Former Sudanese President's Advisor: What is going on is a political war fueled by regional alignment

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Video duration 03 minutes 18 seconds 03:18

Advisor to former Sudanese President Amin Hassan Omar said that the current conflict in his country "is due to external intervention with the aim of re-engineering Sudan politically, and these external interveners will only accept the result that approximates the image they want the final scene in Sudan," and in a way that suits these external parties.

Omar, who served as chief negotiator for the Sudanese government at the Doha peace talks in Darfur (2009-2011), added that "Sudan's current scene is part of the general scene in the region, a scene based on the fragmentation and fragmentation of the region and making it accept normalization with Israel, and to be one of the vehicles pulled by the Israeli locomotive towards the west."

The former minister stressed – in an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera Net – that what is happening in Sudan is not a civil war between Sudanese tribes and clans, but a political war, behind which stands a regional alignment, and "the declared goal is to dismantle the army and target key political forces in the Sudanese scene and remove them permanently not only from all political rights, but from natural human rights."

Amin Hassan Omar received his university education at the University of Khartoum, received his master's and doctoral degrees in the United States, and is the author of several books, including: The Origins of Politics, The Conflict of Secularism and Islam in the Middle East, The Origins of Islamic Thinking, The Origins of Sudanese Culture, and The School of Committed Islamic Literature. He also has two books entitled "Ashjan Autism" and "Muhammadiyat".

And to the details of the dialogue.

The stated goal is to dismantle the army and target political forces and exclude them once and for all, not only from all political rights, but also from natural human rights.

• What is the nature of the crisis in Sudan? Who is responsible for the outcome of the current conflict?

The problem in the prevailing narrative in the media and in diplomacy in general is that there are two teams led by two generals fighting, and this narrative is not true, because even if there is an agreement between these two generals, the problem will not be solved, because the issue is not a personal issue that revolves around them.

The issue is basically an external intervention to re-engineer Sudan politically, and these external interveners will only accept the result that approximates the image on which they want the final scene in Sudan, so it was wrong to focus on personal players, because people do not have all this importance, at least on the side of the army; General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan cannot make a decision regarding the army or the country without the broad consent of the armed forces, which are clearly aware of what is intended. The first thing to do is to dismantle this army – and this is declared – and reassemble it to suit external actors, which will never be allowed.

80 to 90 percent of garrisons are under military control everywhere, except for some peripheral cities

Therefore, there can be no political settlement through equality between the two parties, because there is one national national group that wants to preserve the dignity of the country and its national independence, and the mercenary militia that brings soldiers from abroad, is bound to be defeated and armed from abroad. No people can accept compromise with any external interventionist tendency.

But if the reality is a dispute as was happening between us in the past with the armed movements, then this is an internal dispute, it is true that there are external parties with agendas in it, but the scene was not managed by what they wanted and desired, they only chose one of the two groups and supported it, but now they made one of the two teams, and use it to redraw the scene in a way that achieves their interests in Sudan.

In fact, the Sudan scene is part of the general scene in the region, a scene based on the fragmentation and fragmentation of the region and making it accept normalization with Israel, and to be one of the vehicles pulled by the Israeli locomotive towards the West.

• Does this mean that the regional alignment behind the two parties is behind the continuation of the conflict in Sudan so far?

This change was intended to be very easy, as there is a coup and there is a political incubator ready for it, and there is a regional incubator ready as well, and there is international satisfaction, because the Quartet was satisfied that if there was a smooth change in Sudan towards the so-called framework agreement, there would be no problem, and this did not happen.

What happened was that there was a party that viewed this as a fateful issue, as the stated goal was to dismantle the army and target key political forces in the Sudanese scene and permanently exclude them not only from all political rights, but also from natural human rights.

I am a politician who has worked in politics since the time of former Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri and was arrested in his time, and I was an opponent and then reconciled, and then arrested during the last rule more than once, no one can tell me enough, and you are now outside the political process, and not only me, but the political scene and the whole political trend, especially if you want to replace the weak with the strong and agents with patriots, no one ever accepts this.

Hemedti has been absent for several months, and the scene has not changed because it is managed from the outside, so whether or not it appears will not affect much.

• Does changing one of the two leaderships hasten the end of the conflict and reaching political understandings?

I don't think so, because the main intervention is an external intervention, and it will not be allowed to change leaders except with people who are loyal to the same centers of power, so change will not have a significant impact, except by changing some personality traits that will not change the scene.

Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti) himself was absent from the scene for several months, did the scene change? No, it did not change because it is managed from outside, so its appearance or lack thereof will not affect much in the scene, and for a long time the mercenary Janjaweed who came from abroad did not really know if he was alive or dead, and they did not know exactly who was leading this war, and each group looks at its direct leadership, so changing leadership has a slight impact, and will never change the scene.

• But the RSF was finally able to control multiple areas and exercising power in them?

At the outset, we must define what is meant by the word "control", the mere entry of forces into a civil city that does not have military garrisons cannot be said to be control, did the support forces take control of the military garrisons, and turned into a ruling power in this region? Or are they just cars that come to loot and then come out?

Will the state guard the empty houses after their people abandoned them, because they are being looted, robbed, killed and raped? Does the state govern empty houses?

80 to 90 percent of garrisons are under military control everywhere, with the exception of some peripheral cities. Moreover, when they entered the city of Madani, they entered with the betrayal of the existing authority of the army forces, which withdrew without a fight, and this does not make it control at all.

Military control means controlling garrisons, establishing pillars to control the situation, and imposing authority in this place. All this is not available to these Janjaweed, not in Khartoum, not in Madani, not anywhere, just occupying some people's homes, as happened now in Khartoum. But where is the population? Where is the state? Where is the power? How will you assess the authority over people absent from their homes?

