Angela Merkel came to Putin to solve problems that affect all of Europe. Problems that cannot be solved without Russia.
On January 11, Vladimir Putin received his first foreign guest in 2020. They became German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The leaders talked for almost four hours, and they still had something to discuss. Indeed, contrary to the mantrams of individual Western Russophobes, as well as some Russian pseudo-liberals and cheers, Europe and Russia are not antagonists. And not only because Russia is a part of a large Europe. Indeed, if you look at the situation soberly, then Russia and the same Germany have many common interests. And there are many questions where the parties can be useful to each other. Some of them Merkel and Putin discussed in Moscow.
They spoke primarily about Nord Stream 2, a pipeline that would allow Germany to directly receive cheap Russian gas. And, despite Merkel's assurances that this project is economic, he still initially had a very serious political flair. The point here is not only that it allows you to remove gas supplies from the risk of instability in the transit countries (Ukraine itself, in which the domestic political situation leaves much to be desired). Nord Stream 2 makes Germany the largest European gas distribution hub. Which, in turn, is another basis for the political leadership of Germany in Europe.
In addition, Putin and Merkel discussed Iran. Berlin, like Moscow, is more than interested in saving the Iranian nuclear deal. The deal - if it is restored - implies the absence of nuclear weapons from Iran (which, in turn, means the absence of a nuclear arms race in the region), and also guarantees European companies multibillion-dollar contracts for the supply of equipment, technologies, and goods to Iran. Therefore, Angela Merkel “everything must be done” to save the nuclear deal.
Yes, there is little chance of recovery - Trump restored sanctions against the Islamic Republic, and the Ayatollahs threatened to get out of all nuclear restrictions. At the same time, there is no hope for the correction of the American president - Trump is doing everything possible so that the dialogue with Iran does not take place. He ostentatiously interferes in the internal affairs of the Islamic republic, and also writes posts from the series “I am with the Iranian people” or “I don’t care if Iran negotiates, even if it does not possess nuclear weapons and does not kill protesters.”
However, Moscow and Berlin have a chance to revive the agreement. To do this, Germany must find courage and launch at full capacity a scheme to circumvent Western sanctions in trade with Iran (and protect European companies willing to trade from the Americans), and Russia - use its influence on Tehran to convince the Iranian leadership of the seriousness of European intentions. And Moscow will not be engaged in charity here - it is beneficial for Russia that Germany set a precedent for the leading Western country to refuse the principle of extraterritoriality of American sanctions.
Finally, Putin and Merkel discussed the situation in Libya. One of the complications of this conflict could be the Turkish invasion. In this situation, the flow of refugees to Europe will only increase, as will the potential Turkish influence on decision-making processes in the European Union. Therefore, Germany will try to find a political solution to the problem and hopes in this to help Russia (which actively maintains contacts with both sides of the conflict).
The only question is, why did this pragmatism wake up right now? Of course, the main alarm clock for Berlin is Washington. Including Donald Trump himself.
So, perhaps, if the United States sent clear signals to Germany, continued to control the “collective West” with a stick and a little carrot, there would be no rapprochement.
Germany would humbly walk in a pan-European team, not trying to leave it because of fear of the Washington chief and because of the moral unwillingness to take responsibility. However, such signals are no longer there, because there is no single United States.
The American elite is mired in civil strife, a conflict between the president and the opposing part of the establishment (primarily the democratic one). Moreover, both sides have their own and sometimes even opposite views on foreign policy. Trump is an American nationalist and pragmatist who is not burdened with ideological dominants (like believing in "global democratization"). For him, the main thing is that American interests and the readiness of third countries do not just take these interests into account, but directly observe them. Sanctions and open pressure are applied to the unprepared, and Trump here does not make much difference between allies and opponents. He puts pressure on both Germany and Iran. Democrats, on the other hand, are traditional globalists who believe in a liberal order and place their faith above the national interests of both their country and the desires of the allies.
It is not surprising that Germany, like all of Europe, is not on the way with either side. And since there is no longer a general line, Berlin, left to itself, is forced to take responsibility for its fate. A fate in which too much depends on cooperation with Russia. Therefore, Germany is interested in strengthening this cooperation.
However, on the other hand, it is not worth exaggerating the degree of rapprochement either. The parties are only at the beginning of a long journey.
Thus, successful negotiations, the launch of SP-2, and Moscow’s defense of pan-European interests in Libya and Iran do not mean that tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, or in the very near future, Europe led by Germany will lift Russia’s sanctions. And the point here is not duplicity, but priorities. Despite the importance and need of the Russian Federation, the EU is still the main one for Berlin. Preservation of stability and unity of this organization. That is why Germany will try to avoid any decisions that might split it, for example, lifting the sanctions from Moscow, which Poland and the Baltic countries strongly support. And until a compromise is reached with them, the restrictions will apply. Act, but not aggravated. Which is, in general, progress.
The author’s point of view may not coincide with the position of the publisher.