THE CONVERSATION

Article 49.3 and social reforms: a French history

Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne once again used Article 49.3. This time to pass the pension law, in Paris on March 16, 2023. © Alain Jocard/AFP

Text by: The Conversation

9 min

The pension reform project, supported by Elisabeth Borne's government, gives rise to a showdown between the government and the street which, since mid-January 2023, has manifested itself in the use of traditional forms of mobilization (strikes, demonstrations), channeled by a unanimous inter-union front.

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By Mathias Bernard, University of Clermont Auvergne (UCA)

It was coupled with a political confrontation between the majority and its opposition, exacerbated by the announcement of the use of article 49.3 to pass a law contested both by the street and by a growing majority of French people.

In the history of the Fifth Republic, however, this is not the first time that a government, isolated in the face of rising social and political protests, has had to engage in such a showdown which, in an uncertain context, involves real risk-taking. In fact, whatever the nature of their majority, successive governments over the past 20 years have almost always resorted to Article 49.3 to pass projects that profoundly modify the social system or labour regulations – even if it means backing down under pressure from the street.

May 68 was also a parliamentary crisis

An almost inevitable referent of all social protest movements for fifty years, the crisis of May 68 did not take place simply in the amphitheatres and in the streets. It also awakened political opposition to a Gaullism which, worn out by ten years in power, had only a fragile majority, both in public opinion and in the National Assembly: on 24 April 1968, it was simply eight votes short of a motion of censure, on the situation of public broadcasting, to be adopted.

At the heart of the movement, even though the executive seems divided on the response it must bring to the demands of students and employees, the opposition tabled a new motion of censure, which was discussed on 21 and 22 May, in a climate of extreme tension. François Mitterrand, then leader of the non-communist left, then evokes a crisis of regime that discredits the "system" in power and makes necessary a political "alternative", which he is ready to embody. Thanks to the support of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and his Independent Republicans group, who were critical of the government's management of the crisis, the motion of censure was rejected – by a clear majority: only 233 MPs voted for it, while the majority was 244.

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This parliamentary victory is however insufficient to restore the legitimacy of the government, in a context where the mobilization of students and employees is not weakening. This is why, on the advice of his Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, General de Gaulle, on 30 May, pronounced the dissolution of the National Assembly, after having considered resorting to a referendum.

Before dissolving the National Assembly, de Gaulle hesitated until the last second, as evidenced by the draft of his speech found in the National Archives. Public Senate.

Stirring up public fears about the radicalisation of the social movement and exploiting the fear of revolutionary disorder, the Gaullists obtained, during the legislative elections of 23 and 30 June 1968, an unprecedented majority but very closely dependent on this particular context. In fact, the government emerged weakened from this crisis, and de Gaulle resigned ten months later, after the failure of the referendum of April 1969.

Mass mobilizations

It was in 1984 that the executive branch was again shaken by mass demonstrations. The predominantly socialist government, led by Pierre Mauroy, faces virulent opposition to the Savary bill, aimed at creating a "large unified and secular public service of national education".

Supported by right-wing parties as well as by a significant fraction of public opinion and networks of parents in private education, this opposition culminated in a major demonstration on 24 June 1984 which brought together more than a million people in Paris.

The government had a majority to adopt this text, which was also one of the 110 proposals made by François Mitterrand in 1981: he had, however, resorted to article 49-3 on 23 May 1984 to accelerate the adoption of the text at first reading in the National Assembly.

However, President François Mitterrand yielded to pressure from public opinion and the street and, on 12 July 1984, announced the withdrawal of the bill – resulting in the resignation of Minister Alain Savary and Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy.

Two years later, Jacques Chirac took the same decision after the major mobilizations against the Devaquet bill, even before having had time to present it in plenary session to the National Assembly and possibly resort to 49.3!

Between 1988 and 1993, socialist governments enjoyed only relative majorities in the Assembly. But when they resorted to Article 49.3 or faced motions of censure that sometimes almost overturned them, it was never in the context of mass mobilization or radical contestation of a reform.

On the other hand, in November-December 1995, the pension and social security reform proposed by Alain Juppé's government sparked a social movement unprecedented since 1968, even though the government enjoyed a very large majority in both assemblies. As in 1986, the government withdrew its reform project on 15 December 1995 without having requested a vote in the Assembly.

However, on 30 December 1995, in the midst of the "confectioners' truce" that usually marked a suspension in political life, he resorted to section 49.3 to pass a law authorizing him to issue ordinances to reform social security. This double act of authority (the use of ordinances and 49.3) does not arouse any particular reaction from the oppositions who probably felt that they had obtained the essential (the withdrawal of the pension reform), in a context where the government had, in Parliament, the majority: it was mainly for the executive to move quickly by avoiding obstructionist practices.

Sling and fracture on the left

On 9 February 2006, Dominique de Villepin had his "law for equal opportunities" adopted, establishing the First Employment Contract. Despite massive protest, particularly from young people, the law was promulgated on 31 March 2006 – before Jacques Chirac finally decided, on 16 April, to repeal the article that established the CPE: less than a year before the presidential elections, he did not want to expose his political family to a major electoral risk.

Under the presidency of François Hollande, marked in particular by the "slingshot" of deputies rejecting the economic policy embodied in particular by Manuel Valls and Emmanuel Macron, article 49.3 was used to adopt the "Macron laws", to the great displeasure of the latter, and especially the "Labour Law", carried by Minister Myriam El Khomri both at first reading (May 10, 2016) and during final adoption (July 21).

Tuesday, May 10, 2016, Manuel Valls used the 49.3 to adopt the "Macron bill", named after the Minister of the Economy at the time. France 24.

Despite the opposition of a major part of public opinion, almost all the unions and a particularly virulent and lasting social movement (notably around the "Nuit Debout" movement), the rebellious deputies of the PS did not join their colleagues in the Left and Right Front and, on 12 May, did not vote for the motion of censure. which received only 246 votes out of the required 288. But this showdown is causing a fracture within the governmental left, which has never really recovered.

Passing a law doesn't mean the end of the story

The pension reform project, carried by Édouard Philippe during Emmanuel Macron's first five-year term, was also adopted at first reading by the use of article 49.3, on February 29, 2020, which was violently denounced by the various trade unions.

The government had no problem having the majority to vote this text. But he wanted to quickly close a sequence marked by a strong social mobilization which, a year after the movement of the "yellow vests", contributed to weakening his political and electoral base.

This deliberate desire to dodge a long discussion in Parliament had no immediate consequences: as of March 16, 2020, Emmanuel Macron announced the suspension of this reform, due to the Covid crisis that then hit the France and imposed confinement. His intransigent attitude towards a social movement has undoubtedly contributed to the evolution of his electorate from one presidential election to the next, an electorate now closer to that traditionally captured by the moderate right.

Elisabeth Borne's government is not the first to show authority in Parliament to pass a contested reform and to try to put an end to an agitation that, if it continues, would be deleterious for the image of the government. However, a parliamentary victory achieved through Article 49.3 or by the rejection of a motion of censure is not enough to regain legitimacy – General de Gaulle himself experienced this in May 68. Several laws, thus adopted, have not been promulgated. Obviously, the vote on Monday, March 20 is not a definitive end to a particularly delicate episode for the presidency of Emmanuel Macron.

Mathias Bernard, Historian, University of Clermont Auvergne (UCA)

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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