Inquiry

Olivier Dubois' hostage-taking in Mali: the French army followed the journalist until his abduction, the murky role of the fixer

On the left, screenshot from a Jnim video in which Olivier Dubois announces his abduction, May 2021. Right, a patrol of the French Barkhane force in Gao, April 2015. (Illustrative image) © Photos: screenshot, D. Baché / RFI montage

Text by: David Baché

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Olivier Dubois was released on March 20, after two years of captivity in the hands of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. He had been kidnapped in Gao, northern Mali, where he was to interview a jihadist leader. Our investigation reveals that at the time of his abduction, the French army had been following his preparations step by step, without his knowledge, for several months. Testimonies also highlight the murky role of the French journalist's "fixer" and the risky conditions of his report.

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Investigation conducted jointly for more than a year and a half by RFI, TV5 Monde, Liberation, and Le Monde. These revelations were retained by our media until the release of Olivier Dubois so as not to harm his safety and the negotiations then underway.

On April 8, 2021, Olivier Dubois had an appointment with a jihadist leader of Jnim, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, linked to al-Qaeda. This meeting, the independent French journalist, installed in Mali since 2015 on behalf of several media, had meticulously prepared. In the smallest details and in the greatest discretion. But he didn't know that his secret... was no secret.

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What is the street they asked you to take to drop off Olivier Dubois? This question was asked by a lieutenant of the French Barkhane force, then present in Mali – she left the country last August – who asked Olivier Dubois' fixer, the very day of his abduction. One question among many, asked in a voice message that our media were able to listen to. Kader (not his real name), the fixer, the local contact who helps Olivier Dubois organize his report, is a Malian Tuareg living in Talataye, Gao region, in northern Mali. Above all, he regularly collaborates with the Jnim, for non-war activities. To Olivier Dubois, the French military and our media, Kader assures that it is under duress and to protect his life and that of his family that he had to accept to render certain services to the Jnim. To preserve his anonymity and security, our media have chosen not to provide further details about these services. Olivier Dubois, who had discovered Kader a few years earlier on social networks, and with whom he had already worked on several reports, had made him one of his most valuable sources. Between Kader and Olivier Dubois, a relationship of great trust was gradually established.

Army Indicator

But Kader is not just a source for the journalist. He is also an informant of the French army. According to the hearings of several soldiers – including very senior officers – carried out as part of the investigation opened in Paris by the National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor's Office after the kidnapping of Olivier Dubois, and that our media were able to consult, Kader "worked as an informant" for the Barkhane force "since the end of December 2019": "He gave us access to a key area, because he lived in Talataye," says an officer, who says he expects information from him on "the habits of life" of the "emir of Talataye".

The Emir of Talataye, Abdallah Ag Albakaye, is precisely the jihadist leader that Olivier Dubois wishes to interview. "Kader had been recruited almost exclusively for the location or even capture of Abdallah Ag Albakaye," said one of the soldiers interviewed. To achieve this goal, the French force provides Kader with a satellite phone and pays him. "This money was for the information he gave, for travel expenses, telephone packages and also for medicine for his family," says a soldier, who adds that in addition to these "compensations", a sum of money was planned, since the beginning of the collaboration of Kader and the French force, in case of arrest of the jihadist leader: "I explained to him once again that money could be given only in connection with the result," explains his officer clearly in charge, namely the arrest or neutralization of Abdallah Ag Albakaye.

A letter, money and a boubou

At the end of 2020, Olivier Dubois asked Kader to help him interview Abdallah Ag Albakaye. The journalist knows that Kader has already provided information to the French army several times in the past, but he does not imagine that his interview project can be exposed. Over the years, their relationship turned into a friendship. Olivier Dubois has confidence in his fixer.

Kader, however, informed the Barkhane force immediately. Olivier Dubois does not suspect anything. From that date, the French military followed the journalist's preparations step by step, without his knowledge, thanks to Kader's regular reports. It is he who is charged by Olivier Dubois to contact the jihadist leader. It is also he who presents the journalist with an "official" letter of invitation signed by Abdallah Ag Albakaye himself, and supposed to guarantee his safety. A letter that Kader also forwarded to the Barkhane force. "He gave us the security guarantees written in Arabic," explains Kader's officer, "which we had translated for him [...] so that he can give them to Olivier Dubois. On the basis of this document, the journalist will engage further in his project.

