The Palestinian security services .. to guard Israel and you bear the flag of your country

an introduction

Since its formation in 1994, the security cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, which is the embodiment of the terms of the Oslo Accords (1991) and its aftermath, has been controversial in the Palestinian arena because its continuation has not been linked to progress on the solution of the Palestinian question. Has shown leniency in the agreements signed with Israel, especially those related to security cooperation, in the hope that the latter will abide by the provisions of the agreements of political measures that lead eventually to the establishment of a Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967, and was supposed to be discussed Final mode files During five years of the Oslo Agreement (1).

In the past three years, the legislative and regulatory institutions of the PLO, the national authority of the Palestinian Authority, have issued several decisions to halt security cooperation, sometimes in response to Israel's refusal to meet its obligations under the Oslo Accords, and in response to the decision of the Donald Rumsfeld administration Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the transfer of the US Embassy to it; in addition to the frequency of public opinion polls that reflect the refusal of the Palestinian public to continue this cooperation.

Despite PLO decisions and Palestinian public opinion, the leadership of the Palestinian Authority insists on continuing security cooperation with Israel. Understanding the circumstances that influence the development of the PA leadership's attitude toward security cooperation with Israel requires that the reforms that have been introduced into the PA's political system be recognized as part of the "road map" benefits and the implications of internal division.

This study traces the stages of security cooperation between the PA and Israel, monitors the patterns of its impact on the reforms that have been introduced on the Palestinian political system and the role of internal division in determining its trends, and anticipates the repercussions of its continuation on the reality of the Palestinian issue and the future of the conflict.

"Reforms" to institutionalize security cooperation

The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, and the Taba Agreement of 1995, obliged the Palestinian Authority to fight terrorism and to make it responsible for taking appropriate action against terrorists through security cooperation with Israel. 2 Israel has engaged in security cooperation Especially in reducing the chances of harming its objectives in the occupied territories. This has provided an environment for strengthening the Palestinian Authority's motivation to meet its commitments in Oslo and subsequent sub-agreements, including security cooperation, the fact that both Israel and donor countries have linked the continuation of the negotiating process and continued international support for the Authority's ability to stop resistance operations, Security in activities against resistance movements in coordination with the Israeli army and intelligence.

Since its establishment until the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000, the Palestinian Authority has been committed to security cooperation with Israel, reducing the justification on which Israel can justify its failure to comply with its obligations under the agreements. In the context of security cooperation aimed at containing armed resistance operations, the PA launched arrests during this period, including the leaders of the resistance movements, headed by Hamas, culminating in the winter of 1996, in which 2000 leaders and members of the movement were arrested, 4).

Following the failure of the Camp David conference, which in July 2000 brought together the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headed by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, to make any progress on the negotiations; the Palestinian leadership realized the need to change the pattern of relations with Israel The Palestinian leadership at that time became aware of the need to deal with the course of the negotiations with Israel in a way different from the one that had governed the course that preceded the outbreak of the intifada.

The leadership of the Authority at the time to collect the price of Israel to convince the leadership to show flexibility on the positions of the conflict, and by providing an environment that helps to strengthen the resistance work, both popular and armed. As part of this move, the Palestinian leadership contributed to igniting the Al-Aqsa Intifada on September 28, 2000, which lasted until 2005.6 This led to a cessation of security cooperation.

The PA's security apparatus, which operated security cooperation with Israel, is a major part of the resistance to the occupation during the intifada.

Israel realized that the facts proved that the mere signing of the Oslo Accords and the sub-agreements did not succeed in forcing the organization's leadership not to link the continued security cooperation with the outcome of the negotiations with Tel Aviv, leading to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, in which Israel suffered heavy losses; And 4,500 others were injured, and the Israeli economy suffered enormous losses.

