Finally, Hamas' resumption of its relationship with Bashar al-Assad's regime turned into a reality after it was a unilateral decision.
No sooner had the controversy over her decision ended than it flared up again after her delegation met with Assad, and the controversy took multiple approaches, including political, moral and jurisprudential ones.
In my previous articles, I dealt with various aspects of the subject, including: the relationship between the religious and the political, criticism of the activists’ justifications, criteria for evaluating political action, reliance on the oppressors and the necessities of politics, and the legitimacy of statements, and in this article I discuss the political perspective.
Hamas responded to the requirements of the Assad regime in choosing a representative, which may explain the exaggeration of Khalil al-Hayya - head of the Hamas delegation - in expressing joy and closeness to Assad, whether during the meeting or in his press statement in which he considered the meeting to be "historic and warm."
Hamas was not alone in the aforementioned meeting;
She attended alongside the representatives of the other Palestinian factions, which some "justificationists" wanted to use to push the accusation against her and mitigate the attack on her alone, while he did not pay attention to the political significance of this event, which is that Hamas' presence was marginal within the delegation;
Despite her keenness and pursuit of it, the delegation was headed by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Jihad Movement, and sat next to Assad, representing the Jihad and Fatah movements, while the representative of Hamas sat far away.
Hamas has also responded - by forming the delegation - to the requirements of the Assad regime in choosing a representative, which may explain Khalil al-Hayya - head of the Hamas delegation - exaggerating in expressing joy and closeness to Assad, whether during the meeting or in his press statement in which he considered that the meeting It was “historic and warm,” and that it was a “glorious day,” and showed purification from the past of the rupture with the Assad regime;
When he said: "We are closing any wrong individual act that took place in the past against Syria."
Although Al-Hayya acknowledged the gratitude of the "Syrian people" who were divided between displacement, asylum, killing and imprisonment, he said: "There are angry and sad people from this meeting. Let them grieve and be angry, and we are the victors."
But the angry people here are large segments of the popular support for Hamas from the Syrians, Palestinians and others, which has made its base divided today as it was not before, and it is a major spoiler that will affect the popular support for the Palestinian cause itself, at least.
Hamas left Damascus - led by Khaled Mishaal - in 2012, and has now returned - under Haniyeh's leadership - in a timid manner and in a way that seemed humiliating to it in front of the Assad regime and its popular base together, especially since al-Hayya stated in the same meeting that Qatar and Turkey had blessed the move, then he was forced - hours later - He denied this by an official written statement, in which he affirmed that the movement’s decision is independent;
To deny the movement the charge of lack of independence in making its decision.
Some close to Hamas saw that the decision was Iranian in origin, and Hezbollah had sponsored it for months, especially since Hassan Nasrallah had stated that he was trying to bridge the gap between the two parties, and that it would take time.
The Hamas movement here faces two central questions that have been confused or circumvented by much controversy and quarrels in the past period, especially from Hamas defenders and those seeking to justify its position, namely:
Why did Hamas decide after a decade to restore its relationship with the Syrian regime?
Is it permissible to do it from a jurisprudential point of view, and is it consistent with its moral principles that it announced, whether in the statements of its leaders or in its charter issued in 2017?
The first question here is political;
Because it deals with understanding the situation and the reasons for the change from the estrangement that lasted a decade to the connection again.
As for the second question, it is a complex question that deals with the doctrinal and ethical aspects.
Because it deals with the normative evaluation of political action in view of the religious and moral reference of the "Islamic" Hamas movement, and also deals with the consistency of its principles stipulated in its declared document with its practice.
The two previous questions may be confused or sometimes crossed;
In order to justify Hamas or attack it.
Whoever justifies is not occupied with trying to understand what is going on in the first place, and whoever is busy with understanding and interpretation only is not concerned with evaluation.
There are those who maneuver - oscillates - by moving between the two things in a piecemeal manner;
Because he is busy with hidden defense and wants - at the same time - to appear as a neutral observer.
There is no doubt that we - then - are in front of a political act par excellence, and this act requires understanding and analysis first, then evaluation second, and the first can be satisfied with those engaged in political analysis, but the second cannot be done without completing the first, and a number of Hamas defenders fought in the second without knowledge Firstly.
But politics has several requirements that make it intersect with ethics, in my view at least, and these requirements are as follows:
Understanding political action and explaining its motives and reasons, and its mainstay is to gather information and link events (which is what jurists usually call the correct perception of reality).
An assessment of the situation, based on understanding and interpretation to link the recent history and identify possible scenarios (foreseeing the near future).
Critical evaluation, which is the product of responsibility for the political act on the one hand, and the generality of this act that affects many parties on the other hand, and therefore it is a partner in its evaluation as well, which gives equal right to all parties involved or affected by the act to contribute to its evaluation.
Accordingly, the wave of contempt for any criticism of Hamas recently shows the kind of political culture that some party Islamists spread;
It is the product of a political perception based on the concept of "subjects", as opposed to a political perception based on critical thinking and the democratic culture sought by the Arab revolutions.
