One Lebanese newspaper asked me to write my opinion on why Russia is hosting Taliban delegations in Moscow, why it is negotiating with them at all, and that the Russian Foreign Ministry can discuss round after round with the Taliban.

And this question inspired me to speculate with you.

In general, of course, the situation is interesting - on February 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of Russia recognized the activities of the Taliban as terrorist and ranked the organization among those banned in Russia.

As you read these lines, you will notice the obligatory footnote to this fact at the bottom of the article.

Nevertheless, Russia not only negotiates with the Taliban, but also regularly receives them in Moscow.

For the first time, Taliban comrades visited Moscow as part of talks on Afghanistan in November 2018 - at the President Hotel on Yakimanka, ten minutes from Red Square, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov met with Taliban negotiators.

This is a rather specific hotel, where our Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and his retinue like to lodge entire floors.

The leaders of the LPR and DPR also come there for meetings.

In short, a hotel for tough guys.

In February 2019, the Taliban delegation came again and again stayed at the same hotel, where the Inter-Afghan Dialogue forum was held on the spot.

The next visit took place in May 2019, the official pretext to meet is "100th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Russia and Afghanistan."

Calendar of 2021: in January, a delegation of the Taliban headed by Sher Mohamad Abbass Stanikzai (the Qatari office of the movement) visited Moscow, in March - consultations on Afghanistan attended by representatives of the United States, China, Pakistan, the Afghan government and, in fact, the Taliban.

And in July - another two-day visit.

The talks between Moscow and the Taliban representatives did not go unnoticed by Washington (perhaps because their peace initiatives with the Taliban in Doha and Istanbul have not yet brought the desired result).

In August 2017, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson accused Russia of helping the Taliban, and the NYT wrote in June 2020 that Americans have data on money transfers from Russian-controlled accounts to accounts associated with the Taliban.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called the NYT article a "blockbuster."

Anyway, one thing is clear: Russia considers the Taliban a negotiator and does business with them.

Why?

Let's try to figure it out.

Let's start with the fact that the "Afghan curator" in Russia is Zamir Kabulov, director of the second department of Asia of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

His position is called “the special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Afghanistan”.

Kabulov, who knows Farsi very well, began his career at the Foreign Ministry at the USSR Embassy in Iran, where he served from 1979 to 1983 (just the beginning of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of Khomeini in power).

Immediately after Iran, he was delegated to the USSR Embassy in Afghanistan (1983-1987, Soviet-Afghan war).

In 1995, at the dawn of the birth of the Taliban, he participated in negotiations with the Taliban on the release of the Russian Il-76 crew, which was captured in Kandahar.

In the period from 2004 to 2009, Zamir Kabulov was the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Afghanistan - that is, to make it clear that the Afghan issue in Russia is being dealt with by a professional who has dealt with the Taliban since the 1990s.

And he believes that Russia cannot afford to ignore the Taliban and its growing influence in Afghanistan and in the region as a whole.

“We perceive today's Taliban as a military-political movement in Afghanistan, which is an integral part of Afghan society. We see it as a national movement with its own political and ideological goals. Like any national movement, it has a right to exist, especially since the Taliban have proved their viability in 20 years of war in Afghanistan, including against foreign troops, ”Mr. Kabulov voiced his personal and state position in a large and important interview for Sputnik Afghanistan and Sputnik Tadjikistan, February 17, 2021 (“On the Taliban, the peace and the future of Afghanistan: a long interview with Kabulov”).

“It's another matter that they position themselves as the most important, almost the only force.

We tell them frankly that we, the Russian Federation, do not recognize the Taliban's claim to sole control of this country.

We stand for the fact that the Afghans themselves, of which the Taliban are a part, should agree among themselves on the future state structure ”- I am citing this fragment so that the position of the Russian Federation sounds clear.

Russia does not stake on the Taliban, Russia considers it necessary to speak with the Taliban, participate in a peaceful Afghan settlement, and logically strives to occupy its niche after the withdrawal of American troops.

Why does Russia need to talk to the Taliban?

About what?

In addition to geopolitical influence and our common "post-Afghan trauma", the ten-year Afghan military campaign (1979-1989), the empire's understandable desire to "be" and "influence", there is another serious factor.

And this, of course, is a serious threat to Central Asia from the north of Afghanistan.

If you watch video footage of how settlements and entire provinces are surrendered under the onslaught of the Taliban, the regular Afghan army is fleeing, moreover, the fighting Afghan special forces are captured in mountains of corpses in some "trophy" Taliban footage, the question arises: what will happen if the Taliban or will a militant group that broke away from it, inspired by the victories of the “Islamic emirate,” nevertheless cross the borders in order to expand the territory of the emirate, and enter the territory of, for example, Tajikistan?

How long will the Tajik army hold out before their onslaught?

And the Uzbek (which is stronger than the Tajik, but still)?

And what will happen if the Taliban begin to infiltrate through Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan (the Tajik-Kyrgyz border is 984 km), half of which, it seems, has already moved to Moscow?

I write "leak" - not to mention the military clashes, although we all remember the armed conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border between the military personnel of both countries on April 28 - May 1, 2021.

And if you look at the map of Kazakhstan - 7,598 beautiful kilometers, open doors to our Volga region, Siberia, the Urals.

Drug traffic, Islamists, armed groups ... Central Asia pierced by the Taliban is a direct threat to the security of the Russian Federation.

That is why we are trying to come to an agreement.

True, in early July 2021, when a delegation of the Taliban movement was in Moscow, the Taliban in Afghanistan took the border crossing with Turkmenistan.

(Well, perhaps, while the Taliban's political office is traveling to international meetings, the combat office is busy with its usual routine).

