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North Korea has enacted a nuclear force policy.

In a remedial speech at the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly held on the 8th, Chairman Kim Jong-un said, "We cannot give up our nuclear weapons in a prospective way to contain the United States, a nuclear hydrangea." Command and control were regulated by law.

There are five 'conditions for using nuclear weapons' proposed by the Act, and the contents are as follows.


○ When it is judged that a nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction attack on North Korea has been carried out or is imminent


○ When it is judged that a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces against the state leadership and the national nuclear force command body has been carried out or is imminent


○ Important strategic When it is judged that a fatal military attack has been carried out or is imminent


○ In case of an unavoidable operational necessity to prevent the escalation and prolongation of war and seize the initiative in war


○ The existence of other states and the safety of life of the people In the event that a catastrophic crisis occurs in the country and an unavoidable situation is created that has no choice but to respond with nuclear weapons.


It is worth noting that, as seen in the phrases 'if it is judged imminent' and 'operational necessity', it is stipulated that North Korea can conduct a preemptive nuclear attack at any time.

In particular, it stipulated that the command body, that is, Chairman Kim Jong-un or others, could use nuclear force even if it was not a nuclear attack if there were signs of a fatal attack.


South Korea and the U.S. restart high-level extended deterrence council

As the North Korean nuclear threat became so explicit, South Korean and American officials were also busy.

Although it was already agreed upon at the South Korea-US summit in May, after the North Korean nuclear legislation was announced (local time), the 3rd High-Level Extended Deterrence Strategy Council was held in Washington, DC, USA to respond to the North Korean nuclear program.

At this meeting, held again in four years and eight months since January 2018, measures to protect South Korea from North Korean nuclear attacks or threats were discussed.



The term 'extended deterrence' means 'extended deterrence', and it is the US defense promise to ensure that the US nuclear deterrence extends not only to the US but also to its allies.

This is commonly referred to as the 'nuclear umbrella'.

For those who are not interested in this field, as a supplementary explanation, nuclear deterrence is based on the so-called 'mutually assured destruction' concept.

If an enemy country carries out a nuclear attack, the enemy will also be attacked with nuclear weapons in retaliation and both sides will be destroyed.



In fact, after the US used nuclear weapons in World War II, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, and other countries succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, but they have never been used since.

Instead, they compete to develop various delivery means that can support mutually assured destruction, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), hypersonic missiles, stealth aircraft, and strategic bombers that can survive a nuclear attack and strike an enemy country. is fiercer than ever.



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US reemphasizes nuclear umbrella

"Mobilize all capabilities, including nuclear weapons"

In fact, South Korea has a military alliance with the United States, so the nuclear umbrella promise of the United States has been applied before.

However, while the North Korean nuclear threat is increasingly materializing, as the public fears that the nuclear umbrella promise will only have a declaratory meaning, the government has decided to resume the operation of the Extended Deterrence Forces Council, which was suspended due to the North Korea-U.S. and inter-Korean summits, on the US side. Negotiations began again upon request.



At the ROK-U.S. diplomatic and defense 2+2 high-level extended deterrence consultative meeting, the United States reiterated its nuclear umbrella pledge to provide extended deterrence to the Republic of Korea using all categories of military capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense and advanced non-nuclear capabilities.

We also pledged to cooperate with our country to ensure the timely and effective deployment and operation of strategic assets in the region for deterrence and response to North Korea and enhancement of regional security.



As an example to support this, the F-35A 5th generation fighter combined exercise in July and the upcoming Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group's regional deployment were cited.

The ROK and the United States also agreed to share information on nuclear and non-nuclear threats, including better use of TTX, and strengthen strategic readiness through increased training and exercises.

In addition, the ROK-U.S. alliance agreed to continuously strengthen cooperation in various fields, including space and cyber, as well as the missile response capabilities and posture, and expand related cooperation.



These are the contents of the joint statement issued after the end of the Extended Deterrence Strategy Council.

It seems like there are a lot of good things to say, but they all seem to be on a principled level, so it's easy to follow the question, 'So what are you going to do?'

However, officials strongly attach significance to it as this is the first time that a 'joint statement' has been issued after the council meeting.

If so, how much has South Korea become safe from the North Korean nuclear threat through this consultation?


Reflecting our voices, systematizing consultations…

Non-physical damage is also discussed.

One of the most important points in the nuclear umbrella promise is how much we can be involved in the US nuclear umbrella operation.

Even if a threat is imminent, a promise that only requires the United States to do something is only a promise.

Taking this into consideration, a high-ranking official from the South Korean side said that in this consultation, we discussed specific measures to respond to the North Korean nuclear program in several areas, going beyond the basic level of discussion.



Information sharing, joint planning, crisis consultation, joint exercise, strategic asset deployment, and strategic dialogue plan are all in six areas. The purpose of the explanation was to provide a space for us to directly or indirectly participate in the operation of the nuclear umbrella as well as deliver the requirements to the US side more quickly and accurately.



