The summit that brought together the Russian and Chinese presidents in Samarkand on the sidelines of the Shanghai Organization summit - which was held in Uzbekistan - was the first personal meeting between the two leaders since the outbreak of the Russian war on Ukraine.
Therefore, it has gained critical importance in determining whether the Russia-China partnership, which Putin and Xi described a few weeks before the war, as "borderless" really is.
The Chinese position on the conflict has thus far proven that this partnership is not without limits.
Although economic and trade relations between the two countries have deepened significantly in the post-war period, they have not reached a level that would cause Beijing to drop its guard against the dangers of breaching Western sanctions against Russia.
Chinese imports have greatly helped Russia fill the gap left by Western brands.
The proportion of Chinese exports to Russia of microchips and other electronic components and raw materials has also increased.
In return, Russia has shifted most of its oil exports to China and India, rather than Europe, and the Russian Central Bank is now planning to adopt the Chinese yuan as a major currency in its foreign reserves, rather than the dollar and the euro.
China was able to develop a winning approach to its position on the Russian-Western conflict;
If Russia wins this confrontation, it will strengthen China's position in the political and economic competition with the West, and Russia's weakness will make Putin more dependent on Beijing and more dependent on it in foreign issues.
Nevertheless, China is still keen to draw the limits of this relationship in a way that avoids getting involved in Putin's conflict with the West.
The fact that the Samarkand summit came amid significant military setbacks to Moscow in eastern Ukraine recently makes it difficult to believe that China would risk abandoning its cautious approach in the Russian-Western conflict.
But it may find in the weakness of the Russian position an opportunity to obtain more advantages in the economic relationship with Russia.
This is clearly demonstrated by Putin's acknowledgment that China will ultimately place its own interests above all else.
Indeed, Putin does not have the luxury of obtaining better competitive terms in the economic relationship with Beijing, while the stability of the Russian economy after sanctions has become contingent on Chinese support.
Moreover, Beijing does not seem willing to supply Moscow with some high-tech products, such as advanced semiconductors, in order to avoid breaching Western sanctions;
Post-war trade relations between the two countries have already come under Western scrutiny. Last June, the US Commerce Department added five Chinese electronics companies to its trade blacklist for allegedly helping the Russian defense industry.
On the political level, Beijing continues to avoid overt support for Putin's war in Ukraine.
She has already endorsed Russia's grievances toward NATO expansion, but she has been clear in her assertion of support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
China's partial and cautious support for Putin has provided an opportunity for Beijing to gain more economic advantages in its relations with Moscow while preserving space for it to avoid the fallout from any Russian defeat in the war.
Indeed, China has been able to develop a winning approach to its position on the Russian-Western conflict;
If Russia wins this confrontation, it will strengthen China's position in the political and economic competition with the West, and Russia's weakness will make Putin more dependent on Beijing and more dependent on it in foreign issues.
Despite the Western belief that Russia's need for China will give Beijing the upper hand in an unequal relationship, the two countries share a great common goal, which is to humiliate the West and weaken its global hegemony.
This objective in managing competitive relations between Moscow and Beijing for the foreseeable future is likely to remain superior to other competitive considerations.
Chinese interest in the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war stems not only from concern about the defeat of a close ally such as Russia, but also because the results of the Russian-Western confrontation will test the strength of the West in resisting Moscow and Beijing’s efforts to reshape the world order on new rules based on multipolarity, instead of Western hegemony.
Considering that the Sino-American competition is based mainly on the economy, the economic confrontation between Russia and the West is directly reflected in this competition.
This explains how Beijing is keen to keep the Russian economy afloat in the face of the weapon of Western sanctions;
Because if this weapon succeeds in subduing Putin, it will give an indication of the West's ability to use its economic power to subdue Beijing in the future.
On the other hand, Russia's failure or success in resolving the war in its favour, will also give an indication of the extent to which Beijing is able to reproduce Putin's experience to rejoin Taiwan by force;
One of the main motives for the increasing US involvement in thwarting the Russian war on Ukraine is to deter China from thinking in the future about using force to change Taiwan's position in the game of competition with Beijing.
In contrast to the Cold War period in which the West was able to keep China neutral in the battle with the Soviet Union, the growing Chinese tendency to become a global power competing with the United States, as well as Beijing's feeling that Washington has abandoned the "one China" approach and is promoting Taiwan's separatism , making it difficult for the West to slow the Chinese drift toward deepening partnership with Russia.
While Russia finds China's economic support an important way to avoid economic collapse, its need to draw more from these relationships to prop up its war machine pressures Beijing's cautious approach.
Russia is pushing itself further into the Chinese embrace, while Beijing sees an opportunity to gain new concessions in trade with Moscow, especially in the field of energy.
However, external factors have a major economic impact on China and are causing more headaches for Beijing's reputation in its relations with the West.
Russia's continued inability to achieve a decisive military victory in Ukraine worries the Chinese as much as Putin;
Because it weakens Moscow to the point that it may pose an existential threat to the rule of a close friend of Chinese President Xi, he shares his hostile view of the West.
Prolonging the war for a longer period reduces the chances of developing the Sino-Russian relationship into a "partnership without borders."
Another challenge facing this relationship is the increasing influence of Russia's war in Ukraine on Central Asia, as Moscow and Beijing compete for influence in this region.
The Chinese president's visit to Kazakhstan - the largest economy in Central Asia - before meeting Putin, and his affirmation of its support against any external interference in its internal affairs, was an indication of Beijing's desire to develop its economic relations with Nur-Sultan more closely, and thus enhance its influence in Russia's backyard.