Turkmenistan became the third country, from which the Taliban took the border corridor in a short time - after Tajikistan and Iran.

“The Russian side expressed concern over the escalation of tension in the northern regions of Afghanistan and called on not to allow it outside the country.

Assurances were received from the Taliban regarding the non-violation of the borders of the Central Asian states by the grouping, as well as guarantees of the security of diplomatic and consular missions of foreign states on the territory of Afghanistan, ”reads the communique of the Russian Foreign Ministry dated July 8, 2021.

At this point, you can, of course, ask the opinion of our Iranian colleagues what they think about the guarantees of diplomatic immunity from the Taliban, and they have something to remember: in 1998, the Taliban captured the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif and ten Iranian diplomats were killed ...

But in our situation, we must be optimistic.

In any case, it is important to understand that Russia is not only working with the Taliban on the Afghan issue.

Less visible to the press is the work of the Russian Security Council, which works with the official Afghan government.

On the part of the Russian Federation, the negotiation process is conducted by the Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev (who, by the way, turned 70 yesterday, with which the author of these lines congratulates him), and on the part of Afghanistan - Hamdullah Mohib, National Security Advisor to the President of Afghanistan.

  • © Security Council of the Russian Federation

Mohib flew to Moscow quite recently, on July 2 (before that meetings with the head of the Russian Sovez took place in Tehran) - a few days before the Foreign Ministry received dear (in every sense) guests from the Taliban.

Mohib was born the 11th child of a family in a village north of Jalalabad.

During the Soviet invasion, the family left Afghanistan for the first time, and during the civil war - the second time, fled to Pakistan.

Perhaps that is why Mohib knows very well about the Taliban and its support from Pakistan - in May-June, Islamabad cut off all official contacts with him after he publicly accused Pakistan of supporting the violence in Afghanistan and called it a "brothel."

There are advantages to Russia's work with all parties to the Afghan conflict.

While the Foreign Ministry is working with the Taliban, the Security Council is working with the Afghan government.

On July 8, 2021, the Russian Foreign Ministry “expresses concern” and tries to get promises from the Taliban to “non-violate” the borders of the Central Asian states, and on July 9, Afghanistan Air Force in Shibargan, the capital of the northern province of Jowzjan (Uzbek and Turkmen borders), inflicts airstrikes on Taliban positions from Air: 56 killed, ten wounded, 23 captured (Xinhua).

One way or another, the line on the part of the Security Council obviously works - so far it is the Afghan security forces that are helping Russia and the Central Asian states to block the Taliban.

In the neighboring province of Sari-Pul, 11 more militants were killed, 23 were captured - Afghan troops, with the support of local residents who are part of the "forces of public uprising", are cleaning up two northern provinces, first closing them for a month and only after cleansing open the connecting their highway.

Russia is also ready for a pessimistic turn of events.

The head of the CSTO Joint Staff, Colonel-General Anatoly Sidorov, in an interview with the MIR 24 TV channel, noted Tajik border guards working in difficult conditions - strong temperature drops on the Tajik-Afghan border, mountain ranges up to 4.5-5 thousand meters: “It's hard and they are on duty around the clock. "

The CSTO also confirmed its readiness to use its combat potential to provide assistance to Tajikistan in the event of an aggravation of the situation on the border with Afghanistan.

Let me remind you that on July 5, 2021, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon ordered to mobilize 20 thousand military reservists to strengthen the border with Afghanistan.

This happened on the same day, when about 1,000 Afghan soldiers retreated into Tajikistan, fleeing the Taliban.

(By the way, my personal question remains the fact why border guards or combat special forces crash or flee from militants - is it because of such a significant numerical superiority? Poor armament of the regular forces? Or is it a matter of morale?)

Naimzur Province d


At the end of the day, 15 soldiers joined the Taliban



# Taliban # Afghanistan # kabulpic.twitter.com / vzCan7DGwg

- 🇮🇳🇯🇴alkama husain farooqui🇮🇳 (@ AlkamaFarooqui1) July 7, 2021

The Tajik-Afghan border is 1344.15 km, of which the river is 1135, most along the Pyanj River, the land border is 189.85 km and the lake border is 19 km.

According to the representative of Tajikistan at the CSTO, the Taliban today controls about 910 km of the Tajik-Afghan border.

Turkmenistan has also transferred an army to the borders - to Serhetabat, which is 2 km from the border, the transfer of military units, special forces, armored personnel carriers, artillery and medics has begun.

The most remarkable thing is that all this is happening against the background of the visit of the Taliban delegation, its Qatari office with the very same Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai who visited Moscow.

On July 10, according to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a Taliban delegation was brought to Ashgabat and accommodated in a government sanatorium to discuss the future of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan railway and border security.

“The leadership of Turkmenistan, however, like the leadership of Uzbekistan, has a negotiating mechanism with the Taliban movement,” says Alexander Knyazev, an expert on Central Asia and the Middle East.

Almost all those involved are negotiating with the Taliban, but at the same time, just in case, they are seriously strengthening the borders and pulling troops to them.

This is the truth of life.

Both in Moscow and in Tehran, which is playing its active "Afghan" political game, the Taliban are openly talking about their plans to seize the entire territory of the country and, most certainly, to take control of all borders.

That is why (just in case this happens) Russia, the Central Asian states and others are trying to establish a negotiating mechanism with the Taliban in the hope of resolving everything peacefully and achieving guarantees and agreements.

The Taliban need this in order to legitimize themselves in the international arena.

And with the filing, including the United States, inviting them on an equal footing with the government of Afghanistan to form a new coalition government in Doha, Istanbul and so on, this has actually happened.

Whether it was the right strategy will be revealed soon.

* "Taliban" - the organization was recognized as terrorist by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of February 14, 2003.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.