On May 13, I wrote an article in Al Jazeera Net in which I asked whether President Joe Biden was willing and able to restore the partnership between the United States and the Gulf region.
With this partnership currently facing a series of unprecedented challenges since its inception eight decades ago, it is difficult to say for sure that it can return to the way it was.
But President Biden has just apparently realized that the Gulf region remains important to the United States, and is sending more signals that he wants to restore relations with two key allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
In the past two weeks alone, senior US officials have visited the kingdom, holding talks focused on global energy supplies, Iran, and other regional issues.
The problem for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and even other Gulf capitals that have good relations with the Biden administration, is not only the position on Russia, but mainly related to the growing skepticism of allies in the Gulf about the future of the historical security commitment to the security of the region
A large US delegation led by Vice President Biden also visited Abu Dhabi to offer condolences on the death of the late President of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed.
Also, US officials revealed Biden's intention to make a trip to the region at the end of next June, and he will seek to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Biden's interest in the Gulf region shows how Russia's military invasion of Ukraine has dramatically shifted his administration's geopolitical calculus and prompted him to abandon efforts to ostracize prominent leaders in the region.
He spoke repeatedly with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi last year asking for help in concluding a truce between Gaza's resistance factions and Israel, despite once describing him as Donald Trump's favorite dictator.
His administration recently approved the sale of Chinook-47F helicopters and related equipment to Egypt in a $2.6 billion deal.
He has also sat twice so far with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in the hope of pushing Turkey to the side of the West in its conflict with Russia.
Now, the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are courting after ignoring contact with them.
For these two allies, efforts to mend relations with them go beyond demonstrating that the United States remains committed to the strategic partnership with the Gulf.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi's opposition to increased oil production after the Russian-Ukrainian war has inflicted more pain on the US economy and exacerbated the global inflation crisis.
But the problem for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and even other Gulf capitals that have good relations with the Biden administration, is not limited to the position on Russia, but mainly relates to the growing skepticism of allies in the Gulf about the future of the historical security commitment to the security of the region.
These doubts are justified.
Biden launched his pledge by ending military support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, removing the Houthis from the terrorism list, and declassifying parts of a US intelligence report implicitly accusing the Saudi crown prince of being responsible for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
What added to these doubts was the weak US response to the Houthi attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and the Biden administration's opposition to re-listing the Houthis on the terrorist list, as well as its reluctance to pass an advanced arms deal to the UAE, including F-35 fighters.
Biden also seemed to disregard Gulf interests when engaging in negotiations with Iran to revive the nuclear deal.
Biden does not bear full responsibility for the decline in US-Gulf relations to this level.
The two previous American administrations played a role in this decline, starting with President Barack Obama, who concluded a nuclear agreement with Iran in isolation from the Gulf states, and through Trump, who treated Saudi Arabia with great contempt, even though during his tenure he visited the Kingdom and concluded deals with it worth hundreds of billions of dollars.
But the disregard shown by Biden towards the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE was not familiar in the history of US-Gulf relations, and it seems that he has now realized the error of this disregard, and is seeking to correct the course.
Although oil is the main motivation for the Biden administration to restore relations with the Gulf, US fears of China's efforts to gain a foothold in the Gulf region are also pressing Washington to reset its relations with the Gulf.
Nevertheless, the US engagement with the Gulf region constituted a strong motivation for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to search for new alternatives in their foreign policies as a hedge against the vacuum created by the decline in the US role.
Former US diplomat William Roebuck, in an article recently published by the Gulf States Institute in Washington, attributes this strategic hedging in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to reflecting concerns about the weakening of US resolve to provide security.
He adds that at a time when Washington has traditionally not been concerned about strategic hedging in the two countries when they strengthened their ties with European allies such as France or the United Kingdom, the specter of the rise of China has transformed the United States.
As keen as the Gulf states are to diversify their external options, they remain interested in the traditional partnership with the United States.
This stems from the fact that the new hedging options, in terms of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s efforts to build other partnerships with international powers such as China and Russia, or try to improve relations with regional opponents such as Turkey and Iran, and enter into a partnership with Israel, cannot replace the main role played by American military assets in the region. in enhancing the security of the Gulf region.
The United States has military bases in various Gulf countries.
About 13,000 American soldiers are deployed in Kuwait, and Kuwait Airport has the largest logistical support center for American forces in the region.
In the Sultanate of Oman, there are hundreds of American soldiers, and the Sultanate allows American forces to use its ports and airspace.
In Qatar, the headquarters of the US Central Command is located inside the Al Udeid Air Base, while the Jebel Ali port in the UAE is one of the largest centers of logistical support for US forces abroad. The UAE also hosts about 5,000 US soldiers, some of whom are in Abu Dhabi, and at Al Dhafra Air Base.
Although oil is the main motivation for the Biden administration to restore relations with the Gulf, US concerns about China's efforts to gain a foothold in the Gulf region are also pressing Washington to reset its relations with the Gulf.
The upcoming visit of President Biden to the region will be of great importance in this regard.
It has been more than 5 years since the last visit of an American president to the Gulf.
Since that period, US relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have witnessed a continuous decline.
Washington, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi all have their own interpretation of the erosion of this partnership.
But the fact that the Americans and the Gulf people realize is that the Gulf and the United States still need each other.
Recent US moves have made acceptable strides in improving relations, but the Biden administration will need to show that its return to interest in the Gulf is not circumstantial dictated by the need for oil.
The US administration wants the Gulf allies to help it face the crisis of high oil prices, and this seems very possible.
But in return, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will need Biden to show action, not words, that Washington is still committed to the security of the Gulf.
The process of reforming US-Gulf relations needs a clear roadmap.
If Washington's priority at the moment is to pump more Gulf oil into global markets, the Gulf states have urgent needs from the United States:
First, restoring confidence at the leadership level emerges as an urgent necessity in this process, and this is contingent on steps by Biden to end his disregard for the Saudi crown prince.
Second, it will require the US administration to balance its pressure to end the war in Yemen with Gulf security interests in a way that ensures addressing the threats posed by the Houthi group to the security of the Gulf region.
Third, Biden will have to take into account that efforts to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran cannot create long-term regional stability between Tehran and the Gulf states without imposing conditions on the Iranians to stop their destabilizing activities.
Fourth, Washington will have to abandon its selfishness in partnership with the Gulf, and deal with the Gulf states as important allies of American interests, regardless of the issue of oil.