Flood disaster on the Ahr: When will responsibility finally be taken?

On the night of the flood, Jürgen Pföhler was much more important than the well-being of the general public, who had elected him district administrator.

When he found out that "five massive houses" in nearby Schuld were being swept away by the water and that the situation in his hometown was also becoming more threatening, he warned individual neighbors, vacated his own house and went to his second home.

Even his red Porsche is said to have been moved during the night.

According to the State Criminal Police Office, Pföhler must have suspected that his volunteer crisis team was completely overwhelmed and that the situation was no longer under control.

He just let things slide for now.

The public prosecutor's office is investigating Pföhler for negligent homicide by omission.

The legal clarification is still pending, but it is already clear that this is a case of serious political irresponsibility.

The supervisory authority should have kept a closer eye on Ahrweiler

In the investigative committee for the flood disaster, which the state parliament in Mainz set up in autumn, the impression could recently arise that the death of 134 people in the Ahr Valley was solely due to the failure of a municipal authority and its boss.

But that would be short-sighted.

There are many indications that the state of Rhineland-Palatinate has not sufficiently exercised its control function.

The crisis team in Ahrweiler was poorly prepared, not coordinated as a team, and for example there was no reporting chain, as is common elsewhere, through which municipalities along the river warn each other.

All of this should have been laid down in the flood alert and action plan that the district was legally obliged to draw up.

When the action plan was missing, it should have been called in - that didn't happen.

The responsible supervisory and service directorate ADD, which is to monitor municipalities and districts, should have kept a closer eye on Pföhler and the district administration.

Apparently, the ADD could have intervened more strongly on the night of the flood itself.

This is suggested by a legal opinion prepared for the committee of inquiry.

While the state government and the ADD initially defended themselves by saying that the district should have asked for help, the report clearly shows that there might even have been an obligation for the ADD to take over the situation.

At a certain point, the country can – and must – intervene in the guise of its supervisory authority.

A state needs trust, but it must not be blind

It would certainly not have been advisable to take control of the entire situation in the middle of the flood night, send the volunteers home and control the emergency services from the ADD headquarters in Trier.

However, the ADD could have offered more help – in terms of personnel and resources.

Again and again it was said in statements, including by Prime Minister Malu Dreyer, to the investigative committee that the assessment of the local forces had been relied on.

At a certain point, however, this can no longer be the case when a catastrophe reaches these proportions.

The state government argues that it was late in recognizing the extent of the disaster - the district should have sounded the alarm (which, inexplicably, it did not).

As unbelievable as it may sound in a high-tech country, for hours in Mainz no one knew that the world was going to end in Ahrweiler.

Political consequences only two years after the catastrophe?

There were clear warnings on the days before, at the latest with the dramatic forecasts of the State Office for the Environment in the afternoon before the flood night, those responsible should have been alarmed - in Ahrweiler and in Mainz.

The responsible Ministry of the Environment did not warn sufficiently in a press release that the situation in the Ahr Valley was becoming particularly acute, was not even mentioned.

An additional report was considered, but again rejected with reference to knowledge "on site".

The rest of the state government relied on the Ministry of the Environment.

A state needs trust, but it must not be blind.

The work of the committee of inquiry is far from over.

However, the weaknesses of flood protection have already become clear.

However, a commission of inquiry is to draw up the political consequences for reforms.

The state government does not want to amend the fire and disaster protection law until the final report from the commission is available.

That should be in the fall of next year.

Taking political action two years after a catastrophe is too late.