Not a week goes by for the Sudanese to hear a whisper in the city about the stories of the differences between the Chairman of the Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and his deputy, Lieutenant-General Mohamed Hamdan Hemedti, and there are always multiple accounts supported by evidence and gossip;

Those gossip about the differences have spread since the beginning of the revolution until now and have not found anyone to respond to them, and the two leaders and those close to them often remain silent, so rumors spread and tales weave. I note the main facts regarding these alleged disagreements or truth.

Struggle and gossip

The dispute between the president - that is, the president - and his deputy throughout the eras that have passed in the history of Sudan has existed, whether at the military or political level, and the president has always resolved it by dismissing the deputy or removing him, as was the covenant with the representatives in the eras of Presidents Nimeiri and al-Bashir. Today we are witnessing a different experience. entirely;

The deputy is not an ordinary representative because he did not come to his position appointed by the president, he is not an employee who was called to fill this position.

Representative Hemedti came to power after his contribution to the change (which took place on April 11, 2019) and thousands of soldiers succeeded him, thus becoming a partner in the change with the consent of all parties to the security system and the united forces of freedom and change at the time.

The second fact is that the Rapid Support Forces - historically - made an undeniable contribution to defeating the rebellion in Darfur, as they played a key role in establishing security there, regardless of the many practices that were taken on them at the time. This force was established, trained and armed by the Sudanese state from its resources until it became An apparent military and political presence, regardless of the opinion on the validity of the establishment of these forces or not.

These forces were spent from the Sudanese state treasury, and these forces are officially and legally under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, despite the ambiguous relationship at the present time.

These forces have huge private resources and dozens of companies, both internal and external, and institutions working in various forms of trade, import, export and mineral exploration, and it is not known precisely how much wealth is at their disposal;

The Rapid Support Forces currently enjoy independent foreign relations, starting from Ethiopia to Chad, passing through Central Africa and Niger, and up to South Sudan, in addition to regional relations (the UAE and Saudi Arabia) as well as international links (the European Union after the issue of immigration, and Russia after the issue of exporting and producing gold from Snqo).

Despite the complexities of these relations and the problems they are going through, they do exist. In addition to what was mentioned, the Rapid Support Forces are now deployed in more than 10 states, and in possession of various types of weapons, and more than 100,000 trained and qualified soldiers are organized in their ranks.

Here I would like to point out an important fact, which is that the base of these forces does not belong to one ethnicity, but rather has a great diversity, and includes a wide spectrum of ethnicities and tribes from all over the country, and it is true that its supreme leadership is controlled by the Daglo family with their known backgrounds.

What was mentioned above represents part of the reality of those forces on the ground, which everyone knows, and therefore it is not a matter of politics and civility to belittle and “demonize” them (Janjaweed), and it is a miscalculation to rush to integrate them or dissolve them by a supremely coercive decision, whether by the civil political forces or by The military establishment itself, where multiple parties seek to drive a wedge between the army and rapid support by exaggerating actual and false differences to push the two sides to the edge of the abyss;

This is something that is not in the interest of both parties or the country.

Political and military problems

The Rapid Support Forces suffer from several problems, both politically and militarily, and in their international relations.

From a political point of view, the Rapid Support Forces do not find sufficient acceptance and respect from the revolutionary street or from the political forces, although they are making various efforts to bridge the relationship between them and the political organizations, civil society forces, activists and the media. Huge money, time and effort.

Its attempt, which appears successful so far, is to attract the indigenous administrations in the regions, especially the Darfur regions (before the grandfather's initiative) and the armed movements after the Juba Agreement.

The Rapid Support Forces are looking for a place in the modern sector, but their problem with this sector itself is related to the accusation of participating in the dispersal of the sit-in, and therefore approaching them has become dangerous and condemned by the revolutionary street, and the Islamic forces have lost confidence in these forces, even if they did not support them. Hostility until the moment despite the negative attitudes of its leadership towards the Islamic trend in general.

The major problem that the Rapid Support Forces face internally is related to their always tense relations with the military establishment, and the reasons for this tension have persisted since the establishment of these forces in the arms of the security apparatus, which prompted large sectors of the army from an early age to view them with suspicion, and that they were harmful forces, but they were imposed. itself with the successes it achieved in the battles of Darfur, which made the supreme leadership of the state at that time support it, adhere to it, train it, take care of its qualifications, and establish a special law for it.

Yet at no time did the army accept it within its system;

3 of the army leaders provided her with the necessary care, namely: the former President Al-Bashir, Lieutenant-General Awad Ibn Auf and Lieutenant-General Al-Burhan. All the other leaders had tense relations with them and at one time reached the stage of mobilizing weapons towards them (the Armored Corps incident).

