In a previous article, I promised to dedicate an article to explain the impact left by the book "In the Shadows of the Qur'an" on violent groups, and how its theorists built on the recent developments of Sayyid Qutb, which were included in the second edition of The Shadows;

Until Salih Sarriyya (the owner of the first actual application of violence in Egypt in 1974) considered it a reference to know the "true interpretation" of the Qur'an.

And I had previously concluded that the additions of the second version of the shadows included the main ideas:

  • Exodus against the regimes (Islam is a revolution and a coup).

  • Atonement of Muslim societies (monotheism is a political and legal ruling).

  • And that the comprehensive Islamic system does not accept subjugation (an absolute system), and it only moves in an environment that creates it (purity and emotional isolation).

These ideas formed the movement’s approach based on revolutionary, absolute, and puristic, then violent groups came and built on this and found the means to implement it, so I transferred it from “jurisprudence of papers” to “jurisprudence of movement” in the language of Sayyid Qutb, which I will explain here through two axes: congruence in parts of the curriculum and conformity in the intellectual structure.

At the conceptual level, the theorists of violence insisted on rebuilding the concepts of faith, monotheism, disbelief, jihad, and others.

Because it deviated in their opinion under the nation-state, and then the call to Muslims to the testimony of monotheism again became a central duty, as is the case with Sayyid Qutb.

First: consistency in the curriculum

The relationship with the text on the one hand, and the attitude towards the historical scientific tradition on the other hand, constituted a central issue in the approach of violent groups, as I explained in my book "Permissible Violence: Sharia Confronting the Nation and the State."

We can monitor here 3 manifestations of Sayyid Qutb’s influence on violent groups, whether in terms of dealing with the text or in terms of the position on the scholarly tradition, namely:

  • The first appearance: a direct return to the text, which is of a "speculative" (ie, non-scientific) nature.

    The text - according to this vision - is very clear and does not tolerate any problem or plurality of meaning.

    The clarity of the meaning of the text obviates the need for learning or scientific imitation.

    Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir (author of the book "Fiqh al-Dama") reiterated - on a number of issues - the saying: This issue was "resolved by the legal texts in the eyes of the enlightened ones."

    And Abu al-Bara’ al-Hindi (a member of the Islamic State) says clearly:

    “Open the Qur’an and read the verses of jihad, and everything will become clear (…). All scholars say to me: This is obligatory and that is not obligatory, and this is not the time for jihad (…). Leave everyone and read the Qur’an know jihad

    .

    The Islamic Group in Egypt had previously believed that the Qur’an did not need interpretation, which prompted Sheikh Jad al-Haq Ali Jad al-Haq to respond strongly to Muhammad Abd al-Salam Farag’s disregard for science and scholars.

    The same thing prompted a group of scholars - later on - to write what they called an "open letter" in which they refuted the ideas of the Islamic State organization and talked about what they called the "inconvenience" in the fatwa of the State organization.

  • The second aspect: movement by text to confront ignorance and change the world (which I called the kinetic approach).

    Abu Bakr Naji (author of the book “Management of Savagery”) borrowed two ideas from the shadows:

    The first: that movement in the text reveals the true meaning of the text, and that Islam does not move except in an environment that creates it.

    And he attributed to Sayed a text that he conveyed - in the sense - about shadows, which is that "this Qur'an does not reveal its secrets except to those who fight battles with it, and those who live in the atmosphere in which it was revealed for the first time."

    The second: that these Mujahideen want to create a suitable environment for the implementation of God's commands.

    And Sayyid had previously said about the shadows: “Movement is the foundation of this religion, and therefore only those who move by it understand it and strive to establish it in the reality of people and make it prevail over ignorance through practical movement.”

  • The third manifestation: the priority of jihad over knowledge, and this is what the jihadists understood from the repeated texts of Sayyid Qutb in which he compares the “jurisprudence of papers” and “the jurisprudence of movement”

    , so he diminishes the importance of the first and constantly raises the importance of the second.

