnish relations were not quite as cloudless as they looked outwardly ... There were, so to speak, pre-crisis symptoms ".

There were "symptoms", but the crisis itself did not come during Deryabin's lifetime.

Why?

Because, despite the lack of serenity in relations between Moscow and Helsinki (and is complete serenity possible in principle in any interstate relations?), the political and economic partnership of the two countries met their fundamental national interests.

Back in 2006, the Polish weekly Wprost published an extensive and, which at that time was still possible in Poland, a fairly calm and objective article about relations between Russia and Finland.

And here is a passage in this text that particularly attracts attention: “The word “Finlandization” has already firmly entered the language.

The Finns believe that a large number of stereotypes have grown around this concept.

- For you, Finlandization means humility and a cautious attitude towards Russia.

However, this term also has a positive meaning: it defines, in essence, pragmatic cooperation and maintaining correct relations with Russia, says Hanna Ojanen from the Finnish Institute of International Relations.

Let me emphasize once again: this was said in 2006, at a time when the term “Finlandization” was already something of a bygone historical and political era, and Finnish politicians and experts could evaluate it without choosing expressions, with complete frankness.

The fact that a frank assessment of this term sounded exactly like that at that time speaks volumes.

About, for example, that Russia and Finland are accustomed to living in a state of mutually beneficial economic (and not only economic) symbiosis.

Now (well, maybe not now, even last year) this symbiosis is over.

And, most likely, it will not be possible to reverse this process in the foreseeable future.

In mid-February 2022, in an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö recalled the following episode that happened six years earlier: “Then, in response to a question from a Finnish journalist, Putin said:

“If we now look across the border, we will see the Finn from the other side.

If Finland joins NATO, we will see the enemy from the other side.”

Does anything else need to be added to this?

Probably still needed.

Message from the main Finnish TV channel YLE.

I quote him from RIA Novosti: “The construction of the fence on the border with Russia began with earthworks.

On Monday, trees were uprooted on both sides of the Imatra border crossing.

Maybe I'm too old-fashioned and sentimental.

But I'm not happy about uprooting trees to build fences.

An old friend is better than two new ones.

Old friendship does not rust - are all these wise thoughts really a lie?

The vote in the Finnish parliament, with which I began this text, does not allow even a relatively optimistic answer to this question.

Reasons for optimism will appear only at the next historical turn.

And that's what makes me think that sooner or later such a turn will definitely take place.

Finland's course towards building friendly and pragmatic relations with Moscow is commonly called the "Kekkonen Line" (Urho Kaleva Kekkonen was President of Finland in 1956-1982, and before that he served twice as Prime Minister).

But Kekkonen himself was far from always an adherent of the “Kekkonen line”.

An interesting passage from Yuri Deryabin's book: “There are many examples of how even major, prominent politicians changed their views, resolutely stepped over their previous ideas.

And from this they did not become "changers of clothes" in the philistine sense of the word.

Is it possible to call Urho Kekkonen a “changer of clothes”, who in March 1940 opposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, believed in the victory of Nazi weapons until the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad?

But the same Kekkonen made a famous speech in the Swedish Riksdag in 1943, in which he called on the Finns to take a sober look at reality and understand that the Soviet Union would remain a great power - a neighbor of Finland.

Sounds very modern, don't you think?

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editors.