Reinforced recruitment procedures for intelligence personnel, better detection of radicalization…: the parliamentary commission of inquiry into the lethal attack on the Paris police headquarters (PP) by one of its agents, offers an arsenal of measures to respond to “security breaches” in PP. These proposals, 35 in number, are the subject of a report which the committee is to examine Wednesday behind closed doors and of which AFP has knowledge.
This commission of inquiry of the National Assembly was created to examine the dysfunctions which led on October 3, 2019 to the killing of the PP. On that day, an officer from the Intelligence Department of the Prefecture of Police (DRPP), Mickaël Harpon, had stabbed four of his colleagues before being shot.
"Internal vulnerability"
An unprecedented act considered worrying by the members of the commission of inquiry. "It is the first time that an intelligence service has been the target of a" blue on blue "attack", underlines the president of the commission Eric Ciotti (LR) in the foreword of the report. Words like “sideration” and “amateurism” came up frequently in the mouths of the members of the committee during their work.
And all, members of the commission, of the government, of the intelligence services were unanimous in recognizing "a serious flaw" and "dysfunctions" concerning the detection of the signals of radicalization from Mickaël Harpon.
Faced with the need to raise recruitment standards within the DRPP, the first proposal is to entrust the General Directorate of Internal Security (DGSI) and internal intelligence of the armed forces (DRSD) with the "role of leaders of recruitments within the intelligence services ”.
The commission did not go so far as to recommend abolishing the DRPP now, but it suggests "in the medium term" to "reposition it within internal intelligence according to two possible scenarios, ranging from its complete overhaul to the transfer to minimizing counter-terrorism activities towards the DGSI ”.
The DRPP is "a small service" with "800 agents (all authorized to keep secret) on the 40,000 that account the PP". There reigned "a culture of family spirit". "A little more than a dozen agents were in the IT department" where Mickaël Harpon was assigned, noted Eric Ciotti in February.
"He shouldn't have been there"
In light of the hearings conducted, Eric Ciotti and the rapporteur for the Florent Boudié commission (LREM) then assured: Mickaël Harpon "should never have stayed in such a sensitive department, he should not have been there", and "His authorization should have been withdrawn".
With regard to the detection of signs of radicalization, the committee notes that "the consideration of the terrorist risk was mainly oriented towards the apprehension of radicalization as a phenomenon external to the police headquarters and not as a threat of internal vulnerability".
Mickael Harpon, who had converted to Islam, had said to his colleagues about the Charlie Hebdo attack : "It is well done". This incident had not resulted in an official report.
"He should have been alerted to the immediate hierarchy. This shows that the DRPP was very far from French intelligence standards, and in particular from the "first circle" services. In more standardized services, this would have been the case and probably led to the immediate sidelining of Mickaël Harpon, "Florent Boudié told the specialized press agency AEF.
Strengthen controls on the access of certain external stakeholders
Since then, procedures have been put in place by the PP so that reports are systematic and then evaluated. The commission recommends intensifying efforts and training within the security services on these subjects.
In order to strengthen the recruitment procedures, it also proposes "to extend the field of administrative inquiries prior to the recruitment of administrative personnel from administrations fulfilling a security mission and civilian personnel in the armed forces, in order to ensure control of the 'all staff, even unauthorized'.
It also recommends strengthening controls on the access of outside workers to the services of administrations with a security mission, but also to penal establishments. With regard to airport platforms, it is suggested to identify the jobs that can be the subject of an administrative investigation and to develop training focused on the detection of radicalization.
Regarding the authorization procedures, the commission makes several proposals to strengthen them (reduction of validity, monitoring, reporting, etc.). It also recommends the establishment of an oath confirming adherence to the values of the Republic for "all sensitive professions".
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