As for the problems of an international and regional nature that the Rapid Support Forces face, they are represented in the fact that their relations with those regional and international powers were established unilaterally with the consent of the state or under its sight;

The European Union agreed with the Sudanese government - during Al-Bashir's rule - to deal with the Rapid Support Forces and use them to control cross-border migration routes heading to Europe, especially those coming from East and Southern Africa, which reach the shores of the Mediterranean through the deserts of the northern state.

From the beginning, America has moved away from the Rapid Support Forces, and has not dealt with them, and its relations with them have become more tense after revealing the growing relationship with Russia, especially after the issuance of a torrent of reports from some important American research centers that track the gold trade in which the Rapid Support Forces are active in an attempt to put it under control. And scaring it (Global Witness Report: Billions of Dollars Went Out of Africa 2020), Reuter's report "Under the Sparkle", issued last October, and a report by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington entitled: Its Protectors are its Thieves... How Military Control of the Economy Hinders It democracy in Sudan).

As for its relations with the Gulf states, they cooled down after Saudi Arabia began reviewing its policies towards the Yemen war, which led to the reduction of the Rapid Support Forces (it was about 30,000 soldiers) in Saudi Arabia;

And its relations with the UAE were strained after it was revealed that the Rapid Support Forces exported gold to Russia from Central Africa, where Wagner Company owns its most important military base in Africa - especially Niger, Mali, Senegal and Mauritania - for gold coming from Africa.

Abu Dhabi has not been satisfied with an alternative market to Dubai, at a time when Abu Dhabi is building huge reserves of gold in its banks, and Dubai is the central market.

As for Egypt, a relationship with it was not established in the first place. The Rapid Support Forces remained in doubt among the Egyptians. Rather, they were classified as a militia, and they continued to be dealt with in that capacity. The MP was warned on his first visit to Cairo that Egypt would not accept a militia alternative to the army, and they advised him. accelerating their integration into the armed forces.

According to the testimony of an Egyptian diplomat - who asked not to be named - the message reached the representative clearly early, and he is being dealt with on this basis. In a question about the intersection of this position with some Gulf countries, this same diplomat told me, "Some Gulf countries represent Sudan for them as a political game." As for us, it is a destiny and a national security issue."

The Rapid Support Forces attribute this position to the influence of Lieutenant-General Salah Gosh and his closeness to the security decision-making circles.

Another worrying problem concerns the future and fate of the Rapid Support Forces in a democratic system.

Of course, it will not be able to play the political roles that it is playing now, and economically its resources and the companies affiliated with it will be at stake if a decision is issued by the parliament of a democratic government to return all the companies of the security system to the state. It is likely - in light of the continued issuance of reports by international organizations on these forces - that Such a decision, if issued, will find international support.

hidden causes of stress

Based on the foregoing, all these problems and intersections between the state, its political and military institutions, and the Rapid Support Forces have provided what can be described as raw material for the continuation of the state of tension, if we do not mention the conflict between President Al-Burhan and his deputy, Hemedti. However, other reasons no less important than those intersections have taken place. The conflict between them is now being escalated further.

The first causes of this tension are due to the fact that the second man in the state is not defined in the Basic Law. According to the constitutional document published in the Official Gazette (3/10/2019), Article 4 of the Constitutional Document, which is concerned with the formation of the Sovereignty Council, did not specify the name of the deputy;

There is no mention of the position in the body of the constitutional document, and the legal basis on which an unconstitutional position was named is not known;

Based on this constitutional flaw and in the absence of specific tasks for the deputy, a wide void has arisen in the leadership description of the deputy, as there are no specific and continuous tasks assigned to him in the state.

In fact, the Rapid Support Forces throughout the rescue period had nothing to do with political action and never interfered in politics. They were established under the Rapid Support Forces law approved by the National Council in its 43rd session of the fourth session on January 18 2017. However, after the fall of the rescue regime, it began to play a political role. The deputy became at the mercy of temporary and emergency costs and tasks.

Perhaps the most prominent tasks that Mr. General Hemedti assumed was his sponsorship of the peace agreement, which resulted in what is known as the Juba Peace Agreement signed on the 3rd of October 2020, and the former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok assigned Lieutenant General Hemedti - in his capacity as Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council - to manage economic profile;

In addition to Hemedti's movements during Hamdok's period in dealing with various crises, as happened in the file of tribal reconciliations in Darfur and his attempts to mediate the crisis in the East.

The failure to allocate the position of the Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council to specific constitutional and political tasks is the basis for the protracted dispute between the deputy and President Al-Burhan.

The strange thing is that the political forces that were ruling, and in their maneuvering between the two decision centers: the president and his deputy, accepted the nomination of Hemedti as deputy, and ignored the constitutional document in dealing with him, so they turned a blind eye to constitutional texts that they themselves drafted.

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