The diplomatic activity of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suspiciously recalls the similar actions of his colleague Colin Powell in 2002 on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq. And in general, world politics seems to have made a turn into the past, and mankind again faced the same question: how to behave in the situation of the upcoming American aggression? Only now is not in Iraq, but in Iran.
All US actions today should be assessed in this perspective. Including Pompeo’s recent visit to Sochi, his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as possible negotiations between the leaders of the two countries “on their feet”. It is assumed that such negotiations could take place on June 28-29 during the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan. In any case, Trump has already expressed a desire to hold such negotiations, and Putin reaffirmed Russia's constant desire to build an acceptable relationship with Washington.
It is obvious that at such negotiations the whole package of questions will be raised, and it is doubtful that the problems of sanctions will be circumvented, just as it is doubtful that America’s liberal press will allow Trump to say nothing terrible about Russia's “interference” in the presidential election. But, I think, both will take not too much time, because the main question, which will inevitably be at the center of any negotiations during the current year, is the question of what to do with Iran.
The situation in the Persian Gulf - and specifically in the Strait of Hormuz - is heating up: there are reports of attacks by allied Iranian Hussites on Saudi Arabian tankers. US National Security Advisor John Bolton, the main lobbyist for the military action, has already announced that the USS aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln has been sent to the Gulf. In response to this, another ally of Iran, the Hezbollah organization, occupied one of the islands near the Strait of Hormuz for a possible attack on the military courts if the hot phase of the conflict began. In such a tense situation, it is not necessary to resort to such “spectacular” terrorist acts as it was on September 11, 2001, in order for the war to begin. A war can begin with one projectile fired by someone.
Trump, according to American observers, does not want war. War is simply not his element. His favorite is smart deals, trading advantages, blackmail, bluff. Anything but war. Especially since with the generals he now has (after a series of last year’s resignations) a clearly uneasy relationship, and in the event of a war, he will have to regularly communicate with the military and rely on their competence.
Trump constantly hints that Bolton is such an evil cop, and he himself is a good cop. And he wants only a new profitable nuclear deal with Iran.
Presumably, the complete cessation of uranium enrichment, but also a sharp reduction in Tehran’s geopolitical influence in the Middle East. Suppose the first is still possible as a last resort, but the second is unlikely. The corps of revolutionary guards and all those leaders who are closely associated with the aforementioned allies of Iran may not submit to their leadership if it decides on a geopolitical retreat.
Nevertheless, Trump is desperately trying (including through his alter ego Pompeo) to gain some diplomatic advantage, to strengthen his position, in order to stop the war.
And it is assumed that if Russia enters a kind of diplomatic coalition for a new, improved deal, the slide into war can be stopped. In any case, the president of the United States hopes for this.
America twice - around 2006 and 2013 - managed to avoid a big war with Iran. In 2006, everything was ready for the start of the war in Syria, which inevitably had to be followed by a clash with Tehran. The big war was stopped by the unsuccessful Israeli military campaign against Hezbollah. In the fall of 2013, the world was on the brink of war when Obama announced that Assad had stepped over the “red line” using chemical weapons against civilians.
From the big war, America was restrained by President Putin’s peace initiative to eliminate chemical weapons stocks and Obama’s own unwillingness to get involved in another conflict after Libya, where he was lured by Sarkozy on the one hand and Hillary Clinton on the other.
Today, a big war is prevented by two circumstances. The rise in oil prices, which will follow the complications in the Strait of Hormuz, and the reluctance of the American voter to support the new military operations against some distant adversaries more than once expressed in the elections.
In addition, it should be noted that the neocons today in society are weaker than ever, the peak of their influence behind. Their main body, The Weekly Standard, ordered a long life, went to a different world and the main political ally of the movement, Senator John McCain, and his partner from North Carolina, Lindsay Graham, fled to the Trump camp. In essence, all the hopes of the neocons today are connected primarily with Bolton, no matter how far this politician retreats from neoconservative orthodoxy.
In other words, a big war with Iran, if it happens, will be extremely unpopular in America, and, having it in the record, Trump will not be able to re-elect for a new term.
Is it possible for Russia and the United States, without putting differences on Iran to the fore, nonetheless to establish some kind of dialogue on other issues, primarily on the issue of arms limitation? This will be an extremely difficult task. In the end, in much calmer times, Putin and the younger Bush — with all their mutual sympathy — still could not refrain from confrontation, the culmination of which was the three-day war with Georgia in August 2008.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to talk, and it is good that the conversation began in Sochi. It is also good that the mission of the main negotiator with Russia today was played by a man who strenuously played the role of Colin Powell in the Trump administration. Let's hope that the remake of 2002 in 2019 will end with a different ending, and this time a thin peace will win, not war.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.