Mário Centeno (Olhão, 1966) is a calm man. He did not raise his voice when he was a student at Harvard, he did not do it as a technician at the Banco de Portugal or when he was a professor at the University of Lisbon. And he is not doing it now as Portugal's Minister of Economy and President of the Eurogroup. Liberal of a social-democratic or social-democratic tendency with liberal tendencies, Centeno feels very comfortable in the role of consensus-builder . Unlike his boss, Antonio Costa, he avoids the controversy, the bombastic expressions, the attacks. He publicly honors the code of commitment and the pact, because he understands that the only way for everyone to win in Europe is for everyone to lose, to give in.

Last week, community ministers agreed on a first safety net, a triple safeguard in the form of credits for states, companies and jobs against the impact of the coronavirus. Necessary, but not enough. Now begins the second phase, the delicate one, which faces difficult conciliation positions on mutualization. There is unanimity in the need for a Fund, and the Portuguese believes that the order of magnitude is not billions, but billions of euros . How would it be financed? "Solidarity does not necessarily imply Eurobonds, but I do not exclude them," he said in an interview with EL MUNDO and four other European newspapers.

Sometimes criticized for being too soft, for not getting wet, Centeno tirelessly repeats his thesis: the only way out for this crisis, of enormous proportions, is not austerity, but to distribute the load over time , and probably space. Given that over-indebtedness is inevitable, for all, it urges the south not to abandon the path of risk reduction "to which we owe so much in the last decade", and encourages the north to lose its fear of mutualization. Without an operational Single Market, he warns, precisely the skeptics are the ones that would suffer the most.

