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Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the Munich Security Conference in February
Photograph:
Johannes Simon / EPO
Chinese Premier Li Qiang will arrive in Germany on Sunday with a few ministers in tow for a three-day visit – around the biennial german-China intergovernmental consultations. No other EU or G7 country has such a close format with Beijing, which is why Germany's allies will be watching the visit particularly closely.
Olaf Scholz should take the opportunity to send a strong signal that he is serious about a more realistic China policy. Together with his ministers, he should approach the intergovernmental consultations with far more clarity and a stronger European orientation than his predecessor Angela Merkel.
Thorsten Benner
Thorsten Benner is Director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin
At the last face-to-face intergovernmental consultations in Berlin in 2018, Chancellor Angela Merkel, together with the Chinese government, presented herself as "responsible partners for a better world" and resolved to intensify the "comprehensive strategic partnership".
In the 22 pages of prose of the final declaration, the German government lied in many places that it had a like-minded partner in Beijing. In his first government statement in December 2021, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz countered this with the maxim: "We must align our China policy with the China that we find in reality".
It is not clear whether Beijing is ready for a partnership
The first national security strategy, presented last Wednesday, makes clear how the government sees the real China: It states that China is "increasingly aggressively claiming regional supremacy" and is "repeatedly acting contrary to our interests and values." The elements of systemic rivalry and competition have increased in the relationship with China. In doing so, the government is setting the right tone for next Tuesday's intergovernmental consultations, which it has chosen under the motto "Acting sustainably together".
It is crucial how the government fills this slogan with life. It reflects the conclusion of the security strategy that China remains a partner "without which many global challenges and crises cannot be solved". It is undoubtedly true that many global crises, from climate to pandemics and debt to Russia's war against Ukraine, are difficult to tackle successfully without China. But it is far less clear whether Beijing is really willing to enter into a partnership. In many areas, this is hampered by a lack of transparency and the rule of law.
Cover-ups and secrecy on the Chinese side, for example, hindered scientific and political cooperation with regard to the corona pandemic and its origins. Today, at least half of the 38 countries most at risk of default have China as their main debtor. But Beijing refuses to be transparent about the contracts it has concluded with these states and opposes debt relief. On the German side, the intergovernmental consultations should be a stress test of how much genuine partnership is possible with Beijing in the face of global challenges. In the end, the joint declaration should be limited to areas where there is a real overlap of interests and where robust joint agreements can be reached. Less is more if you don't want to fool yourself on the German side.
What does Germany mean by "de-risking"?
In addition, the German government should convey to the Chinese side and also to the public a clear understanding of the concept of "de-risking", which has risen in recent months to become the common guiding star of Europe and the USA in dealing with China. Olaf Scholz can be credited with bringing this term into the debate early on, long before EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan focused on "de-risking" in two speeches in the spring. "De-risking" is an attractive and successful concept because it offers a broad scope for interpretation and leaves many questions unanswered. Even the translation into German is unclear: Is it about risk minimization (this is how Foreign Minister Baerbock translates the term) or mere risk reduction? What are the risks? What means and speed of "de-risking"? The Chinese side, which is critical of the term, will most likely ask the German interlocutors questions. And it is important that Scholz and all ministers communicate a uniform and ambitious understanding of "de-risking".
This should include minimizing the susceptibility to blackmail on critical raw materials, market dependencies and supply chains, as well as the protection of critical infrastructure – as well as targeted controls on technology cooperation in areas that China can use to strengthen its military capabilities. One of the key risks is that Germany will supply Beijing with the technologies it needs for its ambitious rearmament plans. Recent reports on how Heidelberg University played a role in Beijing's strategy in building military-grade capabilities in the field of quantum communications make this clear. In areas where Beijing is a leader (such as solar and battery production), "de-risking" may well include encouraging Chinese investment in Germany. It is less risky for Germany to be dependent on Chinese solar and battery production in Europe than on pure imports from China for these key technologies of the energy transition. However, the chancellor should clearly reject any advances on the Chinese side to revive the "Comprehensive Agreement on Investment" (CAI) negotiated by Chancellor Merkel. Beijing is primarily interested in the CAI as an instrument to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States.
At his dinner with the Chinese Prime Minister on Monday evening, the Chancellor was also expected to send clear security policy messages in a confidential setting. This includes the fact that Germany is concerned that Beijing has so far been unwilling to engage in substantial talks on arms control in key strategic areas. It too often cuts off direct military (as well as political) channels of communication with the US to punish Washington, instead of investing in guardrails and confidence-building measures.
Beijing's support for Moscow attacks German interests
Scholz should also make it clear that despite not mentioning Taiwan in the national security strategy, Germany sees it as a key challenge to preserve the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait and deter Beijing from using force. Finally, Scholz should once again make it clear that Beijing's direct military support for Moscow in the war against Ukraine is massively attacking European core interests. Germany is highly open to Beijing's constructive role in ending the war against Ukraine, that should be the message; but so far, China's deepening of relations with Moscow since the beginning of the war and Xi's pompous state visit to Putin in March speak a different language.
Beijing would also like to have the intergovernmental consultations with Germany pompously in order to send a signal that it is working very well with Germany, unlike with its arch-enemy USA. It is therefore the right step by the German government to urge the Chinese side to reduce the size of the delegation and the participating ministers in order to provide a counterpoint to the Merkel era.
Another important symbolic accent is the stronger European design of the german-Chinese intergovernmental negotiations. The traffic light partners have committed themselves to this in the coalition agreement. This is central to Germany's credibility in Europe. For years, Berlin has railed against the 16+1 format of the Central and Eastern European states with Beijing, without even questioning its own 1+1 format with Beijing.
In the rest of Europe, this comes across as either hypocritical or schizophrenic. As an antidote, as the Chancellery seems to assume, it is not enough to consult the European partners beforehand and inform them afterwards. In the future, Germany should invite representatives from Brussels and some European partner countries to the intergovernmental consultations in the various thematic areas as guests. This would make it clear that not "Germany First" but "Europe United" is the motto of Germany's China policy.