Killing Zawahiri: Al Qaeda was never really gone

The last spectacular attack attributed to al-Qaeda was only two weeks ago.

Around 500 fighters from the Somali terror group Al-Shabab invaded Ethiopia on Wednesday the week before last.

After shutting down the telecommunications network in south-west Somalia, the jihadists attacked two towns on the border.

Christian Meier

Political correspondent for the Middle East and Northeast Africa.

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But that was only a diversion – while security forces rushed there, numerous heavily armed fighters entered Ethiopia unmolested elsewhere.

There they fought heavy battles with the Ethiopian army for days;

there were hundreds dead on both sides.

It was the largest operation that al-Shabab has ever carried out in Ethiopia.

Observers assume that the attack was not least for PR purposes: the militant Islamists wanted to demonstrate that they are not only capable of carrying out attacks within Somalia, but also pose a continuing threat to the neighboring countries of the unstable state on the Horn of Africa.

Raising their black flag in a country like Ethiopia increases the group's status within the global Al Qaeda network of which it is a part.

And possibly bring her further support.

Bin Laden opposed the inclusion of al-Shabab

The machinations of al-Shabab illustrate how the jihad that al-Qaeda stands for is conducted today.

Osama bin Laden, the founder and first leader of the terrorist group, and his now killed successor Aiman ​​al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's chief ideologue, propagated the worldwide fight against the opponents of Islam.

Through spectacular attacks around the turn of the millennium, they turned al-Qaeda into a global brand with great appeal - militant Islamist groups all over the world subsequently tried to be allowed to wear the "seal of approval" of membership.

In the case of Al-Schabab, which was founded in 2006, bin Laden refused to admit it until he was killed in May 2011 because the group also accepted the deaths of Muslims.

It was not until nine months later, in February 2012, that the leader of al-Shabab swore allegiance to al-Zawahiri;

the group had previously made it clear that its actions would try to avoid Muslim casualties.

The "Islamic State" (IS), which was divorced from al-Qaeda a short time later, no longer makes this distinction - on the contrary, it is part of the ideology of the strictly Sunni group to also and especially attack those Muslims whom it does not consider to be orthodox.

Shiites in particular are therefore repeatedly the victims of IS attacks.

He copied other things from al-Qaeda: above all the franchising system.

IS also has offshoots all over the world.

Local offshoots pose the greatest threat

In the competition between al-Qaeda and ISIS for leadership of global jihad, the latter group has gained the upper hand through its frank display of cruelty and through its spectacular takeover of large parts of Syria and Iraq in 2014.

But as the example of al-Shabab shows, al-Qaeda is still active.

For a while, however, experts have been discussing how great the danger posed by the group twenty years after 9/11.

September” still goes out.

Some say al-Qaida has "failed," others warn against belittling the organization -- especially since the Taliban have regained control of all of Afghanistan.

The Islamists had harbored al-Qaeda since the late 1990s and still have close ties to the leadership today.

This should now have more freedom of movement there again.

Above all, however, it is the offshoots of al-Qaeda that have posed a real threat in recent years.

The focus has shifted away from the Near and Middle East to Africa and South Asia.

In Africa, apart from Al-Schabab, the group Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin, active in the Sahel zone, should be mentioned;

it now operates far beyond Mali.

There, as in other regions of the world, the al-Qaeda offshoots exploit political instabilities.

The death of al-Zawahiri is less important for their specific activities.

How attractive the al-Qaeda “brand” will be in the future depends on who will be his successor and how he will organize the organization.

And that, in turn, will affect how local and regional jihadist groups conduct their struggle.