Military control is known, and political control is another, which is to have a ruling presence in the area you control, the use of the word "control" is not accurate, and if they control Khartoum, why didn't they declare a government that exercises power and manages all civilian business?

If you want to rule the people, is it possible to destroy universities, cut off electricity and water? And how are industrial areas looted? And why do you burn? Is the state fighting or fighting citizens and businessmen? Or is it fighting public services such as electricity and water? We hear all this and we are surprised when it is said that this militia controls Khartoum! What concept of control is this?

• Has the cohesion and social fabric known about Sudan changed in light of this fighting and things have reached civil war?

This narrative is also completely wrong: a civil war must be a war between tribes, clans or groups, in order to be called a civil war, but what is happening in Sudan now is a political war.

If we look at the different tribes, you find groups of them in this camp and other groups in the other camp, and some tribes may have a more inclination here or there, and the importance here is not in the number of people, because the majority of people are not involved in this war, and this makes it a political war, because it was established to enable political-military parties to control the scene in favor of those who finance and ensure this change.

In conditions of turmoil and strife, people can think of such a thought, and this may have some immediate effects that will not last long, but I do not think that the social fabric will be affected by all this, or that there is a crisis in the first place among the people in Sudan.

There is a difference between the political discourse of some intellectuals and elites who use phrases with discursive political approaches in order to maximize their political gains, and the reality on the ground.

The civil war must be between tribes, clans or groups, but what is happening in Sudan now is a political war

I have no fear of either a civil war or a drought before me. It is true that this setback will have social effects, but for some time, it will not be a reaction to the state of meeting among the Sudanese, who always tend to cohesion.

Now Sudanese cohesion is a message to the whole world, have you seen a refugee camp or a camp for displaced people? All the people went to their families who sponsored them, whether inside or outside Sudan, as the expatriates each one in his place sponsors his family and sometimes sponsors more than one family, and inside one house now includes 5 or 6 families living in the same place where one family used to live.

• The citizen on the Sudanese street has closed all avenues to him economically, security, and even the most basic necessities of life. So what can he do in these circumstances?

This is the tragedy of war, and if you are waiting for an answer from me, I do not have an answer, war always victimizes the weak. But if the solution is to allow someone to control your country and lease its interests and financial resources abroad as well as its agricultural land, no one will ever accept this.

Now the matter has gone beyond targeting public interests and state capabilities to targeting the personal capabilities of citizens, as cars are looted as well as money and gold, and mercenaries come in cars in which they loot furniture from homes.

How can people be expected to accept a settlement after this? People will fight for their rights until they get them, or until they secure what is left of them to ensure that they will live a decent life in their country, because no one can feel a decent life outside their country.

• Several human rights groups accuse both parties and their supporters of committing violations against citizens. Is this monitored by legal means and then the perpetrators of these violations prosecuted before international courts?

First, the state has established a commission for this, and there are many civil initiatives that have been established to follow up on these violations, but the words of politicians, foreign ministers and debaters say that we accuse this and that as a matter of compromise, and this has no evidence.

Second, the problem with the militia is that it documents its crimes itself, and on social media you will find all of this, and it will not need an external party to document this, or say that it happened or not. They are proud of their actions, they film them and talk about them, and they say these are our rights.

Third, most of these mercenaries are from outside Sudan, and do not have citizenship rights in Sudan, and Hemedti himself described them as "Kasaba", and this Sudanese word means "a mercenary fighting for the gain he will receive."

If these are unruly, how many are there 10, two hundred, <> thousand? What if the whole army is uncontrollable, including its commanders!

• How do you evaluate the efforts of the Sudanese state to end this conflict and stop the bloodshed and the state's capabilities?

The state now has efforts to stop the war, but it is weak because of the weakness of the government, because the leaders of the weak government that has caused all this so far have mostly not been replaced, although some adjustments may occur.

Fortunately, there is federal rule in Sudan, and there are powers for the states, so you will find that some states are better off and more cohesive, and the production process proceeds in them as if they were in a normal state, and there are some states due to weak leadership in which their situation is more difficult.

In my opinion, this government is powerless, and no one moves in it, and unfortunately those who lead it do not have the desire to amend this matter, due to the connection with the outside, and the fear that they will be told that you have gone with people and brought others who may have different political orientations, so not giving consideration to the people's necessary needs is the problem now.

• You are a statesman, a former negotiator, and an active politician in the Sudanese scene. What is your recipe for getting out of the predicament that the Sudanese are currently experiencing?

People must return to their homes and normal conditions, this first, and this will only happen if these mercenaries leave, even by force, and that people have a normal life, and any agreement reached will be only theoretical and has no value.

The dilemma now is that these people have been released from their garbage, so who can get them out? Hemedti himself has no strong authority over them until he drives them out of the villages they loot, so how can this happen? This can only be done through force, because what was taken by force can only be recovered by force, and because there is no second option.

The main mobilization now is the people themselves who felt threatened for themselves and their property, and it is the weapon of mobilization and the huge mobilization that will decide the battle, at least at the level of getting them out of our homes and towns, and then the problem with the government turns into a political issue as we had in the past.

We stayed in Doha talking to the rebels for 10 years, and we made agreements, signed them and implemented many of them, and there was no one to enter people's homes, loot them and violate their symptoms, such acts are non-negotiable, because negotiation is on political issues, not on your rights, property, honor and honor.

I have no doubt that the Sudanese people will win, and now the West itself is very apprehensive about this huge alert that is happening, because if the people succeed in getting weapons and expel them, Sudan will change forever.

Source : Al Jazeera