After selecting the heads of state and government
A major change in the Iraqi government within days heralds the end of the crisis
Sadr's followers in front of the Iraqi parliament during previous protests.
AFP
Al-Sadr had expected the Sunni and Kurdish blocs in the coalition to resign.
Reuters
Washington considers Al-Sudani as one of the logical and potential candidates offered by the coordination framework.
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* Stephen Simon
*Adam Weinstein
During the past week, the Iraqi government took a giant step that approached the formation of the government, as the parliament elected Abdul Latif Rashid as president of Iraq, who in turn appointed Muhammad Shiaa Al-Sudani as prime minister. A year later, the tables were turned with the rise of Sadr's political opponents.
how did that happen?
In short, Muqtada al-Sadr has moved in and out of Iraqi politics since leading the Shiite militia known as the "Mahdi Army" against the American occupation during the first decade of the occupation, and he has retained an impressive ability to mobilize militants and form a terrifying militia that is now called Saraya al-Salam.
During the preparations for last year's elections, al-Sadr formed a cross-sectarian coalition that included Sunni politician Muhammad al-Halbousi, the Progress Party, and Massoud Barzani's party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Iranian.
According to the Iraqi system, the parliament elects a president, and then a head of state, who in turn chooses a head of government, followed by the selection of ministers by the prime minister, which goes to parliament for approval, but this process was stopped as a result of a decision taken by the Federal Supreme Court, which canceled The option of electing the president through a simple majority in the second parliamentary election if the first election fails to pass two-thirds of the majority, which is what happened.
Supreme Court decision
It is widely believed that the Supreme Court's decision came under great pressure from Iran and former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and this prevented al-Sadr's coalition from forming a government, because it was unable to achieve a two-thirds majority.
Al-Sadr responded to this political blockage by ordering the 73-member deputies of his bloc to resign and send his followers to the parliament building to occupy it. Paralyzing parliamentary politics, making the formation of the government impossible without the approval of al-Sadr and on his own terms, or that he expected his ally al-Halbousi to hesitate before accepting the resignations.
In both cases, al-Sadr played the role of a deliberate arsonist and a firefighter, and instead of following his example, his coalition partners left him alone, and the 73 seats left by his bloc turned to his opponents, the "coordinating framework", which consists of a group of Shiite parties and militias. .
In a quick sequence of steps on October 13, Rashid Latif named Muhammad Shia Al-Sudani as prime minister, which paved the way for the formation of the government, and the scene appeared as if the crisis that engulfed Iraq last year had ended, and the Sadrist challenge was definitively dismissed.
Barring surprises, there will be no elections for another three years.
Al-Sadr, who excelled in maneuvering and arming, had no reasonable path to gaining power. It is not known whether Al-Sadr maintained influence through the senior officials he planted in a group of ministries, as it depends on whether Al-Sudani conducts a clean survey of whom he will choose in his government. Al-Sadr himself also promised to do to his opponents.
Al-Sadr's response to Operation Closed Door, which led to the selection of President Latif and the Sudanese prime minister, was very violent.
He has described the government as a "militia government" and prevented his followers from dealing with it. The new leadership, fearful of preserving its legitimacy, may look for some way to appease al-Sadr and bring him back into the game, but the way forward seems ambiguous.
As expected, the new team moved towards preventing the outgoing prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, from leaving the country, while preparing to make him a scapegoat for the rampant corruption that prompted many Iraqis to vote for Sadr.
What does all this mean for America's relationship with Iraq?
For Washington, Al-Sudani is one of the logical potential candidates presented by the coordination framework, someone with experience who has served as Minister of Human Rights and Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, with less blood on his hands than some of the other potential candidates.
But it is not known the extent of the influence of the controversial former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on al-Sudani, and al-Sudani is considered to be Maliki's creation despite al-Sudani's separation from the Dawa Party.
There are some tough policy choices for the Sudanese who will soon have access to the federal funds, which have ballooned over the past year thanks to high energy prices.
In response to the discontent that erupted in the violent demonstrations of 2019, Al-Sudani will likely use his bloated coffers to provide the public sector with jobs for unemployed youth.
It is not yet known whether he will mobilize ministries and parliament to address the three major issues plaguing Iraq, namely corruption, failure in economic reform, climate change, and combating any emergence of ISIS.
Baghdad prepares for large-scale protests
But Al-Sudani is seen as a weak leader.
One of the issues that the United States will pursue is how the regular army and counter-terrorism forces perform in the budgeting process, compared to the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces.
He must decide how to deal with al-Sadr and his loyal base, who might choose to wreak havoc if they are excluded from the government.
Baghdad braced for large-scale protests after Rashid was elected head of state earlier this week, but so far nothing has happened, and it would not be wise to take this calm for granted.
It is not clear how the "coordinating framework" bloc will deal with the continuing US military presence in the country.
The decision of former US President Donald Trump to kill the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, and the deputy commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, on January 3, 2020, stimulated the Iranian-backed militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces, and prompted them to lead public demands to remove the American forces from Iraq.
The Hashd al-Shaabi’s relationship with the United States has become more complex behind the scenes, and now that they find themselves in power, they will likely hesitate before doing anything that could get them into trouble, and one indication of this will be the efforts that the new government will make to rein in American military operations in Iraq. Which seems to work to target the assets of the popular crowd.
Perhaps most worrisome is Nuri al-Maliki's potential influence on the new prime minister.
Washington blames Maliki for creating the conditions that incubated ISIS in Iraq, and the fears are that this model of extremist rule could be repeated at a time when US equipment training, improved Iraqi military operations skills, and Sunnis reject ISIS rule from the judiciary. against this rebel organization.
• Al-Sadr, who excelled in maneuvering and arming, had no reasonable path to gaining power, and it is not known whether Al-Sadr maintained influence through the senior officials he planted in a group of ministries.
• Al-Sudani is considered to be the work of Al-Maliki, despite Al-Sudani's separation from the Dawa Party. There are some tough policy choices for the Sudanese who will soon have access to the federal funds, which have ballooned over the past year thanks to high energy prices.
Stephen Simon ■ Former US National Security Council official
Adam Weinstein ■ American writer and journalist
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