    Therefore, we found Abd al-Salam Faraj underestimating science.

    on the pretext that the legal obligations take precedence over knowledge;

    Jihad is an individual obligation, while knowledge is a sufficient obligation.

    Indeed, the image of the flag differs among the jihadists.

    In terms of their perception of that simple correlation between science and action centered around jihad.

    Faraj says: “The limits of knowledge are that whoever knows the obligation of prayer must pray.” That is, the limits of knowledge and its function are very easy, so whoever knows the obligation of jihad must strive.

Second: Matching the intellectual structure

As previously, the intellectual structure of Sayyid Qutb is based on the fact that governance is the basis of God’s monotheism and a key to understanding the text.

This new concept of monotheism led him to say that the arbitration of man-made laws comes out of Islam and enters into the Jahiliyyah, which has become the key to understanding the existing reality and its transformations.

Here, the movement approach (and its essence is jihad) constitutes a solution to this dilemma.

To remove "contemporary ignorance" on the one hand, and to restore monotheism based on governance (and building a new Muslim society) on the other hand.

Anyone who follows the writings of the theorists of violent groups will find congruence in the main intellectual structure, which I will explain here through two issues: tracing the unification of governance, and seeing the world in the writings of violent groups.

The first issue: governance and monotheism

I explained above that the concept of governance is a central concept for Sayyid Qutb, and how he defined - on its basis - the meaning of "there is no god but God" and made it the criterion of faith and unbelief.

We will find the same thing with violent groups, and we can refer here to two central ideas related to the concept of governance, namely: their redefinition of concepts from a polar perspective, and the centrality of political and legal rule in formulating those concepts and their applications.

At the conceptual level, the theorists of violence insisted on rebuilding the concepts of faith, monotheism, disbelief, jihad, and others.

Because it has been deviated in their opinion under the nation-state, and then the invitation of Muslims to the testimony of monotheism again became a central duty, as is the case with Sayyid.

Abu Basir al-Tartusi says: "The word - throughout history and to this day - has not been subjected to distortion, distortion, and corrupt interpretation, as the word of monotheism has been subjected to."

They "emptied it of its truth and meaning, and of the purpose for which it was revealed, and portrayed it to people as mere cold letters that are blessed when dhikr or recitation; it does not affect their reality, their lives, their actions, their behaviors, and their relationship to each other!", Qutb's spirit in this text is not hidden.

There is frequent talk of "sedition of terminology" in the writings of theorists of violence in general, such as Abu Qatada, Abu Bakr Naji and others, and it is an essential issue in their rediscovery of Islam and their departure from the scholarly tradition.

As for the centralization of political and legal rule and its impact on defining doctrinal concepts such as monotheism, apostasy and ignorance, we find that Salih Sariyah is keen on diagnosing what he called "contemporary infidelity" in which Muslims fell, which is the rulership of other than God, and then they got caught up in collective apostasy, and Islamic societies became " ignorant societies.

The same meaning is repeated by Abd al-Salam Faraj and after him, up to al-Qaeda and then the Islamic State.

Ayman al-Zawahiri believes that “the battle of truth and falsehood that is taking place throughout time has not taken place and does not revolve except around this two pillars of the Islamic faith: Who has the right to rule and legislate?” Rather, ruling is “a two pillar of one of the pillars of monotheism,” and that is why he said in one of his sermons on Egypt on the date (10-12-2013): "What is happening in Egypt is against everything that is Islamic and is not interests, politics or benefits. [It is] against Islam, against Sharia, against acknowledging the right of the Lord to legislate."

As for Sayyid Imam (one of the theorists of violence), he believes that "issues of legislation, judgment, and arbitration are not among the issues of subsidiary rulings in religion, but are included in the origin of faith and the core of monotheism."

Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir had opened the book “Fiqh al-Dama” with verses that talk about the story of our master Abraham, which describes the state of polytheism and the destruction of idols worshiped instead of God (Surat Al-Anbiya: 51-70).

