The Sudanese power-sharing agreement, signed by the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change, in July 2019, entitled 'Political Agreement to Establish Governing Structures and Institutions in the Transitional Period', ushered in a new and detailed phase in the Sudanese crisis. Most national, regional and international parties welcomed this agreement, as it represents a willingness by all parties to the crisis to put aside disputes, sit at the negotiating table to reach consensus solutions, on arrangements for managing the transitional period, and postpone the controversial issues for some time to avoid sliding the country towards violence and chaos, especially after Regional and international pressures have increased to push the negotiation process forward for fear of further escalation, following the disengagement of the General Command by force, which deepened the state of tension among the protesters, as well as the crisis of confidence between the junta on the one hand, and the political Nazavih under the declaration of freedom and change on the other.

Despite the escalation of optimism after the signing of the political agreement, it remains tainted to the present moment, due to the existence of a number of outstanding issues that were expected to be resolved by the issuance of the constitutional document, as well as the structural challenges facing Sudan could hinder any attempts to peaceful settlement of the crisis , Or ensure the sustainability of compliance with the current agreement.

Terms of Agreement

Since the overthrow of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Ethiopia and the African Union have tried to bridge the views of the parties to the crisis to prevent further escalation. The tension and attraction between the two sides of the crisis has continued throughout this period, due to the existence of fundamental differences between them, mainly centered on the duration of the transitional period. And the body entrusted with the management of that stage, in addition to the form of government, will it be a parliamentary system or presidential? The task of the mediators became more difficult after the disengagement of the GHQ by force in June 2019, when the forces of freedom and change announced at the time that they did not return to any negotiations with the junta, and insisted on the full handover of power to civilians and the immediate disbanding of the Janjaweed militia, whom they accused of involvement in the use of violence. Against protesters.

The Ethiopian-African mediation efforts, in the period following the sit-in scene, are credited with bringing the parties back to the negotiating table.The Forces for Freedom and Change announced their response to the call for direct negotiation in early July 2019, provided that negotiations take no more than 72 hours. The negotiations resulted in the issuance of a political agreement to establish governance structures and institutions in the transitional period, the terms of which were divided into two main categories:

1. Guiding principles

The sanctity of the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan, as well as commitment to the principle of partnership and good faith, to cease any hostile or provocative rhetoric, and to resort to dialogue as a mechanism for the settlement of differences, and commitment to democratic values ​​and respect for human rights.

2. Transitional arrangements

It includes the formation of an 11-member sovereign council (five members of the military, as well as five civilians selected by the Forces for Freedom and Change, plus a civilian figure with the agreement of both sides). The Presidency of the Council is governed by a “rotation” method, whereby the Council is headed by a military figure for 21 months from the date of signature, followed by a civilian for 18 months, in addition to the composition of the Council of Ministers, provided that the Forces for Freedom and Change designate the name of the Prime Minister under the terms of the Constitutional Decree or Constitutional document supplementing the Agreement. The Council of Ministers is composed of independent national competencies nominated by the Forces for Freedom and Change, and does not exceed 20, except the Ministers of Defense and Interior appointed by the military component of the Council of Sovereignty.

It is worth mentioning in this regard two main points included in the agreement: the issuance of a constitutional decree setting out the functions, powers and powers of the Council of Sovereignty and the Council of Ministers, and the conditions for the selection of the Prime Minister, in addition to stating that no person may run for office in either chamber, and state governors , In the elections following the transition period.

Stuck files

Although the power-sharing agreement included a set of texts that were approved by both the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change, there are contentious issues to be resolved through the Constitutional Document for the Transitional Period of 2019, which was to be signed after Two days after the conclusion of the agreement, on July 19, 2019. Perhaps the most prominent of these controversial issues:

1. Formation of the Legislative Council

The agreement deferred to this point, but the document published unofficially resolved, as in article (23) to form the Legislative Council by 67% of those selected by the «forces of freedom and change», and 33% of other forces not under the Declaration of Freedom The Council shall assume its duties within a period not exceeding 90 days from the date of signing the Constitutional Document.