Israel, led by Ariel Sharon, has come to the conclusion that with Yasser Arafat at the head of the Palestinian leadership, the Oslo Accords and other sub-agreements will not serve to restore authority to the course of security cooperation without attaching the proceeds of the negotiations with Tel Aviv. In coordination with the Bush administration, to reduce Arafat's influence on the decision-making process in the Palestinian Authority by creating conditions that would allow for the amendment of the Palestinian Basic Law and the imposition of structural reforms that would institutionalize security cooperation and open the way for Palestinian leaders who do not view the resistance as a means of forcing Tel Aviv to force it. To change their positions on the conflict.

Following the February 2002 "Defensive Shield" campaign, which reoccupied all West Bank towns and encircled Arafat's official headquarters, the Bush administration launched a plan to resolve the conflict in September 2002, calling it the "Road Map" "As the authors of the plan focused on the first phase include the amendment of the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority and re-institutionalize security cooperation on new grounds to be more effective in the face of the resistance, by reducing the powers of Arafat - who was accused of a role in the bombing of the Al-Aqsa Intifada - Ministers, and unify the relevant security agencies to confront "terrorism "Under the new Prime Minister (10).

Despite agreeing in theory to the plan, which allowed the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as Prime Minister and Mohammed Dahlan as Minister of Internal Security and Salam Fayyad as Minister of Finance in March 2003, but Arafat, who was besieged, effectively retained all powers in his hand, forcing both Abbas and Dahlan to resign, which led to the absence of a radical shift in the reality of security cooperation until the death of Arafat and the election of Abbas as his successor.

In the era of Mahmoud Abbas, security cooperation has regained its vitality, not only because of the impact of the "structural reforms" introduced by the "road map" but also because of the character of Abbas' ideological positions, which are absolutely opposed to armed action against the occupation. In addition, Abbas defended security cooperation with Israel as a Palestinian "national interest," regardless of Israeli behavior toward the Palestinians.

Abbas's rejection of the armed resistance is because he believes in negotiations and peaceful solutions as a way to resolve the conflict with Israel. He also believes in the importance of moving in the international arena to secure international recognition of Palestinian national rights and as a form of effective pressure on Israel. In order to secure recognition by the United Nations of the "State of Palestine"; this gave the State of Palestine observer status at the United Nations in 2012. In addition, Abbas believes that the tendency of the balance of power in favor of Israel in a sweeping manner increases the risks resulting from the adoption of armed action. At the same time, the outbreak of chaos in West Bank cities and the decline in security at the end of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2005) reinforced his conviction of avoiding armed action and increased his motivation to adopt negotiations. There are those who see the fate of his predecessor, Arafat, as an additional deterrent to Abbas to bet on negotiations.

On the other hand, Abbas is theoretically defending popular resistance, that is, those who do not rely on weapons, and has reiterated this position on many occasions. However, in practice, the Fatah movement, which he leads, has not been allowed to play any serious role in contributing to popular resistance in the face of the settlement project and the challenge of Israeli policies in the occupied territories. No, but the PA's security services have addressed and frustrated peaceful popular resistance.

In order to enhance the security cooperation environment, the United States for the first time played an active role in organizing and institutionalizing security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In March 2005, the United States formed a council to coordinate security cooperation between the PA and Israel, led by US General Keith Dayton, who personally oversaw the preparation and training of the security services to improve their ability to thwart armed resistance operations.

Dayton has not only institutionalized security cooperation between Israel and the PA, but has also made sure that his training courses contribute to the imposition of a new security doctrine on the security establishment in the Authority, so that the drinking of members of the Palestinian security services will lead to the " "Which views the frustration of the resistance action against the occupation as a national interest. The Israeli army has recognized the role of reforms in the Palestinian political system in increasing the effectiveness of security cooperation and its contribution to improving the conditions of the settlement project in the West Bank.

Security cooperation after internal division

The internal Palestinian split, which ended with the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in July 2007, and the Fatah takeover of the West Bank contributed to an enabling environment for enhanced security cooperation, giving Israel the opportunity to blackmail the Authority's leadership and force it to show maximum cooperation Security, on the pretext that cooperation in the face of resistance movements is necessary to ensure the survival of the rule of "open" and not allow Hamas to repeat "successes" in the West.