Anyone who reads the second version of The Shadows will find these meanings in it, but the violent groups introduced modifications and additions to it that are evident through 3 principles that we find valid in the writings of its theorists, which are as follows:

The first principle: atonement

Sayyid Qutb had previously established the idea of ​​revolting against the regimes, where Islam for him (as for Mawdudi) is a revolution and a coup, and he also established the infidelity of the regimes and the rule of polytheism over those who are judged by man-made laws.

Abu Musab al-Suri mentioned important stories about the connection of the book "Milestones on the Road" with the issue of the rulers being declared unbelievers, and the connection between shadows and landmarks is not hidden.

And I previously quoted the words of Sayyid Qutb in Al-Dilal, in which he said: “Whoever obeys a human being in a law from himself, even in a small part, then he is a polytheist. He says: I testify that there is no god but God with his tongue (…), and when we look at the face of the earth today in the light of these decisive reports, we see ignorance and polytheism - and nothing but ignorance and polytheism - except for those who protected God, so he denied the earthly lords what they claim of the characteristics of divinity and did not Shari’a or ruling is accepted from it except within the limits of coercion.”

Sayyid Qutb seemed - in some places - to be lenient in the shadows.

In that he wrote a contemporary interpretation (or semi-interpretation) in which he addresses the general reader, as he was involved in issuing general judgments that do not take into account the understanding of the modern recipient and how he interacts with them in the context of the nation-state.

As for the theorists of violence, they insisted that expiation is a legal ruling that must be carried out, as we find in the writings of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and those who preceded them.

They may differ about the expansion of atonement, not the origin of its application to contemporary reality.

Some theorists of violence against the state organization faulted its expansion of takfir, and the belief of the state organization differed from the belief of al-Qaeda organization in the takfir of the people of the lands of Islam, which turned into a land of kufr, but they all agree on a general principle, which is the takfir of those who do not rule by what God has revealed.

Because he violated the monotheism of governance, and they also agree to declare all those who did not declare unbelief all of them unbelievers.

Because their expiation is one of the requirements of true monotheism.

Al-Qaeda has mentioned in its creed, among the nullifiers of the testimony of monotheism, the following: “Whoever does not declare the polytheists to be unbelievers, or doubts their unbelief, or corrects their doctrine: unanimously disbelieves,” as well as “supporting the polytheists and aiding them against the Muslims.”

It is important to remember that the "polytheists" here include - among them - the ruling regimes and everyone who is judged according to their laws, which is the ruling that Sayyid Qutb had previously reached, and we find the same thing in some of the writings of the state organization.

And if we want to date this idea, it is learned from the imams of the Najdi call from whom the commentator of the text of the doctrine of the organization of the state was quoted, Abu Abdullah Al-Muhajir, Abu Bakr Naji and others.

Abu Abdullah Al-Muhajir quoted - for example - from the “Collection of Messages and Questions of Najd” that “the apostate is the one who becomes an apostate after his conversion to Islam by word, belief, deed, or doubt, and before that he uttered the two testimonies, prayed, and fasted. And he prays and fasts, and his speaking of the two testimonies, his prayer and his fasting does not prevent him from judging him for apostasy.”

This abstract ruling is problematic in terms of applying it to our reality today.

It is necessary to specify this speech, belief, or action that expels the religion and necessitates the judgment of apostasy (i.e., the nullifiers of faith), and here we will find that the new formulation of the concept of monotheism of Qutb and the violent groups will introduce the masses of Muslims into apostasy.