But Olivier Dubois could not convince the newsrooms for which he worked to finance his mission. The newspaper Libération found her too dangerous and refused her proposal to report. Olivier Dubois then exposes his financial difficulties to Kader. A few weeks later, Kader returns to the journalist with the money intended to pay for his plane ticket, his hotel room and even "a big boubou in bazin and a turban" in the run-up to the meeting. Kader explains that it was jihadist leader Abdallah Ag Albakaye himself who agreed to finance the journalist's project. All these elements are scrupulously and secretly transmitted to the Barkhane force by the fixer/informer.

French journalist Olivier Dubois, on a screenshot from a video from March 13, 2022. © AFP

Collection of Information

At the time, the city of Gao – in which Olivier Dubois was kidnapped – was home to the largest French military camp in Mali, with more than 2,000 men at that time. Among them, the intelligence group in connection with the fixer. "The purpose of our mission was to locate the named Albaka (sic) and to be able to follow him to his refuge area," explains the officer dealing with Kader to the French justice.

He and the other soldiers interviewed unanimously assured that their only objective was to collect intelligence, and not to organize an operation to arrest or kill the jihadist leader that Olivier Dubois was to meet. More precisely: such an operation was considered, but finally ruled out after a meeting held on March 23, 2021, attended by very senior officers in Mali but also in N'Djamena, Chad, where the command of the Barkhane force is located. As part of the French judicial investigation, the soldiers interviewed explain the reasons for this decision: "The purpose of our group is the collection of intelligence", "Barkhane was not sized for this kind of file", "there has never been an operation validated at my level", unanimously say the various soldiers interviewed. The highest-ranking officer is formal: "I did not give any order to carry out any action around the meeting, because it was too dangerous.

For his part, Kader the fixer says he is convinced, from the exchanges he had with his attending officer, that an operation to lead to the arrest or neutralization of the jihadist leader is well planned. But the sequence of events, on the day of the abduction, makes him doubt.

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The operation part is managed by others, I hope as much as you that it will be stopped " the attending officer then answers a worried question from Kader. Confronted with a screenshot during his hearing, the soldier will affirm that this message was not based on any concrete project, and that it was simply intended to reassure his interlocutor to encourage him to continue to transmit his information.

After the abduction, the Directorate of the Armed Forces launched an internal investigation, the conclusions of which were delivered just one month later, on 7 May 2021, then on 24 September 2021 for the detailed supplementary report. Classified as "defense secrets", then declassified for the purposes of the judicial investigation, our media were able to consult these documents, in which the inspector explains by an internal dysfunction the continuation of the collection of intelligence around Olivier Dubois, despite the decision taken on March 23 not to conduct an operation: "Never the intention and the corresponding order that should have been formalized by the PCIAT [Barkhane's command post in N'Djamena, Editor's note] weren't. According to the conclusions of this internal investigation, the Barkhane intelligence group would have "planned – and begun to conduct – an operation in a completely autonomous manner.

Change of vehicle

Thus, on April 8, 2021, the day scheduled for the interview that will not take place, the Barkhane force follows "almost in real time", according to the expression of a soldier interviewed, the movements of Kader and Olivier Dubois thanks to a geolocation application installed on the phone of the fixer. But Kader, contrary to the initial plan, will not participate in the meeting. He must let Olivier Dubois board another car, without him. A change that Kader learns a few hours before the meeting, and of which he informs – separately – Olivier Dubois and the Barkhane force.

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Who is going to be a translator during the meeting if you are not allowed to participate?" "You told me that at 14 p.m. you were going to leave with him to a certain point and then they were going to pick him up by car. Do you know where you will make the exchange with Olivier Dubois? "Are you thinking of deleting our messages for your safety?" These questions are among the many recordings and screenshots attesting to the precise and regular exchanges between Kader and his treating officer, up to the moment of the abduction. The soldiers of Barkhane, on the other hand, explain that they lost track of events the moment Olivier Dubois changed vehicles.

