Image of the President in the imagination of Tunisians .. Will the presidential elections an opportunity to review?

In the norms of democratic states, or those seeking to acquire and resettle good democratic governance, the selection of candidates for the most important sovereign positions - such as the presidency or the presidency of the government - is not arbitrary, improvised or abrupt, but is subject to a sort of gradual sorting, accumulation of experience and testing that offers the candidate Gradually for public opinion, they gain some sort of acceptability and demonstrate efficiency in file management and execution of major tasks.

This is an objective entry to build a kind of legitimacy and legitimacy derived from the ability to communicate and influence, efficient performance and skill listening well to the concerns of citizens, and the proper extrapolation of the reality of the country and how to manage its capabilities and capabilities.

The promotion of cliche and blunt methods, since the proper selection conditions for the most prominent candidate for the presidency is a propaganda communication process in the first place, is a kind of fallacy that empties the modern systems of governance of the most important elements and characteristics that give it credibility and legitimacy.

The mechanism of selection through election must not turn into a kind of deceit of the masses and circumvent their will, that their representatives are lacking specifications that respect the contract of authority to respect the requirements of eligibility, competence and efficiency in someone who seeks to gain the trust of voters.

The experience of post-colonial rule in Tunisia gives us a very different picture in contrast to the choice of who is in power. Habib Bourguiba, in the eyes of Tunisians of all backgrounds, represented a picture in which the leader's qualifications, qualities, charisma and the expectations of the people are very consistent. And its ability to satisfy a high percentage of those expectations.

Without Bourguiba's long reign, he became a disguised monarchy, during which he lost much of his queens, sometimes ridding him of his political rivals or rivals;

Contrary to that picture, the second President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali seemed to lack the most important of these qualities and leadership qualities of rhetoric and the ability to persuade, and the high level of cultural and political increase reflected in the speeches Bourguiba. He has resorted to fill those shortcomings to avoid spontaneous friction of the masses and not to adopt the rhetoric rhetoric, as he replaced it by hiding behind his advisers, he uttered only what they write him and draw him steps and movements, even seemed closer to the puppet than the leader.

His last speech before fleeing, despite his preparation in the Tunisian dialect, was spontaneous and improvised. The gaze of his eyes and his movements indicated his dependence on the written bond, without any use of his personal culture, which would not have qualified him to play the role of the president as ably shown by Bourguiba.

Therefore, it was embarrassed by any comparison with Bourguiba, and obliged his press teams for decades to avoid any form of such comparison because the difference between them is vast, and was comparing the comparison made by the makers of his propaganda campaign of composite images, governed by the requirements of praise and polishing the image and the glory of the imaginary, by concealing an important level Indeed, his appearance would have changed the outlook.

After the change of January 14, 2011, and following the confusion of the first months, it was believed that the mechanism of selecting who would lead the country would change, and the focus remained on the direction of change. Will the victorious forces of the revolution be qualified to lead? Or do the forces of the old regime have more than one way to return to the reins of power and continue their control over a new range? Will this have an impact on the characteristics, competencies and capabilities of the President?

The momentum of the revolutionary movement outweighed the demand for change, producing the Renaissance leadership of the Renaissance to lead the transition, but this coincided with the emergence of blurry binaries in the application of precise criteria for the selection of leadership. Of these binaries, is the leader modernist / progressive or Islamic / conservative? Victorious of the revolution and the demand for change or supporters of the old regime?

This has resulted in a sterile debate on “identity and societal style”; instead of deepening the debate on the features of leadership appropriate to the stage as individuals with leadership qualifications and communication capabilities, and clear perceptions of the quality of appropriate solutions to the growing crises of society; This or that axis.

Within these contexts, candidates for leadership positions - such as Hammadi Jebali, Moncef Marzouki and Moustapha Ben Mustapha - were not treated with regard to their qualifications and alternatives, but rather as within or outside the old system, and with or against that choice without interest in programs or options.

As a result, exaggerated demand waves, strikes and sit-ins have paralyzed the country, bringing them into the terms of crisis leadership, which is not looking for radical solutions to the problems for which the revolution took place; it has become preoccupied with extinguishing fires and keeping the country away from collapse, especially after the appearance of terrorist operations as an effective and profound confusion. The subsequent political assassinations and targeting of security and military institutions.

Together, these factors have combined to disrupt the democratic transition and explicitly call for the return of the old regime; in the eyes of its supporters, it is best able to offer security and development solutions.

The 2014 elections took place in a climate of attraction and intense struggle to get rid of the “new rulers”, and the victory of the old regime by adopting a “useful vote” that brought Béji Caid Essebsi and his party to power.