Hence, Sayyid Imam and Abu Musab al-Suri expanded their takfir, so they judged the countries governed by man-made laws that their rulers are infidels, their judges, those who seek judgment against them, those who work in them, and those who defend them (such as soldiers, security, and others) are infidels, and this is what ISIS followed later when Adnani declared all Arab armies to be infidels and called To fight it, he said in a recording dated (8/31/2013): “The armies of the tyrants are among the rulers of Muslim lands - in general - the armies of apostasy and blasphemy.” Sayyid Imam said: “Whoever prays and fasts for God and gives the right to legislate or rule to others, or is judged by other than his law.” He worshiped God and worshiped others, and by this he is an infidel polytheist who is not a Muslim, and this is the case in contemporary pre-Islamic societies.”

So, the writings of the theorists of violence agreed on ruling regimes as infidels, starting with Salih Sariya to Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir.

Passing by Abd al-Salam Faraj, Abu Musab al-Suri, Sayyid Imam and others.

Indeed, Al-Adnani insisted on this meaning in one of his sermons (31-8-2013) when he said: “All systems are infidels, because they rule by man-made laws, and there is no difference between Mubarak, Morsi, and Ghannouchi (…). Muslims";

Because the apostasy of the rulers necessitates the fall of their Imamate, so it and non-existence become the same.

Confirmation of this meaning came in the body of the doctrine of the rule, which says: “If disbelief occurs in the imam, he departs from the ruling of the guardianship and obedience to him falls, and it is incumbent upon the Muslims to rise up against him and depose him and install a just imam if they are able to do so.” This is the practical shift that distinguished the thought of Sayyid Qutb from the thought of Violent groups, which is the transition from theory to application through the kinetic approach.

The second principle: the obligation to kill

Sayyid Qutb seemed - in some places - to be lenient in the shadows.

In that he wrote a contemporary interpretation (or semi-interpretation) in which he addresses the general reader, as he was involved in issuing general judgments that do not take into account the understanding of the modern recipient and how he interacts with it in the context of the nation-state.

In a place where Qutb quoted Abi Al-Ala Al-Mawdudi as saying: “A person is required to be killed if he leaves the congregation - even if he ties a hair - and if he fasts and prays and claims that he is a Muslim. its foundations in the ground."

Such a text is open to many possibilities, especially with regard to establishing the system of truth, leaving the group and killing, after all the previous ideas of governance, ignorance and takfir, so that we discover that the group that criminalizes deviating from it is the faithful vanguard of Sayyid Qutb and then the jihadist organizations themselves and nothing else.

Sayyid Qutb did not elaborate on the fruit of ruling with disbelief and polytheism, but the theorists of violence did.

This is Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir claiming that the jurists "reported the agreement on the necessity - no permissibility! - the intention of the infidels to kill and fight in their homes, even if they were not exposed to any harm to the Muslims" (the exclamation point here is from the source).

And he repeats this meaning, saying: “The jurists and imams stipulated the absolute legalization of the blood and money of the infidels as long as the Muslims did not secure it.” Abu Bakr Naji confirms this meaning and states that severity is required in confronting the people of the cross and their helpers among the apostates and their soldiers.

He says, "We have no objection to shedding their blood, but rather we see it as one of the most obligatory duties."

It goes without saying that the field of application of these rulings has become very broad after expanding the base of those who have been declared unbelievers.

Based on the new concept of monotheism, I have discussed the invalidity of these claims and the corruption of this thought in my book "Permissible Violence".

The third principle: the priority of fighting the apostates over the original infidels

This origin goes back to the “unification of governance” as well, so the concept of the new monotheism reaches its extent when Qutb declares that “Islam tolerates those who oppose it openly during the day in the creed, but this tolerance does not tolerate those who say Islam is a word in the tongue that is denied by actions, and it does not tolerate those who say: They are They unite God and bear witness that there is no god but God, then they acknowledge to other than God one of the characteristics of divinity, such as governance and legislation for people.

This meaning inspired the theorists of violence later, as their writings focused on the priority of fighting the apostates (the first of whom are rulers without what God has revealed).

We find this in the doctrine of al-Qaeda and the actions of Sayyid Imam, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, and Abu Musab al-Suri.

