Professor Subarevich, in March many economists said that the sanctions against Russia would take effect in the autumn when the stocks were exhausted.

It's autumn now.

Why is there still no burglary in sight?

Catherine Wagner

Business correspondent for Russia and the CIS based in Moscow.

  • Follow I follow

The Russian government has now allowed “parallel imports”.

Many companies, especially in the retail trade, can therefore purchase goods via third countries.

The situation is more difficult for machines and equipment, which are often subject to sanctions.

However, simpler things can be bought in China, and many things are not needed yet.

After the pandemic, many companies built up huge inventories.

Overall, the Russian economy has so far been in a problematic but not critical state.

There will not be a drastic decline in gross domestic product, which we economists expected back in the spring for this year.

Oil and gas prices are too high for that.

And how does mobilization affect the economy?

That depends on how many and which people are drafted.

300,000 people (that's the official goal, editor's note) is not much so far.

But we don't know how many waves of mobilization are still to come.

And it's unclear from which industries the most people are drafted.

So far, most have come from the periphery, i.e. from rural areas.

This applies above all to agriculture, construction and transport.

Fewer people are conscripted in the big cities.

Many hide there or leave the country;

there is more passive resistance.

But if you consider that more than 300,000 people have left Russia since the mobilization was announced, then that comes as a shock to some companies, such as farms or construction companies.

And in the cities, small and medium-sized companies are particularly affected.

If they suddenly lack one or two employees, they can go bankrupt.

Is it true that in poor regions, service at the front is seen as an opportunity for advancement because of the high pay?

If you get killed, that's not a climb.

One opportunity for advancement was service as a contract soldier.

Many from the regions have committed to this and earned three times more than the average for their region.

But they didn't believe that they would ever have to fight.

The mobilized are promised 200,000 rubles a month and that if they fall, they will become heroes and their families will receive large sums of compensation.

But they only get paid as long as they're alive and fighting.

And compensation will only be paid if the soldier is found dead, not if he is presumed missing.

Then the family gets nothing.

But many Russians still believe the state.

What are the consequences of the mobilization for the poor regions?

The men who are not alcoholics, i.e. able to work, are drafted from the periphery.

They are the last human capital in these areas, go to the front and not all come back.

And in regions of the Caucasus like Dagestan and Chechnya, where attempts were made to mobilize a particularly large number, there were protests because the population there is younger than elsewhere.

But the men are drafted anyway.

So there will be more coffins in these regions.

And because society there is organized into clans and everyone knows each other, it will quickly become known.

But we don't know what reaction there will be.

Because it is clear that the compensation amounts will only be paid if people do not complain, do not raise their voices.