This official also answered the most fundamental question that is asked whenever the nuclear umbrella issue comes up, namely, whether the United States will protect South Korea even at the risk of an attack on the mainland of the United States.

The U.S. side said that the U.S. delegation, who had visited the meeting as an opportunity, was invited to the Missile Defense Agency to brief the U.S. military's homeland defense capabilities.

If an attack on the US mainland is carried out, there is no problem in providing the US with extended deterrence, or nuclear umbrella, as long as it is capable of stopping it.



In addition, the discussion also discussed ways to frustrate the nuclear attack attempt itself in a non-physical way, instead of applying a physical blow when North Korea detects signs of a nuclear attack.

A preemptive strike has a disadvantage in that it is not easy to determine whether the opponent's intention to attack is clear, and that even if it was a legitimate attack, there is a large possibility of escalation.



The non-physical strike method discussed this time utilized space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic waves, and military officials evaluated that it meant that South Korea-U.S. cooperation had advanced in new areas related to extended deterrence.

If South Korea and the United States use space or cyber capabilities to detect and evaluate signs of a North Korean nuclear attack in advance, and if it is determined that the intention of the attack is clear, consider a method of neutralizing the launch facility through cyber or electronic warfare before a North Korean nuclear attack. .



The ROK and the United States have agreed to hold an annual high-level extended deterrence consultative body to further develop these discussions.

It seems that they have decided that it is important to have regular consultations in order to continuously observe and respond to the ever-changing attitude of North Korea.

Some criticize whether such a consultative body is really necessary in the field where the military alliance is already in operation, or whether it is a show-off event, but on the American side, Secretary of State Blincoln and White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, etc., have given time to our delegation. Looking at it, it seems right to say that the two sides agreed to some extent on the need.



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How far can we trust the nuclear umbrella promise?

Regarding this consultation, the Korean government is in the mood to see that the results are not small.

It is also true that the explanations from the authorities seem quite convincing.

So, back to the original question here.

How far can the U.S. nuclear umbrella promise go?

As many have pointed out, despite this consultation, it is impossible to predict how the US will behave when the North Korean nuclear threat becomes a reality.



We have organized our voices a little more and have prepared a window through which we can consult with the US side and have created various safeguards, but it is the US that decides whether to unfold the nuclear umbrella when something happens.

Emphasizing that missile defense is not a problem for homeland defense, it is difficult to guarantee whether the US will really take the risk of a nuclear attack that could evaporate the lives of tens or millions of its citizens with a single shot unless the interception probability is 100%. I did.



So, can tactical nuclear redeployment or NATO-style nuclear sharing be a solution?

As a high-ranking official I heard explains, this is also a base.

Even if nuclear missiles are put back on the Korean Peninsula and American nuclear missiles are installed on German fighters, in the end it is entirely up to the US whether to use those nuclear weapons or not.

The important thing for the United States, which can fire nuclear missiles anytime, anywhere, is whether they really want to use nuclear weapons, not where and how they are placed.



So, is the US nuclear umbrella really just a torn umbrella?

I can't even say for sure.

According to experts' assessments, North Korea is one of the countries with the greatest risk of actually using nuclear weapons.

It is said that the United States is also in a situation where it cannot but prepare in advance for the North Korean nuclear program.

In addition, if North Korea does not take a clear military response to North Korea in any form, whether it becomes nuclear or conventional weapons, when North Korea actually uses nuclear weapons, the nuclear umbrella the United States has spread toward its allies will be immediately dismantled, and there is a possibility that it will lead to simultaneous nuclear proliferation. Big.

This is why it is difficult for the US to keep its nuclear umbrella pledge as a pledge.


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Is self-nuclearization impossible?

In any case, it is unsettling that we have to depend on other countries for our security.

It is for this reason that the argument for nuclear armament continues.

In fact, some US think tanks have even mentioned the South Korean nuclear armament scenario.

If we look at the precedents of India and Pakistan, the method of <developing nuclear weapons → international sanctions → lifting sanctions → acquiring the status of a de facto nuclear power state> is possible.

The key is the lifting of sanctions, which is limited to cases in which it is in line with the interests of great powers.

India was also sanctioned by the US after being armed with nuclear weapons, but sanctions were lifted according to the US need to contain China.



How about our country?

Even if we do not take the complicated international relations into account, it is not easy just because of our internal circumstances.

Although it is the world's 10th largest economy, it has an economic structure that can inevitably suffer a fatal blow if trade is blocked by sanctions.

It is said that there is a high degree of external dependence.

Nuclear is also scary, but it can be more terrifying than nuclear weapons to stop eating right away.

Moreover, Korea is a democratic republic.

If a significant portion of the people support the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it could lead to division of the people if it wants to arm itself with nuclear weapons.

If internal divisions are added to the situation that is difficult to bear even if we unite and insist on possessing nuclear weapons, the result is obvious.



It may be that we are standing under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, which is not completely believable, but it is impossible not to believe it, so we have no choice but to make efforts to make it even a little stronger.