Abu Musab decides - like others - that the infidelity of rulers, their aides, and those working with them is "one of the rules of governance for God, loyalty and disavowal in the same God, and not subsidiary issues." Violent groups have turned this principle into a movement platform, and strived to implement it.

The conclusion of the first issue - then - is that the movement project whose foundations were laid by Sayyid Qutb and followed by violent groups, is based on the perception of the absence of Sharia with the absence of the caliphate, meaning that the issue of governance is a matter of faith, monotheism, and obedience to God and His Messenger.

If the system of government is disrupted, the Sharia will be disrupted and destroyed.

It cannot be implemented without a state.

So the state is necessary for the establishment of religion, and the obligatory faith in God is not achieved except by establishing governance, and governance - which is a pillar of the unification of divinity - is not achieved except by the rule of Sharia, and the rule of Sharia is not achieved except by establishing the caliphate that constitutes the Islamic state as a means to it (as is the perception of Al Qaeda and others). ) or coincide with it (as is conceived by ISIS).

The second issue: seeing the world

I have already explained how Sayyid Qutb's worldview is also based on his concept of governance.

He tended to the opinion that the world is either the abode of Islam or the abode of war, and the criterion for the abode of unbelief or war (does not distinguish between them) is governance, and based on this criterion, the abode of Islam is absent from our present;

Because the pre-Islamic society is not governed by Sharia.

The division of the role was a central issue in the thinking of violent groups and their theorists until it turned into “it is known from the religion by necessity,” and “from its beginning is Islam,” as decided by Al-Muhajir and others. Historical branches of jurisprudence to the foundations of belief, which reflects the necessary need for that binary division in the jihadist perception in general, otherwise the perception and the system related to it will collapse, and it is a division that appeared in Bin Laden’s famous speech about the two camps, and then was present in Al-Baghdadi’s speech after announcing his caliphate (1- 7-2014).

The impact of Sayyid Qutb's ideas is clear here in terms of adopting the type of legal rulings in force in the house as a criterion for judging them.

Regardless of its population, and from here the theorists of violence unanimously agreed on the infidelity of rulers and the transformation of Islamic countries into abode of infidelity;

Because it rules by the laws of disbelief, not by what God has revealed. The lands of Islam no longer exist today, as Sayyid Qutb decided before, and as the theorists of violence decided after him, from Salih Sariyah and Faraj to al-Muhajir.

Passing by Sayed Imam, Abu Musab and others.

They see - as Sayyid Qutb - that every house of kufr is a house of war, which explains their need for war and their focus on it in their view of the world and reality.

And the house of war is - by necessity - a house of permissibility that does not establish its infallibility or sanctity, and it is obligatory to migrate from it.

And since migration is obligatory, Dar al-Islam must be found so that those who migrate to it can migrate to it, and from here it was possible for the organization of the state to attract immigrants.

Because it turned the abode of Islam into a realistic reality that was not available before, with the agreement of violent groups to say that it is obligatory to emigrate from the abode of infidelity.

So, the new ideas of Sayyid Qutb left their impact on the thinking of violent groups, and it is remarkable that there is an agreement between Sayyid Qutb and the violent groups on the one hand, and the ideas of the imams of the Najdi call on the other hand, with regard to issues of monotheism, polytheism, and the infidelity of those who rule by laws.

But judging people and the requirements of that were not a central issue for Qutb, while expiation and killing for polytheism is a central issue for violent groups.

It is most likely that Sayyid Qutb was acquainted with the books of the imams of the Najdi call that were published in Egypt by several parties in the first half of the twentieth century, including: the Salafi Press, Al-Manar Press, Dar Al-Maarif, Al-Amrah Al-Sharafiyah, Al-Rahmani Press, and the Muniriyah Printing Department, as it appeared from Follow up on old editions of those books.

Rather, Rashid Rida had taken care of the books of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab in his last stage and wrote in his defense, as he wrote the book “The Wahhabis and the Hijaz,” and God knows best.