After the agreement in the Eurogroup, several capitals with opposing positions claimed victory. How did you see it? It is the wonder of consensus, reaching a compromise in which everyone is comfortable. It is important to understand that last week we were all winners. Now we have a backstop, a firewall for states, companies and workers that in a very short time would have been vulnerable. This containment barrier allows for an equal and proportional response in all countries. The insurance policies you contract them hoping never to have to use them, but they give confidence, security to the markets. You know that a deal is good if everyone ends up happy and unhappy. By definition a commitment implies that everyone has to give in. I am quite optimistic and I think that next week's European Council will begin to define the recovery phase. Do you think they will come to a decision on the details of that Reconstruction Fund? It is a very important European Council and I hope they will give us guidelines, guides, the Commission and the Eurogroup. The first sentence in the conclusions document of last week's meeting stipulates precisely that it was not the end of the road, the other way around. Not achieving it would be a failure, let's say it clearly. After what we have already done and the size of the crisis, it would be a failure. Economically, what we are facing can be explained in simple terms: it is a shock of unprecedented dimensions. We will have a contraction of around 20% of GDP in the second quarter for all countries. There are those who doubt that we are really facing a symmetrical shock. This crisis is something very specific and different from the past, even the opposite. It has come after 25 quarters of growth, millions of jobs created, with the unemployment rate at lows of many years in almost all countries. Public finances respected the medium-term objectives in 14 of the 19 members of the euro zone. There was a need for liquidity for the companies, income for the workers, and a safeguard for the states, and that is what we did last week. But the response to the virus inevitably involves large, highly significant increases in public debt. So next week's discussion will be on how to distribute it over time. There is not a single member who will not experience it, no one is on the sidelines of the equation. We will all come out with more debt. So we have to be innovative. The question is whether the Union can resist the virus or not, and the answer is political, not economic. In the recovery plan, the economic approach is very simple, I repeat: we have to distribute the cost of the crisis over time. In time it is clear. But, to distribute the burden also between partners? The Eurogroup agreed to create a Recovery Fund, and I quote, that "ensures European solidarity with the members most affected." Solidarity is something that is at the very heart, in the conception of the EU. This is not a crisis that we must face with the old manuals, there is no moral hazard, it is not the result of structural weaknesses. That is why we must all go together and help ourselves dilute the cost. Is solidarity mutualizing debt? Are you talking about Eurobonds? Not necessarily, but I don't exclude them. We have seen very favorable or contrary reactions to certain solutions, such as using the EU Multiannual Financial Framework to finance recovery or joint debt issuance. It is not for me to judge now, but the economic objective is very clear and it is in the agreement: to distribute the cost over time with appropriate financing. We have to be innovative, think 'out of the box', outside the conventions, and give a precise answer. We need useful instruments, with economic sense, according to the dimension of each challenge. We do not have to be cautious when looking for alternatives. Why are you optimistic about the European Council? The heads of state and government have seen that they are very divided on this issue. If you take, for example, the cases of Germany and Italy, you will see that the instruments they are using in the face of the crisis are different, so at the European level we have to establish a ' level playing field 'is as symmetrical as possible. So that the states do not have liquidity problems, that there is no market fragmentation. The ECB acted, so did we, but now we are entering a new phase. I am sure that the European Council will focus on it and its guidelines are very necessary to move forward. The Eurogroup package was just over € 500 billion. What is the size of this Recovery Fund? In the recovery phase, we are talking about a response that is calculated in billions of euros. I do not know if it will be one and a half, more, somewhat less, but a very considerable size. Twelve zeros. But beware, we do not need to close the exact number in the coming weeks. We still have a lot to learn from this crisis. Especially on how to go about lifting the containment measures. The Eurozone is made up of very open economies, it is one of the key aspects of the integration process. It makes no economic sense for some to open if there are no others to trade with. Within the Union but also globally. Great coordination is required. And then we will have to more accurately quantify the cost of this crisis. You say there are several possible instruments for the Recovery Fund. I ask you as a minister and as an economist, not as president of the Eurogroup, which one do you think is the most appropriate? European economies are very integrated, very much, and they will end up more indebted. I have no specific preferences for one instrument or another, believe me. It will do me good as long as you provide an adequate answer. It is clear that we must jointly seek relief for the burden of the next two years, spread it as far as possible. There are not many options, but some, and we must explore them all. With the European Stability Mechanism (Mede) lines of credit, the ECB could activate OMT calls, direct purchases. The decision on whether or not to use OMT is from the ECB, I cannot prejudge any action. We all understand that monetary policy cannot be the only available instrument. Governments have done a lot at the national level but we need tools to share the risk, let's call it that, at the EU level. And that complement the measures of the ECB. Complement, not substitute. What time frame do you manage? An appropriate design of the recovery plan should contemplate that it starts as soon as we begin to reverse the containment measures. So we need money available in early summer or late spring. Measures will be taken in the coming months or weeks. This is just the start-up phase and it must remain throughout 2020 to bounce back in 2021. There are many questions, but it will take us two whole years to get back to the 2019 level at least. Cautiously, because debt takes more time, but it is feasible that at the end of 2022 we will return to 2019 levels. How urgent is there? I do not want to add additional pressure, but we have [only] weeks to make decisions. Perhaps not to define the exact size of the Fund, but to build the frame, see what it covers, what it can do. Let me draw a parallel, even if only procedural, with Brexit: a lot of clarity is needed, give it to economic agents, families, markets. Clarity on how we will get out. There is too much uncertainty in our economies, it is not risk but pure uncertainty. Politicians have to be factors of certainty in the coming months. Which solution is faster? His Prime Minister has shown very visceral reactions. How do you control yours with so much stress? When you're in the driver's seat you have to control your emotions. Be very focused. When I say that 'out of the box' ideas are necessary, I mean that they are innovative, not part of classic recipes. The MFF or the French proposal [for a solidarity fund] are not mutually exclusive. They can go hand in hand. The solution will again be a commitment so that everyone can claim victory. Can you guarantee to the citizens that in three, five or 10 years the rhetoric of austerity will not recover? If we follow the marked lines, solidarity and distribution over time burden, we will avoid going back to recipes from the past that would not work. Austerity arose for asymmetric crises of a structural nature. If we criticize them then, even more now that they are not appropriate for this crisis. But if we fail ... Look at the speed of reaction now compared to the previous crisis is incredible. In 2008, it took us four years to make some concrete decisions about necessary institutions. Now we don't talk about those calendars, we don't have those deadlines. You mentioned the French proposal for the Recovery Fund. Is it mutualizing debt? It is a middle ground between the existing possibilities. The Eurogroup agreement specifies that the path chosen must be consistent with the Treaties. No one should worry about mutualization. Really, there is no need to fear it. The single market is a form of mutualization. We buy goods, flowers, pasta. It is very important that we understand that we do not live on an island, we are not alone. A single market without a market is nothing. 75% of Portugal's exports are to the EU. Belgium or the Netherlands are even more dependent on the single market. What are these countries going to do two years from now if we fail? Mutualizing debt I do not think is a problem in any case. The French proposal is middle ground. It is temporary, limited. It would complement the MFF, it does not exclude it. And it would have immediate firepower to finance reconstruction over time. I don't promote it, I just describe it. The Maco Financiero, the EU Budget for the period beginning in 2021, can work, depending on the size, of the instruments used, but it remains to be seen how quickly resources can be made available. The Single Market is a smart way to mutualise our futures, I don't see any problems with that reasoning. The debate cannot collapse for a word. It is the key feeling in some countries, I know. Everyone, individually or collectively, owes a lot to the risk reduction of the last decade. We must continue together there, nobody disputes that idea.

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