Around 15 p.m., Olivier Dubois boarded a "sand-colored" car, with four men in turbans and without visible weapons, according to Kader's account. Once this change of car was made, "there was no technical way to follow him, Barkhane was informed only by Kader," says one of the senior officers interviewed, who specifies that "no instructions" had been given to physically follow the journalist. Thus, the French soldiers explain that they never witnessed the kidnapping of Olivier Dubois, but gradually and simply made the observation, not seeing the journalist return. "After 48 hours, I tell myself that we must consider the case of a hostage-taking," said a very senior officer of the Barkhane force.

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Why didn't you tell him to stop everything?

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The French military confide to the justice to have had, over the weeks, more and more signals on the possibility of an ambush. "All the elements made us think that there was a real risk for Olivier Dubois," recalls a lieutenant. "While you have rather convincing evidence on a possible kidnapping of a French citizen, asks a French investigator, why not told him to stop everything?" The lieutenant's response: "First, because I was not ordered to do so." The highest-ranking military officer interviewed explained that he did not directly try to dissuade the journalist, because that is not the role of the army, but asked the diplomatic services to do so, as is customary.

The day before his departure, however, it was Olivier Dubois who informed, on his own initiative, by message, a counsellor from the France embassy of his trip to Gao – without revealing his true objective. He is then warned against the risks associated with such a move. Interviewed by our media two days after the kidnapping, this adviser said that it was "at [his] request" that a "red letter" was sent to the journalist by the Quai d'Orsay the next day, the day of his departure and abduction, advising him not to leave. This letter, actually dated April 8, is signed by the director of communication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time and sent by email to Olivier Dubois. Its content is the most classic, and journalists accustomed to difficult terrain are many to have received the same, with the same formulas: "The area you plan to go to is formally discouraged for travelers for reasons detailed on our site. " This is followed by a link to the "Mali" page of the ministry's website and a request to "reconsider the displacement project." Olivier Dubois, who has already boarded the plane that takes him to Gao, will not be aware of this email.

No "obstruction manoeuvre"

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In the conclusions of his internal investigation, the Inspector of the Armed Forces considers that "the monitoring and progressive analysis of risks [...] made it possible to alert the journalist in time via the embassy. "It is difficult to blame Barkhane for not having prevented the travel of an independent journalist," says the inspector of the armed forces, who also explains that the commander of the Barkhane force had ultimately – on the evening of April 7, the day before the scheduled appointment – suggested to the embassy of France in Mali an action "possibly relying on the Malian services" to prevent the meeting. "This alert will not give rise to the realization of a maneuver of obstruction," notes the inspector of the armies, without explaining why.

Finally, concerning Kader, the inspector specifies that "the investigation does not rule out concomitant treatment by other actors" than the intelligence group of the Barkhane force. Clearly, Kader could have been the indicator, in parallel, of other states, for example Mali, Algeria or the United States – these are only examples, nothing indicating the involvement of these states – or of the French intelligence services not integrated into Barkhane.

The role of the fixer

After Olivier Dubois was kidnapped, the Barkhane force interrogated Kader in Gao for several days, without arresting him. The Malian police took care of it. Today, Kader is officially charged in Mali with "terrorist criminal association" and "terrorist act (sic)". On parole for several months, he believes he has been "betrayed" and "abandoned" by the French army. During his various hearings and in his exchanges with our media, Kader has, on many occasions, withdrawn to change his version on certain points.

Did Kader's loyalty go more to the Jnim than to the French army? Did he know how to manipulate, or was he himself manipulated by each other?

