Germany was neither militarily nor politically prepared for the engagement in Afghanistan.

Without any knowledge of local conditions, the Bundeswehr came to Kabul in 2002 primarily as a result of a "political beauty contest".

This is how diplomats, generals and political scientists described it during the first hearing of the Bundestag commission of inquiry on engagement in the Hindu Kush.

Michael Steiner, foreign policy adviser in the Chancellery at the time, described the situation at the time: If you don't offer every assistance now, you are against America and will "never be able to count on American assistance again."

The American government was "extremely self-focused" at the time, almost "spooky".

Peter Carstens

Political correspondent in Berlin

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Carl-Hubertus von Butler, who came to Kabul as a brigadier general in January 2002 with an advance command, told the commission how little time it took to prepare for his assignment and the first weeks and months in a city that had been "broken down to its foundations".

There were skeptical looks from the civilian population, "many initially thought we were Russians", opaque, nebulous conditions in Kabul.

The camp in Kabul was shelled at night.

When asked about the goal of the mission at the time, he said they were striving for a "self-supporting security architecture on as democratic a basis as possible".

But he knew "that Afghan society was incompatible with ours in almost every respect."

Learn lessons from Afghanistan

The peace and conflict researcher Conrad Schetter also described this and said that with the Americans, the old warlords from the 20-year war had regained their position and had prevented any state building.

In addition, there has never been an intra-Afghan reconciliation process.

Steiner described it as an “original sin” that the Taliban were not involved at the time.

Von Butler reported that cooperation between the German ministries was not desired.

Even in the good initial phase, the weak own forces of civil reconstruction were not in a position to create trust.

For the Allies, the civil build-up of the Germans was seen as "moral compensation" for military action.

From 2003 onwards, the Americans turned their attention to Iraq, Steiner said.

What was left was an "intervention ruin".

Von Butler described the political beginning of the mission as "unprofessional and chaotic".

He warned that Germany must continue to prepare for international missions in the future.

"Otherwise we would not be able to react and would not have learned any lessons from Afghanistan." The Commission of Inquiry was set up in the summer to explore Germany's commitment to Afghanistan and to draw lessons for future foreign and security policy.