2. Immunity of members of the Sovereignty Council

It is one of the issues that are still hotly debated. The document resolved this controversy in Article (21), which ensured the principle of procedural immunity, ie no criminal proceedings may be taken against members of the Sovereign, Ministers or Legislative Council, but at the same time stipulated that such immunity could be lifted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Legislative Council. Attendees at the session.

3. An investigation committee

Where the demands escalated the need to form a commission of inquiry to resolve the sit-in events of the General Command, the document has decided on this article (7) in relation to the tasks of the transition period, and included the formation of an independent national committee with African support to investigate the events of the sit-in, and other facts committed Human rights violations.

4. Governance of States

The agreement turned a blind eye to this issue. The document referred only in article (8) to the levels of government, by defining Sudan as a federal state, and noted that the existing system with respect to the distribution of powers and powers between the federal and state levels would continue until the current geographical distribution was reviewed. The document also did not specify how governors were appointed and removed.

Increasing challenges

The follow-up to the current Sudanese scene reveals that the aforementioned outstanding issues are a reflection of fundamental problems that cast a shadow over the possibility of reaching a comprehensive settlement, or the signing of the constitutional document supplementing the power-sharing agreement, which is critical to many of the contentious points on the management of the transitional period. The most prominent of these challenges are:

1- Confidence crisis

The crisis of confidence between the TCM on the one hand, and the political opposition forces, on the other hand, whether belonging to the Forces for Freedom and Change or not, as well as protesters from citizens who are not affiliated with any political party. Every good step paves the way for a real breakthrough in the Sudanese crisis, offset by a situation that increases tension and mistrust. It is enough to note in this context that the forces of freedom and change rejected the report of the committee investigating the sit-in events, as they were formed by a decision of the military council, and the forces of freedom and change objected to the statistics of the number of victims since the beginning of the protests, in addition to the deaths of student marches in the city Al-Abyad was recently shot by snipers, which led to the call of "freedom and change" for demonstrations in all Sudanese cities and the signing of the constitutional document unconditionally.

2. Variation of the forces of freedom and change

There are many opposition forces and alliances under the umbrella of the forces of freedom and change, and it is difficult to reach an agreement that satisfies everyone. Internal debates prior to the signing of the power-sharing agreement, as well as reactions, showed divergence of views, and the result resulted in the rejection of the Communist Party National agreement).

3. Separatism in Sudan

This issue is one of the most important issues that must be dealt with during the transitional period, which prompted the constitutional document to refer to it, and therefore must reach comprehensive peace agreements with the armed movements in these regions, rooting out the Sudanese problem in Darfur and the states of eastern and southern Sudan.

4. The economic crisis

Continued high prices of food commodities, especially bread, as well as fuel prices and tariffs, the situation is worsening in Sudan, especially as the deteriorating economic situation was the spark that sparked the demonstrations, which started from the city of Atbara, last December.

5. Rapid Support Forces

These forces are led by the Deputy Chairman of the Transitional Military Council, Hamedati. She was accused of forcibly breaking up the sit-in, known as "paramilitary" forces. She was following the NISS and then the army, but her situation remains worrying for the opposition, given her role in the Darfur crisis. 2003, and its role in breaking up the sit-in.

Resolve problematic points

Signing the constitutional document will resolve many of the problematic points, and it promises to start implementing the tasks entrusted to the state apparatus during the transitional period according to the document. However, the continuation of these challenges makes any agreement to settle and share power ineffective, such as dealing with the offer. the disease. Moreover, there is an urgent need for concessions by all parties to the Sudanese crisis.

Despite the escalation of optimism after the signing of the political agreement, it remains cautious to this day, due to the existence of outstanding issues that were expected to be resolved by the issuance of the constitutional document, as well as the structural challenges facing Sudan may hinder any attempts to peaceful settlement of the crisis.