Well, with the approach of the really predicted cold weather forecasters, jokes with practical gas supplies to Europe, it seems, finally somehow ended immediately. It just so happened that right after the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin instructed the management of the Russian company Gazprom to start scheduled gas injection into European UGS facilities in the middle of last week, the dizzying European price rally at the TTF hub in the Netherlands turned on a confident and, excuse me , a rather cynical decline in price speeds.

And even a sharp rise in prices at the opening of trading on Monday, by about 11%, is unlikely to change the general trend: the market reacts to a specific event, to the reverse pumping of gas to Poland from Germany.

At the same time, as follows from the data of the operator of the Polish gas pipeline network Gaz-System, gas continues to flow through the Yamal-Europe pipeline to the territory of Poland from the east, but the subsequent pumping to the West, to Germany, is currently not carried out.

Therefore, the initial market reaction to what happened, albeit in a planned manner, the change is understandable, but it is not a trend.

Just as an example.

Last Friday, October 29 of this year, on the third day of the implementation of the already confident course to reduce the pan-European spot gas prices, the cost of the December futures on the TTF hub in the Netherlands fell to as much as $ 795.8 per thousand cubic meters, or € 66.375 per MV · h (now the market has corrected this fall, I mentioned this above, but in this case we will just use it as a fairly illustrative example). At the same time, the overall daily price correction exceeded even the historical maximum of 14%, which only confirms the mathematically voiced, one might say, simple truth: Russia, being a responsible energy operator controlling more than a third of the European gas markets of the continent, is really not even purely pragmatic. interested in the current ultra-high prices for blue fuel.

Russians are interested in stable prices, price peaks are more likely to harm them, as well as gas consumers.

And this just needs to be taken into account when analyzing the situation as a purely mathematical fact.

For this is banally bad for large European industrial enterprises, in the long-term prosperity of which we, again, are quite rationally interested in ourselves: they, you know, are our backbone customers.

And the price of any product is formed not only on the basis of the cost of its production and the greed of the manufacturer, but also on how much the consumer is willing to pay for this product, embedding it in their technological chains without any visible damage to their beloved.

This has historically developed, alas, and Russian gas producers understand this perfectly well.

The most striking example is the recent agreement with the same scandalous Moldova, reached by the Russian gas giant literally last weekend, as a result of which on November 1, gas already physically entered there.

The price there turned out to be, of course, much higher than the Moldovans themselves would have liked, but at the same time much lower than the European average: Gazprom, in general, once again proved that it can bargain and negotiate.

As they say, it's better this way than nothing at all ...

That, on the one hand, certainly (sorry for the somewhat cynical trolling) only confirms the guess of naive and gullible Americans, through whose efforts the energy crisis in the Old World largely took place.

Wow, Russia, it turns out, can really influence gas prices in Europe.

But on the other hand, looking at the wonderful process of curbing by Russian gas structures the exorbitant appetites of London stock speculators, who basically accelerated prices on the spot market on the subcontinent, you don't even know: from the point of view of the European economy, is it really so bad "Totalitarian and non-market Putin's" influence on European prices for natural gas, which are now decreasing so much due to the efforts of the Russian side?

Or, on the contrary, is it good?

And this is where the main energy question of our by no means the easiest time arises: this really insane turbulence that is observed now in the spot markets of Europe, when prices jump almost to the "Asian" two thousand dollars for thousand cubic meters, then fall almost to the "Gazprom" values ​​fixed on long-term contracts - what is this, in essence?

Accidental fluctuation, speculation with "blank paper", the whim of London stockbrokers mastering speculation in the gas markets, or an inevitable part of the global economic crisis?

His "energy trigger", if you will?

What can I say here?

The answer to this inherently banal question certainly exists.

It is unlikely that only anyone will like it, alas ...

... Although, if we talk about what is happening soberly and impartially, as they say, from the point of view of pure mathematics, then at least one can quite easily understand at least the following: Russia, and this obviously follows from its current behavior, really did not stand there is no task of “capturing European energy markets,” which our Western partners constantly blame us for.

Gazprom, judging by the words of its head Alexei Miller, who reported to the president, not only sells gas to European markets much higher than its own obligations to European partners, but it is also ready to start pumping gas into European underground storage facilities immediately after filling its own UGS facilities in Russia.

At the same time, it is planned to complete the filling of the Russian storage facilities quite soon, within the next literally a couple of weeks, immediately after the expiration of the internal Russian lockdown, that is, no later than November 8.

And there is only one question: how does the recently completed Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline fit into this simple gas equation?

And the answer is simple and, you will excuse me, rather cynical: but almost nothing.

The future gas pipeline, one of the lines of which is already in fact and purely technically filled with Russian blue fuel (the second is promised to be filled by the end of the calendar year), does not affect the current contractual deliveries from the word “in general”: Gazprom does everything without Nord Stream 2 their contractual obligations.

Which, by the way, was confirmed by none other than the head of the Austrian OMV Alfred Stern during the Friday teleconference: “We have a valid supply contract with Gazprom, which has been in effect with us for many years, and this year, as in all years before that, Gazprom supplies in accordance with its contractual obligations ”(c).

Gazprom is so calm because Nord Stream 2 is not about that.

From the supplier's point of view, sales are already sufficient.

And Nord Stream 2 is not about current supplies, it is “just” about additional supplies.

Which, for some reason, so happened, right now Europe is very, very necessary: ​​not fully filled UGS facilities on the eve of the promising very cold winter - this is not a very strong negotiating position, which is why Europe is so worried. And Gazprom has nothing to twitch here, it has its own planned tasks, including in the domestic markets: gasification of private houses, which is under the control of the president, is worth it. And the cold breath of the impending European winter is not something that the Russian gas giant does not care about at all: in the event of an early launch of Nord Stream 2, neither he nor his European partners will, in general, be superfluous.

But to be honest, in a scarce market, the possibility of additional deliveries can be a problem for anyone, but, believe me, not for the supplier.

Which, it happened so, and without this a whole bunch of both problems and potential buyers.

They actually stand in line.

And how soon Europe will be able to certify the Nord Stream 2 completed by the Russian side, the supplier worries much less than the consumer: after all, in a scarce market, even with an unfavorable scenario for the supplier, any losses from underdelivery are always compensated for by the price.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.