Modern history is becoming less and less interesting, because it is increasingly predictable.
On September 8, US President Donald Trump made a very loud statement to end negotiations with the Taliban *, which could not be taken as anything short-term, caused solely by tactical considerations, and not by the basic American strategy in Afghanistan.
This statement immediately entailed the rapid visits of the Taliban delegations to Moscow, Tehran and Beijing, which remained unnoticed in the information space at that time. This activity signified the desire of the Taliban to maintain its international status of an independent political player and at the same time hinted at the likelihood of a certain interception of the negotiation initiative for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan by the three named capitals. However, this same activity became a catalyst for the American side, the activity of Russian, Chinese and Iranian diplomacy narrowed the scope of US capabilities and in this case made it clear to Washington that the pause could not be long.
Already at the end of September, the US State Department’s special representative for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, not only discussed with the diplomats of several countries the topic of resuming the negotiations with the Taliban, but also managed to meet with the main Taliban negotiator Mullah Abdul Gani Baradar in Islamabad. The parties discussed measures to build mutual trust, exchange prisoners and reduce violence. Then a few more similar discussions followed, and already in November no one really hid the fact that US talks with the Taliban resumed.
On November 27, this fact was confirmed by Donald Trump, and on November 28, Trump landed at the U.S. Air Force base in Bagram in secrecy conditions, having managed to congratulate the military on Thanksgiving and meet with the current President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani. The statements made contain not so much new, perhaps more optimistic than during the previous rounds of negotiations, there was a chance that the Afghan government would be included in the negotiation process.
Although in the context of the electoral impasse that arose after the September 28 presidential election, it remains unclear what kind of government this will be. Kabul already discusses the likelihood of a second round of elections no earlier than the end of spring 2020. In this situation, the inclusion of the current Kabul administration in signing an agreement with the Taliban may be a successful move for Washington. The eligibility of this semi-legitimate administration in the future can always be called into question. However, as is the observance of a hypothetical agreement by the Taliban, which is by no means a centralized structure capable of perfectly operating in accordance with the directives of its leaders. Thus, the role of Washington as the main arbiter and moderator of the entire Afghan political process will be retained.
US tactics in the negotiation process with the Taliban cannot be considered outside the context of the strategic goals and objectives of the United States in Afghanistan, taking on faith the emotional and sometimes quite noble rhetoric of the American president, which, as in this case, has almost immediate significance.
These goals and objectives are both to maintain a certain and manageable level of instability in Afghanistan from Washington, and to maintain its minimum necessary military presence in the country.
The first of these circumstances logically provides the second, which, in turn, requires some kind of at least formal legitimization. The form of legitimization of the American military presence until 2014 was UN Security Council resolutions, then the 2014 bilateral agreement between the United States and Afghanistan, which was supposed to be valid until 2024. The stalemate of the intra-Afghan political process, including the Taliban problem, the growth of activity of other external actors, the tasks of the new presidential electoral process in the United States itself - these and a number of other factors are pushing the Trump administration to update the circumstances of its presence in the IRA and its entire Afghan policy. By signing an agreement with the Taliban, the form is being updated, but not the content.
Absolute uncertainty and unpredictability of the internal political processes themselves make the absence of a fully legitimate power a long-term fact. This position of the country, and in the case of the signing of an agreement with the Taliban, creates opportunities for maintaining, and possibly even increasing instability, which can also contribute to the activity of various terrorist groups beyond the control of the Taliban. Which, in turn, can be overcome only by reaching agreements with the latter, canceling the past elections as such, forming a transitional government with the participation of the Taliban and forming effective state institutions. But this is not the only condition necessary to reduce the level of instability and the appearance, at least in the form of trends, of the contours of a peaceful settlement.
Versions of future agreements consider reaching an agreement with the Taliban elite - not one of the known details contains any program for the reintegration of ordinary Taliban militants into Afghan society. Moreover, the possible reactions of the Afghan population to the return to the legitimate space of the country of several tens of thousands of these militants are not considered. It is clear that the Taliban commanders in the hierarchy from middle level and above will be most successful in this case on their own, and a significant part of ordinary members and lower level commanders will be unclaimed in civilian life.
They can turn out to be an extremely serious mobilization resource for terrorist groups beyond the control of the central bodies of the Taliban, including those of international, non-Afghan origin. Moreover, the lack of funding does not threaten these groups: a number of countries that are formally allied to various degrees in the United States (for example, Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Pakistan) have their own interests in Afghanistan that are different from Washington. Transnational criminal (for example, drug-related) structures also have their own interests.
As a result, it is unlikely that we will have to talk about the real effectiveness of the resumed negotiations with the Taliban, even if some kind of agreement is signed. However, perhaps the ultimate goal of American politics consists only in reformatting the political forces of Afghanistan, and not in achieving peace. And this - in the genre of assessments of real, not public and decorative politics - has long been predictable.
* "Taliban" - the organization was recognized as terrorist by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of February 14, 2003.
The author’s point of view may not coincide with the position of the publisher.