In the remainder of this article, I will focus on the first point only;
Because in my previous articles I dealt with other angles of the subject;
Because I saw that the essence of the problem with the justifiers or the defenders is in jumping over the understanding and interpretation over the previous condition.
With the beginning of the Syrian revolution, Hamas announced in its April 2011 statement that “what is happening in the internal affairs concerns the brothers in Syria, but we in the Hamas movement, and based on our principles that respect the will and aspirations of the Arab and Islamic peoples, we hope to overcome the current situation; In a manner that achieves the aspirations and aspirations of the Syrian people, in a manner that preserves Syria’s stability and internal cohesion, and enhances its role in the face of confrontation and opposition.
Then, in February 2012, Musa Abu Marzouk, then deputy head of the movement’s political bureau, stated that the movement had left Syria;
In protest against the "brutal campaign waged by the regime of President Bashar al-Assad against his opponents", Khaled Meshaal, head of the office, stated in the same year that the movement "welcomes the revolution of the Syrian people who are striving for freedom, and that the pure blood of this great people stop."
But this initial position had additional motives;
As the Assad regime exerted pressure on the resistance movements in Damascus in order to stand with it against the demonstrations;
He was not satisfied with just being silent about what was happening on the pretext that this was an internal Syrian affair, especially since one of his central arguments he used to bury the revolution was the cosmic conspiracy against him.
Because it supports the resistance against Israel.
One of the leaders of Hamas spoke about these pressures from the regime on the resistance in some private meetings, and Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shalah - may God have mercy on him - also told me in August 2011. Indeed, Assad had referred - in 2013 - the beginning of the deterioration of the relationship and the loss of trust Between his regime and Hamas, it "was stingy in responding to al-Qaradawi," whose support for the revolution hurt the Syrian regime, and who used all its sheikhs to encircle and prohibit demonstrations.
Hamas, with its latest decision, did not succeed in establishing a balance between the requirements of the Palestinian cause and the interest of the nation. Rather, this decision caused division within its own base.
Officially, Hamas maintained this position in support of the Syrian revolution until at least 2019;
Nayef Rajoub, a leader in the movement in the West Bank, stated that "relations with the Syrian regime will not return, and the current Syrian regime no longer has any weight or value. It is a mistake to rely on it or get close to it."
But this error will turn into right (if not correct in the view of the justifications), and this principle will gradually turn into pure pragmatism between 2017 and 2022, with the emergence of voices in the movement calling for the restoration of the movement’s relationship with the Iran-Syria axis, and with the change of leadership.
This can be explained by two things:
The first: the changes that occurred in the movement’s leadership. In February 2017, Yahya Sinwar became the head of the movement’s political bureau in the Gaza Strip (and Khalil al-Hayya was appointed as his deputy), and Ismail Haniyeh was elected in May 2017 as head of the political bureau, succeeding Mashaal. October 2017 Al-Arouri was elected deputy head of the Political Bureau.
The second: the movement’s policy has changed since 2017;
There seemed to be a clear dominance of the Gaza Strip, whether in the movement’s new leadership or at the level of the movement’s policy and movements, which are very close to the “Iran-Syria-Hezbollah” axis at the political level (not just financial and military support, which raised questions about the conditions and constraints of support).
In 2017, Sinwar praised Iran for its support of the movement, and this was followed by the visit of a delegation from the movement to Tehran in the same year.
In 2018, Sinwar boasted of coordinating with Iran and Hezbollah on a daily basis;
Although this was carried on political propaganda only.
In 2020, Haniyeh Qassem Soleimani described the former commander of the Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who was engaged in killings and displacement in Syria and Iraq, as a "martyr of Quds."
In May 2021, Osama Hamdan saluted Bashar al-Assad and praised his position in support of the Palestinian resistance.
In 2021, Moaz Abu Shamala, the representative of Hamas in Yemen, honored Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, one of the leaders of the Houthi group in Yemen.
This policy continued at this pace until the developments that emerged to the public during the past few months, which culminated in the meeting that took place a few days ago.
The statements of the liquid interest, the unjustified devotional necessity, the people of trust, and that a sitting person does not give fatwas to a mujahid, and the obligation of critics to obligations that do not bind them and they did not say them at all, the injustice of the siege and the resentment of states, and the issuance of sent rulings such as the absence of an alternative but perdition, and calling all of this a “legal policy.” It is a disruption of political thought in the first place for partisan or justification reasons
However, this shift in the movement’s policy, which began in conjunction with the adoption of the new Hamas charter in May 2017, revealed tensions between some of the movement’s charter and principles on the one hand, and the movement’s new policy that followed the adoption of the charter prepared under the previous leadership on the one hand. other.