Baiji's campaign directors revived all his Bourguiba exploits in form and content by recalling his victory for the woman, whose role was instrumental in tipping the Baji against his rival Marzouki.The focus was on recalling the best of Bourguiba's symbolic balance and injecting it into Baji's balance as an extension.

Béjaiba's exploits were, for the most part, Bourguiba's rhetoric, improvisation, and citation of the Quranic texts, and referring to all the common denominators of the past that attract the attention of Tunisians by adopting images and symbols on which the Tunisian media has worked for decades, with rules that are closer to propaganda than to the media. Anchored in memory and conscience.

This is what contributed to the success of Beji any success in the process of identification with Bourguiba, especially as this was not - in our view - fabricated, since Beji was a pillar of Bourguiba's rule, and imbued with the spirit of his policies except his view of the choice of democracy, which distinguishes Beji from Bourguiba , Since it was one of the minority that demanded it since the 1970s.

When he came to power in 2014, he showed that he did not deny these values, as he did not respond to the UAE / Saudi temptations when he coaxed him to apply a modified version of what happened in Egypt, Tunisia, and he did not respond to this, which will mark a milestone in the political history of the late President Beji.

The early calls that precipitated the succession of President Beji in his party and the presidency of the country were moved by circles close to his party and even to his family, and history manifested itself as if he were repeating himself. What happened to the succession of Bourguiba since the 1970s and ended with the coup against him in 1987, is the same was repeated with Béji from the first day he held the reins of the presidency.

This was one of the engines of the conspiracies being waged for the country, which was only resolved by the sudden death of President Béji.

There is no doubt that those who hastened in a sudden and intensive way to submit the nomination of Abdul Karim al-Zubaidi, and deluded others that he is best suited to play the role of president; they want to make him a president by force, and do not believe that the roles are affected by competencies and abilities, they have in the past pushed Ben Ali to play the role of the president without him Neither capacity nor core competencies.

The Tunisian people have paid a high price whenever the most important positions are unqualified, and the remnants of this will be even more severe if we repeat the mistake again. Surrounding the President himself in abundant numbers of experts would not be a risk.

The supporters of the old regime insist that there is no fear that the president will not have the highest qualifications and capabilities, claiming that his assistant team will take over directly on his behalf; it can deprive the country of being undermined by its best leadership and thus allow access belts to leak from all outlets. Weakness in the president's qualifications and abilities, they direct his performance and implicitly control the country's capabilities, as they did during the time of former President Ben Ali.

It is these considerations that make them rush today to reproduce the same system, and push its representative to the top. Are not the features of Zubaidi closer to the amended version of the President Alterjie, a version that satisfies them and up to them separated from the experience of the old regime?

It is unfair to link the lack of qualifications for the presidency to Abdul Karim al-Zubaidi only, and to mitigate or neglect them in the case of most of the other candidates.Deficiencies are common and almost shared by the majority of candidates.Therefore, we have to admit that there is a vacuum in the perceptions that determine the features of who should be president. We have not specified the appropriate specifications and competencies required for those who wish to assume that responsibility.

We must give up the constitutional "utopia" that makes running for the presidency a right available to all Tunisians. We must separate between the right to citizenship and the right to occupy the most important positions in the leadership of the country; the first is a right available to all that is criminalized deprivation, and the second is an entitlement to the most qualified and competent.

We are called on to abandon the “sanctity” that the president's supporters have laid on their candidate in the contexts of “the great mujahid”, the “inspiring president”, “the protector of fever and religion,” and other propaganda speeches enshrined in the old regime. In general, the president's palace is a built palace, high salary and dozens of other privileges.

The mastermind behind these privileges stems from the background that the people are in the service of the president, a background consistent with the political regimes that view the people as a parish, a common denominator among all Arab regimes.

The Tunisian experience remains the front line in defending the demand to change the political systems, until we return to the origin where the "president is at the service of the people", and until the spirit of that principle in all legislation and arrangements, because the reproduction of dictatorship sneaks from those legislation and arrangements when it becomes a ride to appease The President and the satisfaction of his ego and Alia, and you in the life of President Bourguiba and succeeded after him what sings all the inference.

The circumstance may not be appropriate today to review the arrangements for the selection of the president and other leadership, nor to reconsider privileges that squander the state's possibilities and offer them as they begin their work, and continue as concessions attached to them even after they retire.

But do not senior officials in the state in that way devote a tendency to scramble for the spoils before ensuring the duty and protection of the country's capabilities? Isn't that the image we export to Tunisians about the features and characteristics of their officials closer to the priority of achieving utility before the service?

It is a heavy legacy that has produced perceptions deviated from the rules of good governance, perceptions that the Ben Ali regime exaggerated in order to take root, which presupposes a revision of the picture and perception because the representations of Tunisians to their officials are near to the bottom, because they are "accused until proven innocent."