At the same time, the rise of the right to power in Tel Aviv in 2009 affected the environment of security cooperation, as the ideological positions of Netanyahu's three successive governments since then undermined any possibility of progress on the settlement of the conflict with the Palestinian people ; By emphasizing the refusal to withdraw from the West Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state and other positions. This has made the continuation of security cooperation unrelated to any bets on the return of negotiations with Israel.

Official statements by Israel and the PA indicate that the internal Palestinian division has contributed to improving Israel's revenues from the cooperation of the security authority. Israeli military leaders acknowledge that the security services provide Israel with intelligence that contributes to the dismantling of resistance cells in the West Bank. A report issued by the Israeli military magazine Ma'arakhot monitors the return of security cooperation as follows:

- Improve the security environment in the West Bank significantly, including the security environment of the settlements.

- Reducing the burden on the Israeli army, allowing him full time to conduct exercises and exercises.

- Enable Israel to prepare for confrontation on other fronts, including the transfer of troops to it.

The following table, prepared by the IDF, outlines aspects and activities of cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in 2009, 2010 and 2011, as follows: 25

In the context of security cooperation with Israel, the Palestinian Authority has dried up its financial support through the ratification of the "National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism", under which the Palestinian banking system was obliged not to allow the opening of accounts of persons belonging to Hamas, arguing that they are active in the field of transport Funds to support armed resistance work (26).

At the same time, the security services of the Authority and the Israeli Internal Security Service launched a campaign against charitable organizations operating in the West Bank on the pretext that they are used to transfer funds to Hamas members in the West Bank. Israel acknowledges that these funds are directed to support the families of the resistance fighters who were killed Either by Israeli occupation or by those detained in Israeli jails. The PA security services carried out preventive activities, including raiding Palestinian schools, inspecting students' bags and confiscating knives, fearing that they would use them to carry out attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers.

The reasons for the authority to stick to security cooperation

The Palestinian Authority continues its security cooperation with Israel, despite the fact that it is met with a great rejection by the Palestinian public and the Palestinian elite. This has led the representative institutions, which are the national authority's authority, to make clear and unequivocal decisions to stop it, in response to Israel's determination to resolve the fate of the occupied Palestinian territories For its benefit, to continue settlement and Judaization and to reject the establishment of a Palestinian state.

On March 5, 2015, the Palestinian Central Council decided to cease security cooperation in all its forms, reaffirming this decision at its meeting in January 2018. In addition to suspending recognition of Israel, the Council, which is the first Palestinian legislative authority , The PLO applied Resolution 29. 60% of the Palestinians supported a cessation of security cooperation with Israel, while 67% supported the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority if their presence did not contribute to national independence due to Israel's policies and positions. (30).

Palestinian writers, journalists and academics have sent a letter to the PA leadership demanding that they adopt a new strategy based on popular resistance and a halt to security cooperation. Even prominent Fatah leaders oppose continued security cooperation with the occupation, headed by Marwan Barghouthi, who is being held in Israeli jails, and who collects opinion polls as the most popular Palestinian figure.

The refusal of the Authority to implement the decisions of the Central Council Abbas's announcement that he instructs the leaders of his security services at all levels to cooperate daily with their Israeli counterparts to ensure the cessation of "terrorism", in addition to the assertion that the Palestinian Authority does not link security cooperation with the positions of the extreme right government in Tel Aviv on the conflict and the characteristics of its behavior Towards the Palestinian people. The insistence of the PA leadership on clinging to security cooperation despite the decisions issued by the Central Bank and its recognition of the extent of popular rejection is also due to its fear that any decision to halt security cooperation would contribute to improving the armed resistance environment in the West Bank, which would give Israel a justification to act against the Palestinian Authority.

