Can the world avoid a nuclear cyber catastrophe?

A researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace says that the world during the Cold War period was mainly threatened by nuclear weapons, and today this threat has shifted to other areas, most notably conventional and cyber weapons, and that the latter area has gradually risen to become important in international relations, a tool for statecraft, and a source of friction.

in the American magazine National Interest, researcher Ariel Elie Levitt in the International Affairs and Technology Program at the Carnegie Endowment explained

that there are 3 striking differences between a nuclear threat and a cyber threat:

First, unlike nuclear weapons, which have not been used in combat since World War II, at least some forms of cyberattack have become a normal part of life even in peacetime.

Second: Cyber ​​weapons have spread far and wide, not only in the hands of states and their agents, but also on many “criminal” entities.

Third: Electronic weapons have been created as an effective coercive tool that can produce more diverse effects, from the physical space through the digital world, to the cognitive domain.

However, as the recent Ukraine crisis and the ongoing nuclear epics with both North Korea and Iran have made abundantly clear, nuclear weapons have not faded away, but their agenda has become synergized with the rise of cyber weapons.

ominous possibilities

He added that one of the ominous possibilities, especially those associated with developments in the world of the Internet, is the emergence of cyber weapons as a threat to nuclear operations at the three levels: physical, digital and cognitive.

Cyber ​​weapons can disable or degrade the performance of auxiliary physical systems associated with nuclear weapons infrastructure (such as power supplies or early warning satellites), or undermine the performance of essential nuclear command and control functions at all levels of the hierarchy, affecting the ability to communicate across the chain of command, maintaining On positive controls over the nuclear arsenal, nuclear missions are conducted safely and reliably.

Cyber ​​weapons can also seriously affect situational awareness that supports nuclear decision-making, particularly in crises.

Perhaps most disturbingly, cyber weapons can inadvertently produce such effects, even against the wishes of the perpetrators of the attack.

Attractive cyber capabilities

Levitt pointed to the fact that there is a strong incentive for those who feel threatened by enemy nuclear weapons to have a clear understanding of the role, operations, deployment, plans and readiness of nuclear weapons, which leads them to strive vigorously to reveal their secrets by employing human and technical means.

Of course, the unique qualities of cyber capabilities make them particularly attractive for this purpose.

The researcher also said that the temptation to use cyber weapons for a first strike would be great, especially if it could be assumed that such an attack could be carried out effectively, while avoiding the need to think of more dangerous means (conventional and especially nuclear) to accomplish this task.

The merger of some nuclear and conventional assets - such as early warning and command and control structures - increases the potential for such destabilizing developments.

In addition, it is necessary to consider a scenario in which a third party carries out an electronic operation against a nuclear command and control structure, with the aim of pitting the other parties against each other.

We have already seen "fake" cyber attacks against non-nuclear targets.

Hence, it seems entirely plausible that such a scenario should occur in the nuclear field as well, inasmuch as its consequences could be much more serious.

How can disaster be avoided?

As for answering the question whether a nuclear cyber catastrophe can be avoided?

The researcher said that the natural starting point for addressing the risks inherent in the link between cyber and nuclear space is to acknowledge its existence and think about its possible consequences, noting that such recognition may face serious resistance on the grounds that it may attract significant negative attention to problems that are best dealt with in Secrets are not good for quick fixes, and some options to address these risks will be expensive, time-consuming, and involve painful operational and political trade-offs.

He added that while all options merited serious consideration, none easily presented themselves as suitable for immediate and direct implementation.

So, realistically, the world may have to make a real call to action and motivate the parties involved to overcome institutional and political reticence to think seriously about steps to deal with these risks in ways that may seem unpredictable in advance.