This week marks the sixth anniversary of one of the most important events in the Middle East, which reflected the course of the Arab Spring. On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian army turned against the government of the late President Mohamed Morsi, resulting in a massacre of thousands and thousands of others fleeing exile. Democratic rule in the country, having been around the corner.
The Egyptian army seized power by exploiting popular protests in June 2013 to express dissatisfaction with Morsi's rule (the first democratically elected president in the country's history). Morsi was later arrested and tried in politicized trials and subjected to ill-treatment. The Morsi family confirmed that he had been subjected to systematic medical negligence, which eventually led to his collapse after giving testimony in a soundproofed cage in court and then to his death last month.
Last week, a few days after Morsi's sudden and tragic death, Egyptian security forces arrested prominent secular opposition figures, including former parliamentarian Ziyad al-Alimi and journalist Hossam Mo'nis, for allegedly associating Islamists.
It should be noted that the detainees played an active role in the revolution against Hosni Mubarak, and contributed to rallying the masses against Morsi.
This double repression by the regime of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is part of the largest repressive political campaign in the history of modern Egypt, targeting both secular and Islamic groups. Although levels of injustice are unprecedented, they are not yet sufficient to fill the growing gap and mistrust between the opposing factions in Egypt.
| " What both secularists and political Islamists need to understand is that, although there are significant differences in ideology and their future vision of the country, these differences are not existential. Indeed, these groups have more common denominators than one would like to recognize: common suffering and a common dream to participate in shaping the future of their country " |
On the contrary, the narratives of different factions have become more entrenched in recent years; each category has a radically different view of the past, based on polarized ideological propaganda and emotional associations with events.
The demonstrations of June 2013 reflected the struggle of both factions. For decades, the political ambition of the Islamists was limited by parliament. When Mursi was elected, his victory was deeper than being president; for his Muslim audience, Morsi was the embodiment of their success in smashing the political bishop.
Secularists considered him to be part of a small elite with no public base and no capacity to crowd. So when they managed to rally against Morsi in 2013, supporters saw the demonstrations as an embodiment of their success.
Every year since 2013, the political opposition has been re-examining this divergent history, which represents deep-rooted issues. On the one hand, Islamists are trying to delegitimize the 2013 protests by reducing the number of participants and exaggerating the support of the security services. In the same way, the secularists are trying to delegitimize Morsi by portraying him as an incompetent president who represents only Islamists; thus each side plays on the historical political shortcoming of the other.
At the same time, the Sisi system is cleverly exploiting these shortcomings to create further divisions and uses repression as a tool to reinforce each other's narratives.
Controversial blame policies are not new on the Egyptian scene, especially in this context. Historically, the army has instigated various opposition factions against each other in order to strike a balance between the dynamics of power. Today it uses similar tactics, such as "demonizing" opposition groups, offering preferential treatment in sentences and prison conditions to one faction over the other, in order to deepen the decades-long conflict between secularists and Islamists.
| " When politicians and Egyptian factions put their differences aside and make their country a priority, then they can free themselves from the demons of the past and inspire the world as they did before " |
What both secularists and political Islamists need to understand is that although there are major differences in ideology and their future vision for the country, these differences are not existential; indeed, these groups have more common denominators than both sides wish to recognize: common suffering and shared dreams To participate in shaping the future of their country.
In the face of the endless repression of the regime, both factions must realize that political reality does not give them the luxury of engaging in theoretical differences or debates about their contradictory perceptions of the narratives of the past. Now more than ever, they must find common ground to build a free, pluralistic and democratic future in which they all live.
Egyptians must realize that they need an environment that guarantees freedom, transparency and the rule of law to find out the facts of the past. Attempts by both factions to fill the current political vacuum by marginalizing the other will only prolong the life of the Sisi regime.
When Egyptian politicians and factions put their differences aside and make their country a priority, then they can free themselves from the demons of the past and inspire the world as they have before.