The PA's leadership also fears that if security cooperation ceases to emerge, entities and figures willing to cooperate with the occupation will emerge, in exchange for the role of mediator between Israel and the Palestinian public. In addition, the fragmentation of the Arab world is diminishing the chances of adopting the leadership of the Authority over the Arab regimes to support it in the face of Israel's punitive measures if it decides to stop security cooperation.

The rise of Trump's administration in America and its apparent willingness to support the Israeli position by punishing the Palestinians deter the PA leadership from taking any decision that would provoke Washington and force it to impose further sanctions against it, especially after its refusal to cooperate with the Horn deal. With some Arab regimes to dispose of the current leadership of the Authority (36). One can not ignore the fact that the embodiment of the Oslo Accords led to the formation of elites and factions inside and outside the PA whose interests were related to the maintenance of this agreement and the commitment to continue security cooperation.

Ramifications

Despite the justification for the continuation of security cooperation, the continuation of this type of relationship with the occupation does not contribute to the achievement of the national objectives of the Palestinian people, especially in the presence of an Israeli government belonging to the extreme right, which is determined to resolve the fate of the occupied Palestinian territories. This means that the continuation of the Palestinian Authority's security cooperation with the occupation in the face of resistance means improving the ability of the extreme right government to implement its program at the lowest level of Palestinian reluctance.

One of the factors that negatively affected the position of the masses and the Palestinian forces from security cooperation with Israel is in the absence of reciprocity as a condition for continuing this relationship. The fulfillment by the Authority of its security obligations was not met by the implementation of the commitments made by Tel Aviv. The implications of continued security cooperation on the national issue and the conflict environment with Israel can be monitored as follows:

First, 25 years after its signing, it became clear that the commitment to implement the benefits of the agreements signed with Israel, including cooperation with Israel, did not bring the Palestinians closer to achieving Abbas' political program of establishing a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

Second, with the rise of the right in both religious and secular terms to rule in Israel and Donald Trump taking office in the United States, it is no longer possible to bet on negotiations as a path that could lead to the realization of national rights, making the Palestinians immersed in security cooperation activities.

Thirdly, Israel granted the security environment that enabled it to consecrate its occupation of the West Bank by establishing settlement facts on the ground. The number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank jumped from 134,400 at the time of the formation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 to 423400 settlers. Since the signing of Oslo more than three times (37).

Fourthly, the Palestinian Authority leadership did not respect the decisions to stop the security cooperation issued by the PLO's representative institutions. The Palestinian public lost confidence in these institutions. Moreover, ignoring the attitudes of the Palestinian public contributed to the credibility of the Palestinian Authority in the Palestinian street.

Fifth, security cooperation has clearly contributed to the internal Palestinian division, because adherence to it obliges the Palestinian Authority to adopt security policies that can not contribute to the achievement of national reconciliation, especially since opinion polls confirm the rejection by the overwhelming majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip .

Sixth, security cooperation has played a major role in the increasing polarization of the political system in the Palestinian Authority areas. The process of restructuring this system has been subject to the requirements of developing and institutionalizing this cooperation and not to the requirements of the national situation.

Seventh : The impact of the commitment to security cooperation negatively affects the national awareness of the Palestinian youth. While the security services, whose members represent a large segment of these youth, are engaged in the activities of this cooperation, an absolute majority of Palestinians believe that such cooperation does not serve the national interest .

Eighth : Although the PA's security services carry out significant and important activities in the context of maintaining the law and controlling public security, their commitment to security cooperation with Israel has been perceived as national institutions.

Ninth : Although the leadership of the Palestinian Authority has unequivocally explained its rejection of the American settlement plan, called the "Deal of the Century", which is described as a deal to liquidate the national cause, the insistence on continuing security cooperation with Israel affects the credibility of the official Palestinian position.

Tenth : provided the attributes of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, particularly security cooperation, pretexts for some Arab regimes to follow the steps in the normalization of relations with Israel, based on the argument: " We can not be monarchists more than the king."