It is remarkable that items No. (9, 37, 38, 40, 41) included matters that completely contradict the outcome of the movement's practical policy, leading to the meeting with Assad, and they are as follows:
First: The document states that Hamas believes that “the message of Islam came with the values of truth, justice, freedom and dignity, prohibiting injustice in all its forms, and criminalizing the oppressor, regardless of his religion, race, gender or nationality,” and that Islam is “a religion that educates its followers to respond to aggression and victory.” for the oppressed, and urges them to give and sacrifice in defense of their dignity, land, peoples, and sanctities.”
There is no doubt that “criminalizing the oppressor” whoever he is, and “victory for the oppressed” completely contradicts her return to Damascus as her agent of constant praise for Iran and its honoring of the Houthis. The picture doesn't look the same for her other relationships, or at least how she manages hers.
Second: The document states that Hamas believes “in its relations with the countries and peoples of the world in the values of cooperation, justice, freedom, and respect for the will of peoples,” and that supporting its cause “is imposed by the requirements of truth, justice and common human values.” Others that share the same principles, but Hamas’s indifference to anger, and its management of the relationship with the Syrian regime and Iran reflects a distinction between issues and a division between peoples.
Third: The document states that Hamas “refuses to interfere in the internal affairs of countries,” and that it seeks “to build balanced relations whose criterion is to combine the requirements of the Palestinian cause and the interest of the Palestinian people, and the interest of the nation, its advancement and security.”
Here, internal affairs, which are administrative and political issues, are usually confused with the necessary moral issues that deal with bloodshed, desecration of honor, displacement and expulsion from their homes, as happened in Syria, and it is strange that some of those engaged in the purposes of Sharia who justify Hamas, did not notice this difference. !
In addition, Hamas, with its latest decision, did not succeed in establishing a balance between the requirements of the Palestinian cause and the interest of the nation. Rather, this decision caused division within its own base.
Fourth: The document states that Hamas "condemns the support of any party or party to the Zionist entity, or covering up its crimes and aggression against the Palestinians, and calls for the prosecution of Zionist war criminals," but in return it contributes directly or indirectly to covering up the crimes of Iran and the Syrian regime in Some countries in the region, by granting Soleimani the rank of martyr of Jerusalem and normalization with the Assad regime, which many countries refuse to return to the Arab League and recycle.
We are well aware that relations - in the balance of politics - do not mean congruence of views;
Rather, it is based on mutual relations of interest, but the performance and statements of the Hamas leadership tend towards two things:
The first: the investment of its supporters in it, and their co-optation of it to cover up their policies by praising it, and legitimizing them time after time.
This does not apply to the criteria of political action, which is - usually - between countries.
As for the relationship between a state and a movement without the state, it is divided internally.
As a result of the bureaucracy created by Iranian support, it must be absent from the parity and independence that enables the fulfillment of principles.
The second: that political relations, which are necessarily interest-based (in the political sense, not in the legal sense), impose erroneous assessments;
As a result of various factors, including that some leaders have their personal and regional biases, as well as their visions that deserve a critical pause from the devotees and devotees to correct the path that has begun to change since 2017. As for covering these data with rhetoric that some enthusiasts who have been captured by the duality of attacking Hamas and defending tend to This is far from understanding and interpretation, let alone evaluation, as previously.
The zeal of defense prompted some of them to claim that Hamas’s jurisprudence “circulates between what is right and what is right, and between what is good and what is better.”
Although jurisprudential ijtihad itself revolves between right and wrong, what about political ijtihad?
This is a behavior implicated in the infallibility of the “people of trust”;
It almost sanctifies political action, so trustworthy people - according to him - are not even required to state their arguments and justifications for their jurisprudence in matters of public affairs.
On the other hand, some critics of Hamas slandered him, bringing the issue under the section of faith and unbelief or treason!
In addition to the previous three considerations of political action (interpretation, assessment of the situation, and critical evaluation), political action is characterized by flexibility in choices rather than flexibility in “justifications”, meaning that there is - always - a margin for maneuver, and flexible diplomacy in expressing political interests away from groveling And verbally succumb to the demands or pressures of supporters.
Moreover, political action always involves contradictions between principles and interests, and therefore Islamic political action is always supposed to be preoccupied with defining the criteria to be used in resolving these contradictions.
Instead of stubbornness in denying its existence or lazy justification with fluid and cloudy statements such as necessity and interest;
Without going into the details of who appreciates it, the methodology for its estimation, and the degree to which it is proven, but rather presenting the justifications for the decision to the popular base instead of there being schizophrenia between the one who makes the decision and the one who invents justifications for him!
In conclusion, the statements of the liquid interest, the unjustified devotional necessity, the people of trust, and the fact that a sitting person does not give fatwas to a mujahid, and obligating critics with obligations that do not bind them and did not say them at all, the injustice of the siege and the struggle of states, and the issuance of sent rulings such as the absence of an alternative but perdition, and naming all of that. A legitimate policy” is a disruption of political thought originally for partisan or justification reasons, where arguments and criteria that are invoked are absent, as well as a serious and systematic discussion of the questions raised.