On the side of the French military, it is the reliability of Kader that is questioned. "I think you have to be wary of a source who brings you on a silver platter a jihadist leader," said the highest-ranking officer of the soldiers questioned during his hearing, inducing a double game of the fixer. "I think he used Olivier Dubois," said another. Comments made after the kidnapping of the journalist, and after the French military made extensive use of Kader's services. "The duplicity of this source is gradually appearing," according to the internal investigation of the army inspectorate, which cites Kader's links with the jihadist sphere as proof. Links that were nevertheless perfectly known, and which were even the initial interest of this indicator of Barkhane.

« Lack of lucidity »

The inspector of the armed forces thus concludes that "intelligence and targeting procedures have been respected" and recalls the "decision of command not to validate a project of operation", "the risks weighing on the journalist having been constantly taken into account." The report admits "a lack of lucidity", the "sensitivity of the subject" having not been "taken into account at a sufficient level", but this "lack of vigilance is understandable within a staff focused on major operations", justifies the inspector, who retains above all "the primary responsibility of Olivier Dubois", described as "trompe-la-mort".

Did the jihadist leader Abdallah Ag Albakaye send the journalist a false invitation, to set a trap for him and capture a French hostage? A few days before Olivier Dubois' release, the emir of AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), Abou Obeida Youssef al-Annabi, denied to France 24 the existence of any invitation, saying that the jihadist Abdallah Ag Albakaye had "not attracted" the journalist and that he had "nothing to do" with his abduction. Words accompanied by this allusion, whose veracity is impossible to measure: "The French services know.

Asked by our media, Olivier Dubois preferred not to comment on this information at this stage.

The Ministry of the Armed Forces did not wish to answer our questions but said it "rejoiced" at the release of Olivier Dubois and "cooperate fully with justice." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to our requests.

► Read also Olivier Dubois: "I continued to do my job as a journalist from the inside"

"Using a journalist as a Trojan horse: a form of negligence or even irresponsibility"

Arnaud Froger is the head of the Reporters Without Borders Investigation desk. The association is a civil party in the legal proceedings opened by the National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor's Office in Paris on the kidnapping in Mali of journalist Olivier Dubois on 8 April 2021. He is reacting to the revelations of our investigation that the French army followed Olivier Dubois from his preparations to the very moment of his abduction.

« There is obviously an ill-considered risk-taking, because the risk of kidnapping Olivier is identified on the side of the army and, yet, the operation is maintained. There is a form of minimization of responsibility in the sense that, as far as we know, there is no operation to neutralize the person Olivier was supposed to interview that is planned, but, nevertheless, the intelligence operation is continued. And that put Olivier, a French national, in grave danger. » 

But it was Olivier Dubois who wanted, on his own initiative, to interview a jihadist leader. And it is the role of the army to obtain intelligence on terrorist groups it is fighting...

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We must not minimize the responsibility of Olivier Dubois, the journalist: it is his interview project and it is by nature an extremely risky project. He knew it. From the moment the army becomes aware of this interview project, there are two possible forms of attitudes: either we try to dissuade Olivier Dubois, or we put a device in place to ensure that the kidnapping cannot take place. There, he was put in even more danger than he was by his own responsibility and that is what seems to us to be, at the very least, negligence. Using a journalist as a Trojan horse to carry out an intelligence operation, on the one hand, we can ask ourselves the question of the merits of the approach, and secondly, it poses a problem, because this operation was carried out without Olivier knowing what was happening around him. And this, even though his own fixer played a dual role, since his fixer was also an informant of Barkhane. Thus, Olivier Dubois, in this situation, was exposed to the risk of being taken for himself for a French intelligence agent that he was not, since he was on a mission as a journalist, reporter and correspondent.

The Barkhane force had not planned an operation to try to arrest or kill the jihadist leader Olivier Dubois was to meet. In your opinion, could another service – Sabre Special Forces or DGSE Action Service, for example – have carried out this type of operation without the Barkhane force being informed?

« This is theoretically completely possible. The DGSE does not report to the Barkhane force for what it does, in any case it is not an obligation. Now, I have no more information than that on a possible operation. But the simple fact that an intelligence operation still took place without Olivier Dubois' knowledge, put him in danger, even more in danger than he was. And there, there is a form of negligence, even irresponsibility, to have conducted this intelligence operation. » 

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