The European Union is finalizing these days a partial embargo on Russian oil.

The European Commission will adopt this Tuesday by written procedure a proposal for a sanctions package, the sixth since the start of the war in Ukraine, in which

oil is included for the first time

, but gas is completely left out.

New political and military leaders will appear on the punished list, as well as "relevant actors in the disinformation campaign", and more financial entities will be removed from the Swift international system, which coordinates communication and operations at a global level.

Among them, Sberbank, the largest.

If the previous measures were more or less rapid and consensual, the core of the energy is not.

Dependence on Russian hydrocarbons is very strong in some Member States, which simply

cannot accept a nipping in the bud

.

Germany, very skeptical since February, admitted this weekend that the numbers are beginning to add up, and opened the door for an embargo at the community level, as long as a flexible calendar is set between now and the end of the year.

"It is absurd to think that the sanctions are not going to have consequences for our economies and for prices. As Europeans we are prepared to assume it if we want to help Ukraine. But there is no way that it does not have a cost for us," said the German minister. of Economics,

Robert Habeck

.

The idea is to set a very long term of application so that each Member State can join when they can, but to speak of eight months is offensive to the neighbors of the Russians, the most combative and hawkish in this debate.

The proposal also targets the 'tankers', the large ships, rather than the pipelines.

Something similar, but more concentrated, happened last month with coal, for which a transition period of up to four months was set to respect the signed contracts.

The EU

imports far more oil than Russian gas

, in a ratio of almost four to one, but the dependence on gas is much greater.

There are no realistic alternatives, not in the short term, that can compensate for a supply cut, so Berlin or Vienna, despite pressure from the Baltic states or Poland, have reiterated that it cannot be done, not yet.

Italy preferred to put a price cap, or tariffs, but there is no support for the idea.

Oil, with all its problems, is more viable, except for one recurring detail:

the Hungarian veto

.

Hungary has been putting sticks in the wheel of European foreign policy for years, for ideological reasons but also as a form of internal pressure for its own cuts with Brussels.

In the Russian case, both things come together, as well as

the proximity of Viktor Orban to Vladimir Putin

.

Budapest has joined all the sanctions so far, but it refused to participate in the mechanism for buying and delivering weapons to Ukraine, it has prevented their passage through its territory and, furthermore, it has been warning for weeks that they are not favor of punitive measures with hydrocarbons.

Unanimity is required for sanctions packages.

That is why the high representative

Josep Borrell

, responsible for Foreign Policy, has been reiterating for some time that although it may not be possible to go all out at 28, it can be done voluntarily at 27. "The Russian war affects global security. We are working on a sixth package of sanctions that it will remove more Russian banks from Swift, add those responsible for disinformation to the lists and address oil imports. The measures will be presented for approval by the Council, "explained the Spaniard this afternoon.

The idea is that the ambassadors of the 27 to the EU, known as the Coreper, study them tonight and start discussing them tomorrow morning.

The process can be resolved in a day, but more meetings may also be necessary, as was the case with the fifth package.

After much consultation, the European Commission believes that perhaps Orban and the rest of the holdouts can be won over, provided there is a flexible schedule, very flexible, that allows for sequential additions.

With a maximum term, but very broad.

There are more or less similar examples in Community legislation.

Certain Member States of the European Union have what are known as 'opt-out' or exclusions, which is a way of allowing when they do not want to participate in a particular area of ​​EU policy

they can stay out without forcing a general lockdown

.

Thus, for example, Ireland, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Cyprus are not in Schengen;

Sweden and others are not in the Monetary Union, Poland has never joined the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Denmark is outside the area of ​​freedom, security and justice.

Following the Russian decision to cut shipments to Bulgaria and Poland, the EU wanted a joint response.

There are members with doubts.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia have publicly requested guarantees that there will be immediate solidarity between neighbors if they too run out of gas for not bowing to the demands of the Kremlin, which requires opening two accounts in their banks, one of which would be denominated in rubles.

Something that community sanctions prohibit.

Or that they will have financial aid if they join the oil ban, since they would need more than 250 million euros to slowly transform their refineries, only adapted to Russian material.

The same thing happens to Germany with one in Brandenburg, which is also in less than Rosnef.

And many companies that flirt with the idea of ​​paying in Russian currency despite everything.

And Brussels believes that

There is no clearer message than responding to blackmail with a drastic cut

.

"If an embargo on Russian oil is approved in the sanctions package, Slovakia will ask for an exemption," the country's economy minister confirmed in response to questions from

Reuters

.

Hungary would do the same, according to European sources.

"We need a much longer transition period for pipelines," he added, explaining that their dependence on Russian crude is almost total and that adapting the infrastructure would take years, and they only have enough reserves for a quarter.

Ukraine, aware of the moment, redoubles the pressure.

Its intelligence services have indicated this week that Russia would have shared its plans with Hungary before the invasion, and the idea has even circulated that Orban would have shown interest in some historically problematic areas.

Hungarian diplomacy has vetoed several issues related to Ukraine in recent years due to laws that limit the use of minority languages ​​in that country, and that affect a Magyar minority.

In this way the pressure on Budapest is now multiplied with very serious accusations.

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