In fact, it is not entirely clear how the sanctions for the supply of a number of Russian goods, introduced in response to similar measures previously taken by Ukraine, will work. Despite the fact that the ban applies to only 1.2% of Russian exports in this area, supply restrictions may be either suicidal for the Ukrainian economy, and may not cause any tangible harm to it. The point is the nomenclature of goods.

Ukraine imported more than 15 million tons of coal from Russia in 2018 for a total of more than $ 1.8 billion. In the total volume of imports, which amounted to more than 21 million tons, the share of Russian coal was 70.2%. Ukraine will not be able to replace these volumes quickly, Ukraine has repeatedly tried to buy fuel in other countries, and all these attempts have broken about price realities. Coal was fabulously expensive. So for a poor country with an empty budget, burdened with huge debts, the ban, if it works, will be not just a sensitive, but, to put it mildly, crushing blow.

With oil things are simpler. Her Ukraine from Russia does not receive from the very beginning of the political crisis, so the bulk of petroleum products are purchased in Belarus. But this is a product of processing again the Russian energy carrier. Poland and Hungary supply something, but the price difference with Belarusian imports is very noticeable. However, Russia sells gasoline and diesel to Ukraine: according to Ukrainian data, in the first half of 2018, Russian deliveries accounted for 36.7% of all foreign fuel purchases. In the first place in the export of fuel supplies Belarus - 40.5%. In the third - Lithuania (about 10%).

However, half a year ago, Moscow achieved from Minsk the cessation of re-export of its oil to Ukraine and reduced its own supplies to the volumes necessary for consumption within the country. That is, in fact, we are talking about blocking the channels through which Ukraine received over 80% of the strategic energy carrier. That is, the sanctions are able to drive the Ukrainian economy into such a collapse, which it has never experienced in the whole of post-Soviet history. On the nose of sowing. To carry it out, it takes a huge amount of fuel, mostly diesel. Lack of fuel will automatically lead to its rise in price several times. It threatens agriculture with complete ruin. Ukrainian tanks in the Donbass are working on the same Russian diesel fuel.

The rest of the goods in the sanctions list are not critical, so we will not touch them. Nevertheless, it is too early to say that the energy crisis is inevitable. Moscow left itself a field for maneuvers.

Energy can be supplied on a single quota, which will be issued by the Ministry of Economic Development. The mechanism of granting permits for coal and oil is not yet available, it still needs to be worked out. But it is obvious that Ukraine will have to negotiate procurement every time. What preferences or political concessions will Moscow require? I believe that it is very significant. And Kiev will have to either fulfill the conditions set, or prepare for a default, which, with more than 80 percent of the energy exports curtailed, becomes inevitable.

The Russian government has actually formed a political and economic space of relations with Ukraine, within which it can put forward any ultimatums to Kiev. Apparently, not one of the presidential candidates is ready to give Moscow an inch. This means that the threat of default becomes more than real. Another problem that significantly complicates the situation for the Ukrainian leadership is the need to repay $ 1.5 billion of debt to creditors within a month. There is no such money in the treasury. So by June 1, when the sanctions come into force, the Ukrainian budget will be naked and poor, like a Latvian from a famous saying.

I honestly do not think that even if the new president of Ukraine refuses to bow to Moscow (and he refuses), the ban will work in full force. Economic catastrophe, which will affect the entire population of Ukraine, Russia does not need. Ordinary people are not to blame. Therefore, some export volume will be curtailed and Ukrainians will certainly feel the effects of sanctions, but most of the supply will remain in any case. The main thing is that the Ukrainian consumer understands that the ban is exclusively reciprocal. So if a motorist or a combine driver has to buy fuel at European market prices, he should be aware that the increase in value is the exclusive merit of his own authorities.

The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.